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ABSTRACT
Portability, or the right of a terminating employee
to transfer pension assets to a succeeding pension plan,
has been offered as a means of enabling the mobile employee
to participate in the private pension system.

Extension

of the private pension system to include coverage of mobile
workers would permit achievement of two economically
desirable goalss

(1) labor mobility with pension preser

vation and (2) provision of an adequate and secure retire
ment income for the United States labor force.
Although the portability concept has been a popular
and controversial pension reform issue during the past
decade, it has not been widely understood by legislators
and pension experts and has been criticized as excessively
costly and complex as well as being unnecessary.

The

purpose of this study is to develop a clear definition of
portability and to examine the implications, desirability
and feasibility of establishing a national system for the
transfer of pension credits.

In addition, other pension

reform issues (including vesting, funding, insurance of
unfunded liabilities, disclosure and fiduciary responsi
bility), their relationship to portability, pending
portability legislation and limited and full portability
systems are examined.

The methodology includes a review
viii

of pertinent literature, interviews with staff members
of Congressional Committees working in the area of pension
reform, interviews with representatives of the private
pension industry, an examination of Congressional hearings
to determine the position on pension reform of unions and
private industry lobbyists and the calculation of fund and
annuity simulations and sample transfer values.
Several major conclusions were forthcoming from
this study.

First, portability is a desirable option for

a limited group of mobile employees and can be implemented
on a voluntary basis, preferably through the provision of
the direct tax free transfer of funds.

Second, portability

is unnecessary and too costly and complicated for the
majority of the working population.

Major hindering com

plications include the prevalent practice of underfunding,
possible benefit level fluctuations and the nonforfeitability
status of transferred pension assets.

Finally, requiring

universal portability immediately would impose excessive
restrictions on the private pension system, possibly re
ducing that system's flexibility and growth potential.

The

intricate technical and mechanical problems cannot be
solved instantaneously.

Rather, the portability concept

must be developed slowly with a long period of maturation
in order to achieve portability's full potential as a
valuable management tool for the provision of a secure,
adequate retirement income for the United States labor force.
ix

INTRODUCTION
Need for the Study of the
Portability Concept
The private pension industry in the United States
achieved its major growth during the past two and onehalf decades as a result of the general public's increased
need for retirement income.

The American labor force,

no longer provided for during old age by the family unit,
has become increasingly independent and self-subsistent
in terms of financial capacity after retirement.

The

demise of extended family groups, combined with high-cost
urban living and a constantly increasing standard of
living have compounded the economic problems of retire
ment,

Old age income typically is derived from Social

Security benefits

(or other government-sponsored programs),

personal savings and private pensions.

In the past, the

mobile worker has had to rely on Social Security benefits
and personal savings as the primary source of retirement
income.

Recent developments in the private pension

industry and in the area of federal legislative actions
may allow even the mobile worker to realize benefits from
private pension plans.
Portability, or the right of a terminating
employee to transfer pension assets to a succeeding pension

pension plan, has been suggested as one means of enabling
the mobile employee to participate in the private pension
system.

Preservation of pension benefits is widely

accepted as an employee's right, i.e., private pensions
are a form of deferred wages.

Recognition of this concept

is evident not only within the ranks of the pension
industry, but also among the nation's employers.

In

addition, the need for increased pension coverage as
an expression of corporate social responsibility has moti
vated pension reform advocates to seek a way of providing
all workers, including the mobile and transient, with an
adequate retirement income.

Such attitudes and objectives

as these may entail the implementation of a portability
system.
Increased Public Interest
As dependence on the private pension industry for
adequate retirement income has increased, so has public
interest in pension reform.

Widely publicized incidents

such as unfulfilled pension expectations and pension fund
abuses and frauds have stimulated considerable concern
that there is a need for enactment of pension reform
legislation.

Specifically, proponents contend that reform

is required to prevent benefit losses arising from unfair
eligibility requirements, fund inadequacy and misuse, plan
terminations,

incomplete disclosure of employee benefit

accruals and inappropriate or imprudent management of
pension funds.

Moreover, support for reform is extensive.

3
It is no longer a few college professors and
radical extremists who are pointing out short-comings
in the private pension system.
Leaders of government
across the political spectrum are talking about the
problems.
Journalists are writing about them in
our daily newspapers.
And the man on the street
is concerned.
Lack of Understanding of the Portability Concent
Various government reports indicate that Congressional
interest in the portability concept has been evident since

1965 when a special private pension fund study committee
reported to President Lyndon B. Johnson that portability
was "worthy of serious study to help fulfill the long
range promise of the private pension system."

Although

the portability concept achieved prominence as a pension
reform issue in 1965» 'fc^ie mechanics of the system have
not been "widely understood" by legislators . J

Hearings

on pension reform held during the 92d Congress by the
Senate Labor Subcommittee support the conclusion that
the transfer concept is not sufficiently developed to
A

Donald S. Grubbs, "An Adequate Retirement Income
for Every American," Address presented at the Society
of Actuaries Regional Meeting, New Orleans, Louisiana,
March 20, 1972, p. 1.
(Mimeographed)
2

President's Committee on Corporate Pension Funds
and Other Private Retirement and Welfare Programs,
Public
Policy and Private Pension Programs. A Report to the
President on Private Employee Retirement Plans (Wash
ington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1965), P* vii,
forward,
-^Mike Gordon, Minority Counsel to the Senate Sub
committee on Labor and Aid to Senator Jacob K. Javits,
private interview, Washington, D.C., August 9, 1972.

permit legislation of full portability:
The hearings demonstrated that although the right
of an employee to carry his pension credits is
another aspect of the private pension plan system in
the U.S. which must be closely examined, it is a
complex area and one which requires further and
exhaustive consideration before solutions become
feasible.
Understanding of the portability concept has not
improved to date in the 93d Congress.

Early in 1973* and

in recognition of the complexity of portability, Rep.
Tom Railsback (R— 111.) introduced legislation which
"directs that a portability study be undertaken."-^

In

addition, the Hearings conducted by the House General
Subcommittee on Labor on pension reform further demonstrate
the need for an examination of the portability concept:
"there appears to be considerable confusion among Congress
men as to what is to be 'ported*— service credits or vested
benefits,"^

Finally, to facilitate development of the

portability concept, the U.S. House of Representatives
appropriated funds for the House Pension Study Task Force
of the House General Committee on Education and Labor
h,

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Interim Report of Activities of the Private
Welfare and Pension Plan Study, by the Subcommittee on
Labor, S. Rept. 92- 634 , 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1971» p. 84-.
-%.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Rep.
Tom Railsback speaking for pension reform, H.R. 934, 935»
93d Cong., 1st sess., January 9* 1973* Congressional
Record, CXIX, Elll.
^"Dent Opens Hearings on H.R. 2 a n d H . R , 462— >
Pension Reform Legislation," Employee Benefit Plan Review
Research Reports. Weekly News Digest. XXI. No. 8 (February
23, 1973), 3.

to conduct a study of portability and reinsurance during
the 93d Congress.

In short, there has not been sufficient

examination and analysis of the portability concept to
permit the drafting of a workable legislative proposal
for the adoption of a portable pension system.
In addition to the misconceptions, associated with
portability on the legislative front, the system is mis
construed in equal measure by the pension industry.

In

referring to these confused interpretations of portability,
several experts have commented:
It is also much used by all persons actually
involved in private pension plans, such as pension
consultants, insurance companies, banks, employers,
employees and officials of labor unions.
To each
of these various p e r s o n s ' p o r t a b i l i t y ' seems to
mean something different.
It's catghy, but it's been used to describe too
many things.
Scope of the Study of the
Portability Concept
The purpose of this study is to develop a clear
definition of portability and to examine the implications
of establishing a national system for the transfer of
pension credits.

In addition, the desirability and

feasibility of a transfer system will be explored.

Porta

bility is only one solution to the problem of private
^Norman H. Tarver, "Preservation of Pension Benefits,
Best's Review; Life and Health Insurance Edition, LXXII,
No. 11 (March, 1972), 22.
O

Jay Kobler,"Pension Reform and the Life Insurance
Industry,"
Best's Review; Life and Health Insurance
Edition, LXXII, No. 5 (September, 1971). 72.

pension preservation for a mobile U.S. labor force and may
not, in fact, be the most appropriate alternative.

Finally,

the future of pending portability legislation and both
limited and full portability systems will be examined.
Part I:

Development of the Portability Concept
Part I of this study includes the theoretical and

historical justification of the portability concept.
Particular emphasis is given to the debate within the
pension industry regarding the proper categorization of
pension fund contributions as either a gratuity or a form
of deferred wages.

Next, the advantages and disadvan

tages of the portability concept as presented in financial
and business journals and Congressional hearings are
separated from other pension reform issues for discussion
purposes.

Then, since portability usually is referred

to as in integral part of a legislative reform package,
the relationship between the transfer concept and other
pension reform proposals is delineated.

The final

chapter in Part I analyzes the changing political environ
ment for pension reform.

Although portability has been a

prominent part of comprehensive pension reform efforts
since the 89 th Congress, there has been little Congressional
action in the area of general pension reform.

Pressure is

building., however, for passage of some form of private
pension regulation in the 93d Congress.

Part II:

Growth of the Portability Concept
Although a national portability system has not

been legislated in the United States, the portability
technique is utilized in varying degrees in Europe,
Canada and, as a more limited form, in the U.S.

The

adaptability of these existing prototypes for use in the
U.S. as well as other suggested portability mechanisms
are discussed and assessed in Part II of this study in
terms of feasibility of implementation.
Since the mechanical and technical workability
of a national transfer system has been subject to such
wide criticism, the problems encountered in implementing
a portability system are evaluated by means of sample
simulations in a separate chapter in Part II.

Particular

emphasis is given to the problems of funding, annuity level
fluctuation and benefit status.
Finally, Part II includes an analysis of the
portability segments of the three major pension reform
bills before the 93d Congress.

As indicated by the review,

the portability portions of the bills represent completely
contrasting philosophies of implementation.
Methodology
The methodology of this study includes
of pertinent literature,

(1) a review

(2) interviews with staff mem

bers of Congressional Committees working in the area of
pension reform,

(3) interviews with representatives of the

private pension industry,

(^) an examination of Congres-

sional hearings to determine the position of unions and
private industry lobbyists and (5) the calculation of
fund and annuity simulations and sample transfer values.
Intent of the Study of the
Portability Concept
An intensive and comprehensive study of the porta
bility concept, its implications and problems of mechanical
implementation, should provide the basis for furthering
a broader understanding of portable pensions.

The problem

of the complexity of the portability technique, as well
as the question of whether a transfer system actually is
needed for pension preservation, must be resolved before
legislators can draft a workable proposal for portable
pensions.

Accordingly, delineation of the technical

problems involved in transferring pension assets from
one fund to a subsequent fund should provide a reliable
procedural guide for future attempts to implement portable
pension systems on both a national and limited basis.

PART I
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PORTABILITY CONCEPT

CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION
FOR PORTABLE PENSIONS
Bases of Confusion Related to Portability
The concept of portable pensions has received wide
attention in the past decade from legislators, the private
pension industry, unions, the press and the general
public.

The focus of this interest is the evaluation of

the portability concept as the solution to the problem of
providing an adequate and secure retirement income for
a mobile American labor force.
The definition of portability generally accepted
by pension experts and legislators is stated as the
right of a terminating employee to transfer the assets
supporting his pension credits to a succeeding pension
plan.*

Despite the universality of this definition, there

is still confusion with respect to the inherent nature
of the portable pension concept.
■^Similar definitions may be found in Jay Kobler,
'Tension Reform and the Life Insurance Industry,"
Best*s
Review; Life and Health Insurance Edition, LXXII, No. 5
(September, 1971)» 72, and U.S., Congress, House, Com
mittee on Ways and Means, Tax Proposals Affecting Private
Pension Plans. Hearings, before the Committee on Ways and
Means, House of Representatives, on H.R. 12272, 92d Cong.,
2d sess., 1972, p. 580.
10

Two bases of confusion about portability arise from,
first, attempts to assess the implications of portability
and, second, misconceptions about the means by which the
transfer can be effected.

This lack of understanding of

portable pensions is clearly stated by Mrs. Jozetta Srb
in her analysis of portable pensions:
Portability has become a key issue but there may
be confusion about what is meant by the term.
Over
the past few years, it has become popular to refer to
any pensions in which rights are retained by employees
changing jobs before retirement as 'portable' r e 
gardless of whether credits are actually carried to
another plan, left in 'cold storage,' or simply
result from participation in a plan concerning the
employees of two or more financially unrelated em
ployers.
Semantically, the British term 'pension
preservation' describes the general grouping more
accurately; but portable pension and portability
are well-established in American journals and despite
the more careful use of terms in the current debate
over pension reform, they remain ambiguous.
Misinterpretations
The confusion about the implications and mode
of portability has been further inflated by disagreements
as to what exactly does constitute portability.

A number

of alternative pension arrangements have erroneously been
called portable pensions.

The term portability frequently

is used either to describe restricted forms of pension
credit transferrability or mistakenly equated with other
private pension concepts.
p

Such inaccurate usage of pension

Jozetta H. Srb, Portable Pensions; A Review of the
Issues, Industrial and Labor Relations Library, Key Issue
Series— No. 4 (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Public Information Center,
School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University,
1969), p. 2.

terminology in areas such as multiemployer plans, reci
procal agreements, vested benefits and preservation of
pension benefits has created considerable misunderstanding
in connection with portable pensions.
Multiemployer Plans.— Limited portability is
found in multiemployer plans.

In a multiemployer plan,

two or more employers (often financially unrelated) act
as one employer for pension plan purposes;

i.e., one master

t

pension plan serves several employers.

The benefits provi

ded by such a plan either can be insured or managed under
a trust agreement, with trustees representing all the
employers.

Uniform benefits and plan financing among

participating employers are implicit in this form of
pension arrangement.

If an employee changes jobs

within the participating employer group, maintenance of
his pension benefits is guaranteed.

In the strictest

sense, portability does not exist in a multiemployer
plan since a transfer does not take place.

Nevertheless,

since the goal of benefit security for a mobile labor
force is accomplished through the multiemployer plan,
partial portability can be said to be achieved, limited
only by the number of participating employers.

In fact,

early conceptions of portability largely were within the
sphere of multiemployer plans.
A . . . means of overcoming the obstacle to labor
mobility is the adoption of 'portable* pension

13
credits within the scope of a multiemployer pension
program.
Reciprocal Agreements.— Another means by which
portability can be accomplished on a limited basis is
through the reciprocity agreement, an arrangement between
nonuniform plans by which employees are allowed to move
from one plan to another without losing pension credits.
Reciprocal arrangements are frequently made under col
lective bargaining agreements.

An employee who changes

jobs within the participating employer group generally
enters the succeeding pension plan with some accrued credit
for prior year's service.

This accrued credit can be based

on the formula of the pension plan of either the first
employer or the second employer, depending on the terms
of the reciprocal agreement.

There exist many variations

of credit transfer, but the important feature of all
reciprocal agreements is that at least some credit in the
succeeding plan is allowed for an employee's prior ser
vice with a preceding participating employer.
There is an infinite variety of methods through which
this limited form of portability can be accomplished.

For

example, an actual fund transfer can be made at the time of
employee termination.

Or, the fund transfer can be de

ferred for a specified waiting period (e.g., five years).
Alternatively, the transfer can be delayed until the employee
•^Robert C. Miljus and Alton C. Johnson, "MultiEmployer Pensions and Labor Mobility," Harvard Business
Review^(September-October, 1963), p. 1^7*

retires under the final plan.

At that time, complete

settlement among participating employers is made on behalf
of the retiree, with the last employer acting as the admin
istrator of the total retirement benefit.

As still

another illustration, some reciprocity agreements require
that there be no actual fund transfer upon the termination
of any particular employee.

Rather, a bookkeeping

transfer records individual terminations and actual net
fund transfers are made only periodically.

Again, as in

the case of multiemployer plans, mobility of labor
with benefit preservation is limited by the number of
participating employers.
Broadening of portability of pension rights through
reciprocity agreements probably accomplishes a great
deal for the workers governed by them.
In industries
and occupations where a high proportion of the labor
force is likely to spend their entire working career
within their industry or occupation, workers stand
to benefit most. . . .
The strongest attraction of reciprocity for
strengthening pension plan protection lies in the
fact that it permits the integration of coverage
despite wide diversity iri plan provisions.
Vesting.— In addition to the confusion centering
around limited portability as provided by multiemployer
plans and reciprocity arrangements is the misconception
created when portability is used interchangeably with the
concept of vesting.

Vesting is the right of an employee

to the benefit attributable to his employer's contributions
^Walter W. Kolodrubetz, "Reciprocity and Pension
Portability," Monthly Labor Review, XCI, No. 9 (September,
1968), 28.

under a pension plan in the event of his termination of
employment prior to retirement.

The assets supporting the

vested right remain in the original employer's fund and there
is no transfer of funds to a succeeding employer.

Retire

ment checks are issued from the fund of the employer
whose contributions have become vested.

An employee who

has accrued vested benefits from several employers will
receive upon retirement a separate check from each employer
involved.

Vesting therefdre differs from portability in

two ways:

(1) there is no transfer of funds between

previous and succeeding employers and (2) there is no
combination of all earlier employers' pension credits by
the final employer for the dispensation of retirement
benefits by one check.
Despite these differences, vesting and portability
are frequently used interchangeably as is indicated in
testimony at recent Congressional hearings:
Portability is nothing but a way of implementing
a vesting provision.
It is not something that is
separate and apart from vesting.
Pension Preservation.— Some pension experts view
portability in a much broader perspective than that of the
right of a terminating employee to transfer the assets
supporting his pension credits to a succeeding pension
plan.

Rather, portability is viewed as the maintenance

'’U.S. , Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Private Pension Bills, Hearings before
a Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Senate, on S. 3598, S. 302^, S. 3012 and
Other Bills, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, p. 195*

of pension benefits or as the prevention of "loss of
accrued benefits."^

The primary proponent of a liberal

interpretation of the concept of portability is Norman
H. Tarver, a Canadian pension expert employed by The
Manufacturers Life Insurance Company in connection with
the administration of predominantly U.S. pension plans.
I suggest that portability means the preservation
of pension benefits that have become vested in an
employee at the time he terminates-participation in
a qualified plan. . . •
Where and how the preservation of vested benefits
takes place is irrelevant to the definition;
the
vested benefits may be preserved where they have
accumulated or they may be transferred and preserved
elsewhere.
'Portability' is thus nothing more^or
less than the preservation of vested benefits.
General Definition of Portability
Although the goal of benefit security for the
mobile worker possibly may be attained through sound vesting
practices, it is generally agreed that portability trans
cends the theory of vesting because portable pensions
involve the transfer of asset values.
Achievement of 'portability' means in pension termin
ology, the development of arrangements by which a
worker could accumulate private pension credits from
job to job and eventually combine them into a quali
fication for a single pension.
^"Legislative Forum," Pension and Welfare News,
VIII, No. 9 (September, 1972), 6 3 .
"^Norman H. Tarver, "Preservation of Pension
Benefits," Best's Review; Life and Health Insurance
Edition, LXXII, No. 11 (March, 1972), 22.
O

American Enterprise Institute, Issues Affecting
Pensions (Washington, D.C.i
American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1971)f P» 17*

The term E portability or portable pensions 3 is
appropriately used to describe an employee's right
to transfergpension credits from one pension plan
to another.
Implications of Definition of Portability
In contrast to the general definitional acquiescence
of portable pensions, the implications of portability are
more difficult to resolve.
include

Three such major problem areas

(1) implementation of the transfer of funds,

(2) creation of tax liabilities and (3) determination of
transfer values.
There are two general ways by which a fund transfer
can be implemented:
from one qualified
fied pension plan,

(1) a direct transfer can take place

10

pension plan to a succeeding quali

(2) the transfer can be indirect

through a central clearinghouse.

A central clearinghouse

would act as a depository for the assets supporting the
pension credits of a terminating employee.

When a

succeeding employer is found by the terminated employee
and any specified waiting period requirement is met,
the pension assets with any accrued interest are then
transferred to the succeeding employer's plan.

If no

succeeding employer is involved, the clearinghouse can be
o

Srb, Portable Pensions, p. 2.

*0A pension plan is accorded a "qualified" status
by the Internal Revenue Service under Section *K)1 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 195^ when certain standards of
contract formality, nondiscrimination and benefit determina
tion are met.
The purpose of "qualification" is to allow
an employer to deduct pension contributions within speci
fied limits as ordinary business expenses for federal income
tax purposes.

used as the final administrator of pension benefits; i.e.,
the clearinghouse would secondarily serve as a private
pension plan.

The form of a central clearinghouse could

be wholly private, governmental in arrangement or some
combination of a private and public agency.
The necessity of working out a means of transferring
funds as one of the perplexing implications of portability
brings out a second problem involved with portability.
In a direct transfer of funds from one employer to another
employer, there may be a lapse of time during which the
terminating employee involved gains "constructive receipt
of the funds."

Under the present federal income tax laws,

such access to the pension assets would require that the
fund assets be taxed as ordinary income.

Since pension

assets for even an individual can involve rather large
amounts, it probably would be difficult for the terminating
employee to meet the tax obligation, especially since the
assets being taxed would eventually be going into another
fund and therefore not be available as a means of satisfying
the tax liability.

A federal income tax revision would

be necessary to realistically allow direct pension fund
transfers; i.e., the direct transfer being allowed as a
nontaxable negotiation.
A third implication of the portability concept,
and one which is often considered the most difficult,
is the definition of the transfer value.

The benefit pro

visions of the numerous private pension plans are extremely

varied since each plan is usually individually tailored
to meet a particular employer's needs.

In addition to

the lack of benefits and option uniformity, each plan is
subject to a variety of financing levels and actuarial
assumptions**

which may make an equitable transfer of

benefits complicated.
Having established a definition of portability, it
is to these complex implications of portability that this
paper is directed.

Realistic feasibility of portable

pensions and the facilitation of asset transfer must be
addressed.

It is necessary, however, to first establish

the relationship of portability to the entire private
pension movement through both the historical and theore
tical framework.
Historical and Theoretical Perspective
Growth of the Private Pension Industry
The private pension industry has enjoyed incom
parable growth since World War II.

In the past decade

alone, pension assets have tripled in size, growing from
$52.0 billion in 1961 to $152.8 billion in 1972.*2

More

11

Actuarial assumptions include the mortality rate,
interest, retirement rate, disability rate, withdrawal
rate, new entrant rate, salary scales, marital status and
expense loading.
These assumptions are chosen on the basis
of individual experience of the plan to facilitate plan
financing,
12

"Tighter Rules for Private Pensions--The Out
look Mow," U.S. Mews and World Report, October 2, 1972,
p. 60 .

than 32 million workers representing 55 percent of the
work force are covered by private pension plans . ^
The causes for this rapid growth are possibly as
numerous as the number of plans in existence.

Individual

employers are motivated to provide a pension plan to meet
varying needs and the pension industry has responded
by allowing wide latitude in tailoring individual plans.
In general terms, however, the commonly cited causes for
the establishment of a pension plan include the tax benefits
of a qualified plan, flexibility in financing plan benefits
and the ability to provide fringe benefits.

The pension

system "provides a very large leverage on the basic pension
1ju,
dollar"
in four wayss
(1) tax exemption of employer
pension contributions,

(2) accrual of interest and capital

gains on those contributions,

(3) tax exemption of the

earnings and capital gains of the pension fund and (4) partial deferment of total funding.

J

The ability to defer

payment for pension benefit credits granted for past service allows a "quick startup"

16

of the plan with equitable

^ " B L S Survey Indicates 55 % of Private Workforce
Covered Under Pension Plans," Recent Developments in
Pension Benefits, Employee Benefit Plan Review Research
Reports, October 10. 1971* p. 1*
1h
James A. Curtis, "How Should the Pension Pie
Be Sliced?" Pension and Welfare N e w s , VII, No. 9
(September, 1971)* 32.
^ T o maintain a qualified status, an employer need
only pay the interest on the initial unfunded liability,
i.e., the cost of benefits granted employees for service
prior to the inception of the plan.
^Curtis,

"Pension Pie," p. 32.
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"benefits for long-service employees close to retirement
by requiring the employer to fund only future service bene
fits on a current basis and allowing a gradual amortization
of the past service liability created by the plan's instal
lation.

From a social welfare point of view, if the same

level of employer contributions were made to a savings
plan instead of a pension plan, the social benefit of
providing retirement income would be deferred a generation.
It is this distinctive feature of the private pension
system, which allows deferment of funding for pension
credits for service prior to the effective date of the plan,
along with the tax relief feature, that has motivated
employers to choose the private pension form as a desirable
means of providing fringe benefits.
The provisions of pension plans have consistently
been liberalized from year to year.

Employers have sought

to broaden the scope of existing benefits by adding such
features as increased vesting, death benefits, disability
benefits,

spouse benefits and increased retirement benefits.

There also has been a trend either to reduce or eliminate
employee contributions to pension funds with the result
that plans are becoming largely noncontributory.
addition,

18

In

the eligibility requirements for both partici-

"*■"^Bankers Trust Company, 1970 Study of Industrial
Retirement Plans (New Yorks
Bankers Trust Company, New
York, 1970), pp. 12-29.
18Ibid., p. 10.
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pating and receiving benefits have been liberalized by
lowering the age and service requirements.

19

If the trend

of liberalizing fringe benefits continues, future ex
pansions could lead to provision of portable pensions as
the ultimate fringe benefit.

This especially would be

applicable to mature pension plans, with sound benefit,
vesting and financing practices, that might attempt
to increase employee benefits through the portability
concept.
The Deferred Wage-Gratuity Debate
Both the portability concept and the practice of
vesting are related irrevocably to the controversy of
whether pension fund contributions are a form of deferred
wages or are a gratuity from employers.

Pension benefits

prior to World War II largely were viewed as a reward
for an employee's long and faithful service and even were
used as a means of compelling the long service and faith
fulness of employees.

If pensions are viewed as a gratuity,

there is little support theoretically for the provision
of pension benefits to terminated employees through either
vesting or portability.

If, on the other hand, pension

contributions are considered to be a form of wages
for service rendered, then forfeiture of these rights by
an employee upon termination prior to retirement is illogi
cal.

Under the Deferred Wage Theory, the employee has
19Ibid., p. 9.

a right to the pension benefits he has earned.

Preservation

of these rights can be accomplished either through the
vested pension or the portable pension.
Although the deferred wage-gratuity controversy
is predominantly settled within the ranks of employers
and the private pension industry, who have accorded
pension contributions the status of earned wages, there
are a few remaining who feel that pensions are a gift made
by the employer.

The views of this minority typify the

arguments presented by earlier pension experts who supported
this "non-deferred compensation concept."

20

For example,

Kenneth Anderson of the Bank of America in a television in
terview pointed out that pensions are and have been volun
tary on the part of the employer and are of the nature
of a gift and, as such, private pensions are not subject
to legislation.

21

The concept of pensions as deferred

wages is weakened by the fact that many employers make
pension plan contributions in addition to paying fully
competitive wages.

Taking a somewhat more middle position,

Richard C. Keating, president of A.S. Hansen, a well-known
pension consulting firm, feels that although the gratuity
po

Charles D. Spencer, "One Answer to Bernstein's
Proposals to Transform Private Pension System," Recent
Developments in Pension Benefits, Employee Benefit Plan
Review Research Reports, M a r c h 6 , 1970, pp. 1-2.
2 1 "NBC Reports," N.B.C. Telecast, September 12,
1972 1 "Pensions*
The Broken Promise,"
Narrator,
Edwin Newman.

2k

concept is "repugnant," the wage position is "untenable."
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Every pension plan also has an insurance element,
the spreading of risk.
Just as life insurance protects
against the hazard of premature death, so a pension
plan protects against the hazard of too long life.
So long as some retirees die at age 66 and some
others die at age 105 » complete equity in 'return
of wages' cannot be achieved. . . .
In connection with a pension plan or any other
form of insurance, the 'part of wages' concept is
a metaphor.
Contributions to the plan are part 2o
of wages to the group but not to the individual. ^
Mr. Keating urges that the idea of viewing the
entire benefit package as a whole should be considered.
To support this argument, he gave an example of an employer
contribution to a pension plan and a group insurance plan.
The pension plan contribution is more important to the
sixty year old employee than to the thirty year old employee.
On the other hand, the group insurance contribution is
more important to the thirty year old employee than to
the sixty year old employee.

2k

When viewing the entire

fringe benefit package as a whole, it would be difficult
to separate pension contributions as deferred wages.
Direct Support for the Deferred Wage Theory.— In
spite of the cogent arguments of part of the private pension
industry, there are both direct and indirect indications that
pensions now are being considered a part of deferred wages.
22

Richard C. Keating, "Employee Expectations in
Private Pension Plans," Pension and Welfare N e w s , VII,
No, 11 (November, 1971)*
23Ibid., p. 5 1 .
2^Ibid.

The

following statements from varying sources signify the
sidespread support for the Deferred Wage Theory:
These E private pension 3 plans are2collective
arrangements for redistributing income. ^
I.W. Abel, president of the United Steelworkers
of America, sees it differently.
Said Mr. Abelt
'When a worker is deprived of his deferred com
pensation each time he loses his job, he has been
unfairly and unjustly deprived of part of his
earnings.*
Pension accumulation should be considered as de
ferred compensation, and therefore, regular employer
contributions to a retirement fund are, in fact,
a normal charge against cost of production rather
than a charge against fringe benefits. '
Herbert Denenberg, Pennsylvania State Insurance
Commissioner:
'It is the employee's money.'
There is almost universal agreement that pensions
are not regarded as gifts or rewards from the
employer.
At hearings of the Subcommittee on Labor
in July, 1971» several witnesses emphatically
reiterated that they and their employers regarded
the pension contribution by the employer as remuner
ation due the workers for services performed in the
same category as wages earned. ^
^"Joint Economic Committee Staff Report on
Pensions Indicts System as Thoroughly Irrational and Inef
ficient," Employee Benefit Plan Review Research Reports,
December, 19o£, p. 1«

26 "New Pressures to Safeguard Pensions:

Are Many
Retirement Plans a 'Cruel Hoax?*"
U.S. News and World
Report, LXXI (October 11, 1971)* ^2.

27

1Arthur H. Hale, Pensions for Professionals,
Inc., Unpublished description of portable pension plan
in the process of being established, Washington, D.C.,
August 15* 1972, p. 7. (Mimeographed)

^®"NBC Reports," September 12, 1972.
29
7U.S,, Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Interim Report of Activities of the Private
Welfare and Pension Plan Study, by the Subcommittee on
Labor, S. Rept. 92 - 634 , 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1971* p. 13*
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For many it's self-evident that pension costs are
a form of wages.
They're subject to union bargaining
as are wages; and they're received by employees as
are wages.
Pension fund contributions were first accorded
collective bargaining status in 19^8 with the historic
Inland Steel Ruling in which the National Labor Relations
Board defined wages as "emoluments of value, like pension
and insurance benefits which may accrue to employees out
of their employment relationship."-^1

Since that time,

pension fund contributions have been widely accepted as
part of the wage package.

Speaking before the Association

of Private Pension and Welfare Plans in Detroit, Rep.
Martha W. Griffith (D— Mich.) commented,

"As for the funds

belonging to the employee, I would hate to see what the
wage settlements would have been in the absence of such
'fringe benefits.'
A final indication that contributions made to a
pension fund are a form of wages is provided in Phase II,
the Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971»
which places a ceiling of 5*5 percent on wage increases,
which includes contributions made by an employer to
pension and welfare plans.

In order that new plan for-

J Peter M. Flanigan, "A View of Pensions from the
White House," Financial Executive.February, 1972, p. 18.

31

U.S., Congress, Joint Committee of Labor
Management Relations, "Report of the Joint Committee of
Labor Management Relations," 80th Cong., 2d sess., 19^8,
pp. 9^-95."
•^Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans,
Inc., Capitol Report, September, 1971» P» 5*
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mations would not be inhibited by this restriction, a special
exception had to be included in the Act--Section 302.-^
Indirect Support for the Deferred Wage Theory.— In
addition to the statements of direct support for the
Deferred Wage Theory, there are several indirect indica
tions that pension fund contributions are being considered
as deferred wages not only in theory, but also in practice.
For example, the fact that formal contracts have been
developed for pension plans reflects the idea that pensions
have changed from a gift to a right.

Second, pensions as

deferred wages are being supported in courts on the
principle of promissory estoppel, the concept that justi
fiable expectations cannot be denied if the employee
under question acted upon those expectations.

A third

indication of the increasing support for pension fund
contributions as deferred wages is found in the form of
the broad liberalization of benefit provisions.

Increased

vesting, preretirement and postretirement death benefits,
addition of early retirement and disability benefits as
well as salary-based benefit increases all support the
contention that pension fund contributions are in practice
considered deferred wages, and thus nonforfeitable.

If

the liberalization had been strictly a basic benefit
-^Norman H. Tarver, "Proposals for the Improvement
of the Private Pension Plan System," Unpublished study
prepared for the Senate Subcommittee on Labor for Hearings
on S. 3598, Toronto, Canada, 1972, p. 21.

expansion, forfeitable upon termination, there would be
no indication that acceptance of pensions as deferred
wages has been gained.
Conclusion
Although there are a few persons who would still
like to consider pensions as a gratuity, the evidence is
overwhelmingly in support of pension fund contributions as
deferred wages.

The legal environment has moved its

support from pensions as gifts to redefining wages as
including pension contributions.

The private pension

industry and employers have added their assent to the
change verbally as well as tacitly through extended plan
formalization and coverage.

With the deferred wage-gratuity

conflict now largely seen as an historical debate, the
irrevocable right of employees to their pensions is well
established.

As a solution to the problems of how this

right can best be effected, the portable pension concept
has been developed.

Whether or not portable pensions

are the best solution is yet to be determined.

Toward

this end, the traditional arguments both for and against
portability will be presented in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II
PREVAILING POSITIONS ON THE PORTABILITY
CONCEPT
Arguments Against Portability
Portability Deemed Unnecessary
The arguments against portability are quite per
suasive i generally concentrating on the complexity and
cost of implementing a portability system.

But perhaps

one of the most difficult arguments to counter realisti
cally is the contention that portability really may be
unnecessary.

If the ultimate goals of the private pension

system are wide employee coverage and benefit security, then
these goals may be met just as effectively by sound funding
and vesting provisions.

This position was stated suscinctly

during recent House hearings by the representatives of the
i
Treasury Department.
We find difficulty in a portability solution that
would be feasible for many plans.
We thought that
the greatest problem was that of assuring the retire
ment income to a person who might otherwise lose it.
Whether he gets that retirement income from two
•^The Treasury Department has been active in drafting
pension legislative proposals on behalf of the Nixon Admin
istration.
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employers or one employer is not as important as
whether he is assured of getting it.
The belief that the only advantage to portability
is that the ultimate retirement income would come from one
rather than several sources is widely supported.

Even leg

islative representatives who have sponsored portability legis
lation in the past have admitted that portability may not
be necessary.

Michael Gordon, Minority Counsel to the Senate

Subcommittee on Labor which currently is sponsoring a volun
tary clearinghouse (as part of S. *<•), said that the porta
bility provisions of legislation are the weakest part of their
pension reform bill.

He pointed out that the main intent of

legislation is to provide minimum standards to prevent major
abuses and if vesting standards are provided, then major
abuses will be eliminated.

Even the very mobile worker is

at least partially protected.

Vance Anderson, Special Coun

sel to the House General Subcommittee on Labor, who currently
is working with the House Special Task Force on Pensions, up
held the contention that there is no valid need for portabill±

ity if sound vesting and funding exist.

Both of these

specialists in pension legislation implied that portability
O

U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means,
Tax Proposals Affecting Private Pension Plans. Hearings.
before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Repre
sentatives, on H.R. 12272, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, p. 102.
-^Michael Gordon, Minority Counsel to the Senate
Subcommittee on Labor and Aid to Senator Jacob K. Javits,
private interview, Washington, D.C., August 9» 1972.
^Vance Anderson, Special Counsel, House General
Subcommittee on Labor, private interview, Washington,
D.C.*
August 10, 1972.

could be a very future reality, but presently it simply
is not feasible because the private pension system is not
ready for portability.
It is clear, therefore, that before portability
can be accepted as an integral part of the private pension
system, effective, strong levels of vesting and funding
must be achieved.

By definition, when an employee ter

minates, the only pension cre'dits which he can claim
are those which are vested.

The only pension credits,

therefore that a terminated employee could "port" to a
succeeding employer are those benefits which are rightfully
his, that is, his vested benefits.

In addition, if the

vested benefits are not funded; i.e., there are no assets
to support the liabilities created by the benefit promise,
there would be no assets to transfer.

Alternatively,

if any portion of the total liabilities under the plan are
unfunded and an asset transfer is made on behalf of a
terminating employee, the financial sufficiency of the
plan with regard to earned benefits payable in the future
may be in a precarious position.
Portability also is alleged to be unnecessary for
additional reasons.

First, if an employer desires to

provide a terminating employee with a portable pension,
the employer can always purchase a deferred annuity from
a qualified life insurer.

Although the assets are not

further transferrable to a third carrier, pension preser
vation with economic growth participation is accomplished.

Future employers could purchase additional deferred
annuities for the employee from the same insurance company
so that benefit consolidation is achieved.

Second,

"oppo

nents T of portability 1 argued that both Social Security
and personal savings were completely portable and that
private plans were designed to supplement, not duplicate
them,Third,

the increased prevalence of multiemployer

plans and reciprocity arrangements should meet the needs of
particularly mobile groups of employees who are unable to
obtain pension security through vesting and funding.
Concentration of Funds in a Central Clearinghouse
If a central clearinghouse is implemented to facili
tate the transfer of pension assets, it is argued that the
resulting concentration of funds in one agency could be
detrimental.

If this agency is federally administered,

only low-yield U.S. Government securities would be purchased
for investment income, the results of which would be a
substantial loss of income and no protection from inflation.
Moreover, since private pension funds are heavily invested
in private industry (68 percent in common stocks and 21
percent in corporate bonds^), even a partial shift of
pension funds from the private equity market to the public
-’"Private Pension Plans*
Congress Considers
Action," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XXX,
No. 16 (April 15, 1972), 649.
^"Tighter Rules for Private Pensions— The Outlook
Now," U.S. News and World Report, October 2, 1972, p. 60.

sector could have serious implications in the capital mar
kets.

Private pension funds presently represent $153

billion and are projected to represent $250 billion by the
end of the decade;

"no one knows what would happen if the
7
system were changed drastically."

Possible Loss of Viability of the Private Pension System
Many pension experts see portability as a threat to
the private pension system.

Government intervention possibly

could force "pension plans into a rigid mold as to make imO

possible their continued growth and proper performance."
Even if actuarial assumptions and benefit formulas are not de
fined legislatively within a portability system there would
be a natural movement toward uniform assumptions and benefits
Such a trend is seen as a threat to the flexibility, inde
pendence and competition within the private system.
It seems to us that the natural direction of a
portability system would inevitably be towards uni
formity among all pension plans.
The administration of
this kind of a uniform scheme inevitably would limit the
freedom to devise alternative versions of plans to
fit the particular conditions of employer and employees.
It would limit the competition among the employers trying
to hire employees based on better pension benefits. . . .
Portability, therefore, is essentially a movement
towards converting the private pension system into a
uniform nationalized social security system.
"NBC Reports," N.B.C. Telecast, September 12,
1972;
"Pensions;
The Broken Promise,"
Narrator,
Edwin Newman.
O

American Enterprise Institute, Issues Affecting
Pensions (Washington, D.C.;
American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1971), p. 18.
a
7Peter M. Flanigan, "A View of Pensions from the
White House," Financial Executive, February, 1972, p. 20.

Since pension plan formations have long been
motivated by both management and union desire to attract
and maintain competent, long-service employees, a change
in philosophy could reverse the increasing trend of new
plan formation.

Pension plans generally are voluntary

on the part of the employer and increased complexity of pen
sion plan regulation as well as increased cost could make
a wary employer turn to the profit sharing mechanism
and away from the private pension plan as a means of
providing retirement income.
Complexity of the Portability Concept
For a number of reasons, portable pensions have
been cited as being too complex for realistic implemen
tation.

Private pension plans vary widely in actuarial

assumptions and experience, wage patterns and benefit
structure.

From an administrative point of view, it

would be very difficult to transfer equitably the benefit
structure of a plan to successive pensions.

The following

examples illustrate three such problems.
(1)

Suppose an employee transfers from a plan with a

flat benefit formula of $200 per month beginning at age
sixty-five to a plan guaranteeing only $100 per month at
age sixty-five.

Which benefit should the employee receive?

If the larger benefit is paid, other employees partici
pating in the second plan may feel slighted.

If the

smaller benefit is paid, then the employee who has trans
ferred his credits may feel unjustly treated.

Since

obviously a $200 benefit costs more to fund than a $100
benefit, and if the lower benefit is eventually paid, the
second employer could feasibly use the higher funded asset
level transferred in to offset the future cost of pro
viding the lower benefit.3-0
(2) Although any benefit can be translated into an
actuarial present value for the purposes of stating the
cash transfer value, from the point of view of the
employee's utility, it may not be possible to express
such options as benefits for spouse, children, and early
retirement and disability benefits available under one
plan in a cash value.

The employee simply may not be in

different between the early retirement option under one
plan and a large benefit under a succeeding plan which has
no early retirement provision.
(3) Suppose an employee transfers from a plan providing
a vested career average salary benefit; e.g., 2 percent
of annual salary for each year of service.

Suppose further

that the next pension plan the employee participates in
has a benefit of 50 percent of final average salary,
and the employee receives a considerable salary increase
with his second employer.

The assets transferred from

the first fund clearly would not be sufficient to fund
even a prorated portion of the accrued benefit under the
10

This example was taken from the testimony of
Kenneth L. Houck, Counsel for Bethlehem Steel; U.S.,
Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Hearings on
H.R. 12272, p. 582.

final average salary plan.

Would the second employer be

responsible for making the necessary additional contri
butions to fund the benefit?

It is highly unlikely that

the original employer or even the employee would make
such contributions, but the second employer is also
unlikely to want to assume such heavy retirement costs
for a new employee when that money could be spent on
additional benefits for all employees.
Cost of a Portability System
Critics of portability point to the increased cost
related to the provision of portable pensions and the fact
that if costs are increased, future benefit expansions for
remaining employees may be reduced.

If a particular fund

has large turnover experience, the fund may be endangered
as assets are siphoned off to comply with portability
guarantees.
Clearly, portability would favor younger em
ployees at the expense of older employees.
It
would benefit those least interested in retirement
benefits at the expense of those who are most
dependent on their pensions.
To be meaningful, portable pensions must be fully
vested and fully funded, a requirement which can be quite
expensive if a plan has no vesting and only minimal
funding.

The contention that portability is too expensive
11

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Private Pension Bills, Hearings before
a Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Senate, on S. 3598, S. 302*1-, S. 3012 and
Other Bills, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, p. 13^3*
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must be examined quite separately from the vesting and
funding issues.

The incremental costs of portability (i.e.,

over and above the cost of vesting and funding)
three sources?

come from

(1) the administrative cost of calculating

the transfer value and effecting the transfer;

(2) loss

of investment income due to increased liquidity requirements;
and (3) no funding "forgiveness"
employee termination.

(relief) because of

With respect to the third cost

source, funding forgiveness occurs in nonvested plans
when turnover is anticipated actuarially to reduce costs
in the funding of benefits.

Since under the portability

concept terminated employees will receive benefits, none
of the assets supporting the liability created on behalf
of these vested benefits will be released to offset funding
costs when an employee terminates.
Legislative Problems
If portability were to be implemented by legis
lation, it is possible, as with any imposed regulation,

that

distortions could occur which would not be intended or
anticipated by the legislative body.
Portability is subject to certain anti-selection.
For example, if you want to provide portability with
respect to vested pension credits and vested death
benefits, presumably many employers who have employees
in poor health would terminate their employment and
transfer liabilities to the portability scheme
rather than have-the death benefits paid from the
employer's plan.
12Ibid., p. 997.
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Former Secretary of Labor James D. Hodgson has
recognized that portability may involve many intricate
technical problems and even unintended distortions and,
therefore, may best be "left to the parties themselves,"
either at the bargaining table or between the individual
employer and employee.

13

Problems Regarding the "Frozen" Benefit Arguments which
Support the Portability Concept
Some of the support for portability comes from
the concept of the inadequacy of vested benefits that
are frozen at the time of termination and not permitted
to participate in economic growth or later improvement
by the employer.

This argument is rather easily countered.

First, it is unlikely that an employer would improve
the benefits of terminated employees.

Second,

"there is

no reason to believe . . . T the second employer 3
would make benefit increases applicable to a period of
service rendered for another employer."

Finally, the

assets transferred into a successor fund would be inter
mingled with other fund assets and would enjoy the same
investment experience as the other fund assets; i.e., the
assets are allowed to benefit from economic growth.

If,

on the other hand, the funds were transferred to a federal
clearinghouse, then only the limited investment income
13Ibid. . pp. 130-131.
14
Ibid. . p. 217.

of government securities would be possible.

In neither

case, however, are the assets definitely frozen.

Future

service benefits (and thus total retirement benefits)
could be increased through the investment income from
the transferred assets.
Arguments Supporting Portability
Technical Feasibility
Initial support for any portability scheme
necessarily must come from the fact that the transfer
system can be devised.

That is, it technically is pos

sible to transfer assets from one plan to another and
to determine from those asset values the employee’s
benefit level under the succeeding plan.

The ability to

calculate transfer values has been demonstrated by the
prevalence of reciprocal agreements in which transfer
arrangements are worked out between plans which are quite
dissimilar in funding level, benefit structure and act
uarial assumptions.
Portability Deemed Necessary for Certain Groups
Perhaps one of the most potent arguments for
portability is that only portable pensions can meet the
retirement security needs of certain groups.

The first

of these groups is the nation's law enforcement officers.
In the aggregate, these workers currently are employed by
more than 1^,000 separate agencies, each of which has its

own separate authority network, pay scale, fringe benefits
and promotional opportunities.
A law enforcement officer, wishing to advance his
position by transfer from one agency to another, is
faced with serious handicaps.
Firstly, the agency
to which he is interested in moving may not permit
lateral entry, that is employment (above the most
junior level) of a man having experience with a dif
ferent law enforcement agency.
Secondly, he faces in
many cases the loss of his accrued pension rights by
reason of transfer to the other agency.
On the assumption that freer mobility would promote a more
efficient law enforcement agency and better talent
utilization, a study on this subject was conducted by
Geoffrey N. Calvert of Alexander and Alexander, a New
York-based firm, and the College of Insurance of New York
under the auspices of the Justice Department's Law Enforce
ment Assistance Administration, the National Institute
of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.

The conclusion

of the study was that each state should have a state
pension plan encompassing all law enforcement officers
with a multilevel benefit structure or tapered benefit
formula with a flexible retirement age
community needs could be met.

17

so that the various

In addition, the study

recommended that there should be reciprocal agreements

16

U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assis
tance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice, Portable Police Pensions— Improving
Interagency Transfers, Prepared by Geoffrey N. Calvert of
Alexander and Alexander, New York, New York 10007.(Washing
ton, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1971)» P* 1»
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Reduced benefits were allowed for earlier retire
ment; the earlier the retirement, the lower the benefit
level.

between the states as well as federal assistance to facili
tate interstate transfers.

State legislatures would set

up the fifty plans.
The second major group which would benefit greatly
by portable pensions is professional people, which
broadly includes engineers, chemists, accountants,
actuaries, economists, lawyers, educators and scientists.
These people often are called upon to change locality so
that their technical skills can be used wherever most
needed.

Their intensive education and training may produce

individuals with highly specialized capabilities, making
it difficult to adapt to the more varied needs of a
single employer.

Increased mobility is the only answer

to the need for maximum utilization of these highly
specialized talents.

The peculiarities of the mobile

professional worker with regard to retirement needs were
brought out at recent Senate hearings on pensions by the
National Society of Professional Engineers.
Seldom is it possible, the engineer discovered to
change jobs T only 3 several times during a working
lifetime.
Even where interests in fact become
vested, the total accumulation of credits is very
rarely adequate in these circumstances.
A third group of employees often cited as in need
of a portable pension system is that of skilled craftsmen.
1R

U.S. Department of Justice, Portable Police
Pensions, pp. 63-64.
19
7U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Hearings on S. 3598, and Other Bills,
1972, p. 4.

Although there is a recent trend to set up trade asso
ciation or union pension plans which provide limited
portability,

20

the organizations themselves may not

be strong enough to gain wide acceptance for employer
support.

In addition, employers with established plans may

not want to participate in these peripheral plans,
especially if they have a benefit structure and funding
level quite different from the employer*s original plan.
The problem of employee discrimination may occur if the
two plans are different.

Even without potential employer

reluctance to participate in trade association or union
plans, the employee does not obtain full retirement
security protection under the limited portability provided
in these plans.

Craftsmen are always subject to a "sub

stantial change or decline in the sector of the industry
in which he is employed."

21

A final group which may become increasingly in
need of a portable pension system generally includes
business executives.

Although the business executive may

be subject to may of the same pressures as the professional
person, Dr. William M. Evans, Professor of Sociology and
20The most recent examples of efforts to establish
such plans involve carpenters and chemical workers.
21U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statis'
tics, Labor Mobility and Private Pension Plans; A Study
of Vesting. Early Retirement, and Portability Provisions,
sponsored by Office of Manpower, Automation^and Training,
(Washington, D.C.*
Government Printing Office, BLS
Bulletin No. 1407, 1964), p. 39.

14-3
Industry at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania,
has pointed out that the executive particularly is exposed
to the uncertainties connected with mergers and conglomerate
acquisitions as well as the frustrations of becoming the
"bottle-necked executive" in many of today's organizations.
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Labor Mobility
Many of the arguments in support of portability
are related to the larger question of labor mobility.

The

issue of whether pensions deter or simply have no effect
of labor mobility is far from answered, nor is any available
evidence conclusive.

Increased labor mobility historically

has been one of the major reasons cited for general
pension legislation.2 -^

Apart from the effect of pensions

on labor mobility, however, it is clear that even people
outside of particularly mobile groups commonly change
jobs every six or seven years.

oL

It is possible with the

continuous service requirements usually associated with
vesting eligibility that even the normal worker will not
qualify for a secure pension.

Concern for a remedy to this

social problem has caused some legislators to view porta
bility as a public issue.

An early dedication to portability

2 2 "Pension Portability— What Are Its Chances?"
Modern Manufacturing, March, 1970, p. 15*
2^The debate over whether or not pension plans
impede labor mobility will be presented in Appendix C since
it is related to the question of comprehensive pension
legislation and is related to the subject matter of both
this and the next chapter.
Oji

"Congress Readies Pension Control," Business
Week, March 18, 1972, p. 66.
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as a public concern is seen in the final report to President
Lyndon B. Johnson of a special committee appointed by
President John P. Kennedy to study private pensions.
Many workers who participate in a plan or plans
will never receive adequate retirement benefits
through no fault of their own, of their employers,
or of the individual plans.
Rather, these will be
workers employed by several different employers
during their working life, leaving these jobs
either without having acquired vested rights or with
rights to only very limited benefit.
These conditions, in the judgment of the Com
mittee, pose difficult and intricate problems,
but not ones that are unsolvable.
Rather, they
appear to be susceptible to solution, at least
in part, through the development of appropriate
institutional arrangements.
If private pensions are deemed to be a public issue,
the question arises exactly who should be responsible
for the financing of the public portion of pensions.

That

is, if portability (and perhaps vesting) is a public
responsibility because increased labor mobility and secure
retirement benefits are socially desirable, the question
arises as to who is to bear the cost of the added benefits.
The business community generally is felt to be more finan
cially able to support portable pensions than the individual
or the governmental mechanism.

The wide acceptance of the

Deferred Wage Theory supports the contention that the enployer is financially able and indeed responsible for the
provision of private pensions.
^President*s Committee on Corporate Pension Funds
and Other Private Retirement and Welfare Programs, Public
Policy and Private Pension Programs: A Report to the
President on Private Employee Retirement Plans, (Wash
ington, D.C.s
Government Printing Office, 1965)» P« 55*
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Plan Terminations
Much of the hasis for legislative support for port
able pensions is the inequitable treatment of employees with
regard to pension provision when either the plan terminates
p Z

or a plan in a multiplant operation closes down.

If there

existed a portability system, under the circumstances of plan
termination or partial plan termination, an employee could
transfer his pension assets to another employer's plan (or
to a clearinghouse) and actively participate in the asset
and even benefit growth made available through the investment
mechanism of the private pension system.
Unique Advantages of the Clearinghouse Concent
The concept of a national clearinghouse has been
greatly popularized by Professor Merton C. B e r n s t e i n . ^
His concept of a clearinghouse as a depository has peculiar
advantages which additionally render vesting as adequate
pension protection impossible.

Even if an employee is able

to qualify for benefits under several plans, he may find
the fragments of retirement income and options available so
small that they are hardly worth filing for or electing.
Also,

"without one control record of all vested pension
26

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Hearings on S. 3598 and Other Bills, 1972,
p. 299» and U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study,
1972— Report of Hearings on Pension Plan Terminations,
92d Cong., 2d sess., September, 1972.
27
rThe clearinghouse concept was first rigorously
explained in his book*
Merton C. Bernstein, The Future of
Private Pensions (New York*
The Free Press of Glencoe,
1 9 6 k ) , pp. 256-259.

credits, an employee and his dependents simply may lose
track of his entitlements."
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From the employer's point

of view, there could be reduced administrative costs since
records of the vested pensions of terminated employees would
no longer have to be maintained nor would retirement checks
have to be issued.

In addition, the employer would not

be faced with raising benefits of terminated employees due
to potential union or legislative pressure.

Other advantages

which easily could be provided in the implementation of a
clearinghouse include availability of assets to the
employee upon disability, a "locking-in" feature

(elimina

tion of the employee's usual right to a cash withdrawal
of assets upon termination) and increased coverage by
allowing small employers to participate on a money purchase basis.

29

Small companies which cannot afford the

installation costs nor the regular funding requirements of
a formal plan could contribute whatever they can afford to
the clearinghouse.

These contributions would purchase

immediately vested benefits and be credited with any
investment income available through the clearinghouse.
Portable Pensions Superior to Vested Benefits
On a more theoretical basis, portable pensions
are superior to vested pensions which are "frozen" at the
^'•'Legislative Forum," Pension and Welfare News.
VIII, No. 9 (September, 1972), Z T ,
29Ibid.

^7
point of termination.

In explaining the concept of

frozen pensions at Senate hearings on pension reform,
¥ r * Bernstein explained what happens to an employee age

forty-five who terminates with a vested benefit, payment
to begin at age sixty-five.
He C the employee H does not participate in any
of the plan improvements for those years of service
in which he has a vested credit.
Those credits are
subject to all of the erosion of inflation during
the period of time and it E sic 1 does not participate
in the growth of the economy, although the very same
credits given to coemployees who stay on the job
will undoubtedly have appreciated significantly
in value . ^
In short, a portable pension, with assets trans
ferred either to a succeeding employer or to a clearinghouse
could participate in economic growth;

i.e., be credited

with more than just the minimal interest guaranteed
in the actuarial assumptions used to calculate the transfer
value.

In addition, the succeeding employer could, at a

later point in time, increase benefits for both past
service and accrued future service, in which case the em
ployee possibly would qualify for the higher benefits, having
transferred in pension credits for service with the preceding
employer.

Former Rep. Seymour Halpern (R— N.Y.), who has

consistently supported portability in Congress, explained in
his testimony before a House hearing another way in which
portability is more advantageous to an employee changing
■^°U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Hearings on S. 3598 and Other Bills,
1972, p. 299.

jobs than a frozen vested benefit.
In many cases this E job IE change results in a
higher salary for . . . r the employee 3, which
entitles him to a higher level of benefits under the
new pension plan he joins.
If this person were able
to apply the value of former pension credits to the new
plan, he would be vested for that much more of his
higher benefits.
Therefore, the lack of portability
arrangements could deprive a person of substantial
retirement benefit increases.5
Liquidity Requirements
One of the major criticisms of the portability
concept has been the increased liquidity requirements on a
plan.

Fund managers, faced with potential asset withdrawals

because of terminating employees, must limit the investment
portfolio by maintaining enough liquid assets to meet the
potential asset drain.

This argument can be countered,

however, by the fact that liquid assets should be created
by additions to the fund from employer contributions and
new employees transferring assets into the plan.

Normal

asset turnover also should help to provide sufficient cash
flow to meet the drain of both termination withdrawals and
normal retirement disbursals.
Conclusions
The arguments both in support of and against
portability make it quite clear that portability cannot be
approved nor condemned on the basis of logical reasoning.
31

U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and
Means, Hearings on K.R. 12272, p. 727.
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Opponents of portability believe that vesting and funding
meet the goals of adequate benefit security for a mobile
population.

Since portability is too complex and costly,

and since there might be system distortions when the transfer
apparatus is imposed, portable pensions are deemed unde
sirable.

When the opponents of portability wish to streng

then their position, they point to the dangers of portability.
First, there is the alleged demise of the private pension
system, brought about by forcing plan uniformity and the
resulting prevention of new plan formations.

Second, the

implications.of disrupting the private equity market by
regulating pension funds frequently are emphasized.

Finally,

the restrictions imposed by increased liquidity requirements
on pension fund performance and the resulting jeopardizing
of benefit security for covered employees are stressed.
The supporters of portability center their argu
ments around the irrevocable right of an employee to a
pension and present portability as the only means of imple
menting this right for certain groups of highly mobile
workers.

Vesting as a form of pension preservation for

the mobile employee is deemed inadequate because of the
age and service eligibility requirements, the "frozen"
and fragmented nature of vested benefits, individual
record-keeping requirements, and inaccessability for
disability purposes.
Each position seems convincing, especially when
the counter-arguments are considered, but the validity

of the portability concept is impossible to determine
solely by examination of the traditional viewpoints.

It

is clear, however, that "portability is not going to go
away, particularly in labor markets with high mobility ."-^2
It is necessary to take a broader view of portability,
its relation to other pension issues and the effects
of pension reform legislation on the desirability of
portability, before a conclusion can be reached regarding
a proper position on the portability concept.

32Robert W. Gardner, "Will Private Pensions Be
Retired?" Industry W e e k , March 13» 1972, p.

CHAPTER III
LEGISLATIVE CONCERN REGARDING THE
PRIVATE PENSION SYSTEM
Introduction
Since the closing of the Studebaker plant in 1964-,
which resulted in the termination of the pension plan and
extensive loss of expected benefits for thousands of
workers, there has been considerable interest in various
forms of pension reform both in the Congress and the
executive branch.

Numerous bills have been sponsored

during the past decade covering such aspects of the private
pension system as vesting, funding, insurance of unfunded
liabilities, portability, disclosure and fiduciary respon
sibility.

The legislative proposals vary widely with

regard to the specific pension issues included in a given
bill as well as the particular provisions pertaining to
the general reform issue.

For example, some bills are

designed to deal only with reinsurance or disclosure and
fiduciary responsibility.

Alternatively, other bills

are designed to initiate complete pension reform, but
may differ in the vesting formula or the required funding
level.

Despite variations in the comprehensiveness of

the proposed pension bills, each of the current issues in
51
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in pension reform is related to the other.

That is, it

is difficult to consider insurance of unfunded liabilities
without considering funding.

In like manner, portability

is related to vesting, funding, insurance, disclosure and
fiduciary responsibility.

The purpose of this chapter is

to examine the relationship of portability to the other
pension reform issues.

An examination of this relationship

will provide a basis for determining the growth and future
direction of the portability concept should legislation
in any area of private pension reform be passed.
The Vesting Concept
Vesting is one of the most well known and popular
of the pension reform issues and generally is thought
to be one of the most necessary pension reforms.

In fact,

arguments presented in support of portability often are
made simply to insure that vesting is implemented since
portability is a more extreme and expensive means than
vesting of assuring benefit security.

Thus, "'portability*

is an indirect or 'back door* way to promote more liberal
vesting provisions."*
The theoretical relationship of vesting to portabi
lity has been discussed in previous chapters.

It is,

therefore, necessary to discuss only the various types of
vesting and the vesting formulas.
1

An understanding of

Charles D. Spencer, "Editorial Analysis of JEC
Staff Report," Employee Benefit Plan Review Research
Reports, December, 1966, p. 6,

these formulas will clarify the relationship between
vesting and portability.
Types of Vesting
There are several types of vesting which will be
referred to throughout any discussion of legislative
reform of vesting practices.

First, the term "deferred

full vesting” implies that the right to pension credits
is deferred until all vesting requirements are met.

When

the requirements (e.g., ten years of service) are fulfilled,
all pension rights are vested.

A second form of vesting,

"immediate full vesting," provides 100 percent vesting of
benefits as they are accrued by the plan participant#
A third type of vesting is "deferred graded vesting" and
is based on a system such as 50 percent vesting of accrued
benefits after ten years of service with an additional
10 percent of accrued benefits for each year of service
thereafter, so that 100 percent vesting can be achieved
after fifteen years of service.

Deferred graded vesting

can be achieved through numerous combinations of different
service requirements and various percentages of vesting
of accrued benefit rights.

Although the goal of the

deferred graded vesting system is usually 100 percent, full
vesting may not be achieved until just prior to retirement.
For example, the deferred graded vesting system may pro
vide for 50 percent of accrued benefits after ten years
of service with an additional 1 percent of accrued benefits

for each year of service thereafter* subject to a minimum
vesting provision of 100 percent vesting after the later
of thirty years of service or attainment of age 6 5 .

Such

a provision could mean a sudden increase in vested rights
just prior to retirement.
These three types of vesting generally are con
ditional, and the conditional terms of vested rights are
specifically stated in the pension contract.
Conditional vesting permits the participant to
exercise his rights only under certain circumstances,
usually only in the event of withdrawal. This is the
more common usage of vesting and is one means by which
the survivors of a plan participant are prevented from
exercising the participant's right in the event of
his death before retirement, and in the absence of a
specific provision for survivors' benefits.
A vesting provision in the pension plan is a direct
means of assuring this form of benefit security.

Vesting

can be provided, however, in an indirect manner through
an early retirement provision at the employee's election.-^
When an employee elects early retirement, the pension
benefit usually is actuarially reduced to reflect the
experience losses predominantly in interest and mortality
due to the shortened working period of the employee.
Since an employee effectively can secure his pension bene
fits by retiring early, which is a form of withdrawal,
o

U.S., Congress, Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Interim Report of Activities on the Private
Welfare and Pension Plan Study, by the Subcommittee on
Labor, S. Rept. 92-^3^» 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1971* PP» 1^-15*
^Bankers Trust Company, 1970 Study of Industrial Re
tirement Plans (New Yorki
Bankers Trust Company, 1970),
pp. 10-1 1 .
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an indirect form of vesting is achieved through the early
retirement option.
One of the prime reasons vesting is deemed so
important is the preservation of benefit rights upon plan
termination.

When a plan terminates or the employer

discontinues contributions, the benefits accrued to date
are vested to the extent of the fund.

The benefits which

vest at plan termination are not necessarily the same as
the contractual vested benefits when the plan is operating
under ’'going concern" provisions.

That is, a separate

vesting procedure is agreed upon contractually in the
event of plan termination and a priority list of employee
classes is made.

Usually long-service and older employees

are given highest priority in the disbursement of a ter
minated fund's assets.

"This difference in vesting pro

visions has come as a great shock to many members of termi
nated plans with long service and has naturally led to a
great deal of unhappiness and feelings of having been
c
cheated.
Vesting Formulas
The various vesting formulas which have been sug
gested to date are presented in Table 1.

The incorporation

^Internal Revenue Code of 195^ t sec. 401(a)(7),
Amended, 19&2,
(See Appendix B for additional Internal
Revenue Service requirements for qualification.)
-’Norman H. Tarver, "Proposals for the Improvement
of the Private Pension Plan System," Unpublished Study
prepared for the Senate labor Subcommittee Hearings on
S. 3598, Toronto, Canada, 1972.

TABLE 1
VESTING FORMULAS

Formula Name

Legislative
Proposal
(If applicable)

Immediate 1
Rule of 35

Provision

100% vesting of benefits as
contributions made
H.R. 7 1 5 7 Administration
Proposal for
self-employed
persons only

50% vesting when age and yrs.
of service (or participation)
total 3 5 # plus 10% vesting
for each additional year of
service (or participation)

Rule of ^0 ‘

50% vesting when years of
service and age total ^-0 ,
plus 10% vesting for each
additional year of service

Rule of ^5

50% vesting when age and
years of service total ^5
plus 10% vesting for each
additional year of service

Modified
Rule of U-5C

Norman H.
Tarver

Same as Rule of ^5 except
that a graduated vesting
schedule in the four years
prior to completion of the
total of ^5 is provided to
phase in the final 50%
vesting

Rule of 50

H.R. 7 1 5 7 Administration
Proposal for em
ployer plans
only

50% vesting when age and yrs.
of service (or participation)
total 50 * plus 10% vesting
for each additional year of
service (or participation)

Modified ,
Rule of 50

Dan M. McGill

Same as Rule of 50 except
full vesting must be
achieved for;
(1) Persons who entered at
age 30 with 10 years of
service
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TABLE 1— Continued

Formula Name

Legislative
Proposal
(If applicable)

Provision
(2) Persons older than 30
with less than 10 years of
service (6 months for each
year of entry age above age
30)
(3) Persons younger than 30
with more than 10 years of
service (6 months for each
year of entry age below
age 30)

n-year
Vesting

10-year Vesting
H.R. 4

Full Deferred S. 2 —
Graded
Williams-Javits
Vesting
Joint Senate
Proposal
H.R. 10050

Sourcet

100# vesting after n years
of service
30# vesting after 8 years
of service plus 10# vesting
for each additional year
of service
(1) If entry age is less than
47, 1# vesting for each year
of service up to 19 years;
after 20 years, 100# vesting
per year is larger (the older
the entrant, the larger the
percentage vesting credited).
At normal retirement age,
full vesting credited.

With the exception of a and b below, the com
plete title of the sources are listed in the
bibliography.
The full text of all legislative
proposals are printed in related Congressional
Committee hearings.

aNorman H. Tarver, "Mandatory Vesting Schedules,"
Pension and Welfare News, VII, No. 1 (January, 1972), 27*
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Private Pension Bills, Hearings before a
Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, Senate, on S. 3598, S. 3024, S. 3012, and other
Bills, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, p. 211.
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of the formulas into a legislative proposal is also cited.
It is evident from the formula descriptions that most of
the suggestions for mandatory vesting have utilized one of
three types of eligibility requirements:
service,

(2)

and service.

(1) age plus

service only and (3) some combination of

age

Thesethree different philosophies of

vesting requirements are supported by separate legislative
sponsors.

The Rule of 50, an age plus participation re

quirement, is associated largely with the Nixon Administra
tion.

A ten year service requirement consistently has been

supported by the House General Subcommittee on Labor
whose chairman, Rep. John Dent (D— Pa.), has sponsored
bills in the House.

Future bills emanating from the

Pension Task Force of that House Committee probably
will be centered around a ten year service requirement.^
The Senate Labor Subcommittee, on the other hand, largely
dominated by

Senator Jacob K. Javits (R— N.Y.), seems

to be committed to a

deferred graded vesting system, with
7
full vesting achieved after fifteen years.
The vesting formulas presented in Table 1 have
various implications for portability.

In general,

£
Vance Anderson, Special Counsel, House General
Subcommittee on Labor, private interview, Washington,
D.C. , August 10, 1972.
7
rSee Appendix A for S. 2, sponsored by Senator
Jacob K. Javits and more recently S. 3598 sponsored by
both Senator Javits and Senator Harrison A. Williams
(D— N.J.).
The vesting provisions are very similar in both
bills indicating continuing support for a deferred graded
vesting system by that Committee.
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however, the earlier vesting is achieved, the greater
the opportunity for the mobile worker to accumulate
pension credits.

Restrictive eligibility requirements

(e.g., fifteen years of service) could mean that even
a moderately mobile worker would never have any vested
credits to port to a succeeding pension fund.
Vesting Coverage
Much of the concern over vesting as a prerequisite
to portability systems has centered around the question of
current vesting coverage.

The results of several recent

studies of vesting coverage are presented in Table 2.
Although the studies vary widely in comprehension and form,
it is clear that, with the exception of the pension plans
included in the A.S. Hansen study, a high incidence of
some type of vesting is indicated.

At least 90 percent of

all plans, and in most studies a comparably high percentage
of employees, are covered by some form of vesting.

The

authors of the A.S. Hansen study emphasized that young
employees who were not yet eligible for vested benefits
could expect to be covered in the future (under either
the current or a succeeding employer's plan).

It therefore

is possible that coverage statistics for this study may
be understated.

In addition, the Senate study result,

which concluded that 76 percent of the vested employees
were covered under a deferred full vesting system, implies
not only a high incidence of vesting, but also an extensive
level of vested benefits.

In fact, about 90 percent

6o

TABLE 2
VESTING COVERAGE
Study

Study Sponsor

Summary Results

500 Small
Plan Vesting
Provisions
(Based on
Sample of
100)

National Asso
ciation of
Life Under
writers and
Association
for Advanced
Life Under
writing

(1) Immediate Benefits on ter
mination of employment
($ of plans)
82$— some bendfit (e.g., trans
fer of ca&h value or life
insurance policy)
99^5— after 7 years of parti
cipation
100%— after 10 years of parti
cipation
(2) Full vesting on termination
of employment ($ of plans)
22$— 0-5 yrs. participation
38$— 0-10 yrs. participation
82$— 10 yrs. participation
94$— 15 yrs. participation

21 Industry
Pension Fund
Management
S u r v e y560 plans
(9 6 .6 $
cooperation)

Standard and
Poor1s

(1) 96$ of the combined in
sured and uninsured pension
plans had some form of vesting
33*85$~”Service only require
ment averaging 11.93 yrs.
1 .52$— age only requirement
averaging 5 6 . 2 5 yrs.
64.0$— age and service re
quirement respectively
averaging 43.76 yrs and
12.14 yrs.

1970 Study
Bankers Trust
of Industrial Company; New
Retirement
York
Plans
(covers

7,800,000)

Provisions for 1965-70 19 60 -65
_____
Plans
Plans
Full Vesting
Vesting oft Com
pletion of a
(1 0 - 2 5 yrsi or
more with more
than half 10 yrs.
2 5 .06$
or less)
42.5$
Vesting on At
tainment of age
2.22
(55 or 6 0 )
3.22
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TABLE 2— Continued
Study

Study Sponsor

Summary Results
Vesting on Com
pletion of a
period of credited
service ranging
from 1 0 - 2 5 yrs.
and attainment
of age 35-60
50.78
Vesting only
on layoff

•74

Partial vesting
No vesting

A.S. Hansen
Study of
pension plans
of clients
(covered
881,281 em
ployees)

Senate Pen
sion Plan
Study (1493
plan sample
from 34,000
on file with
Dept. of
Labor; study
covered
14,179,631
employees)

A.S. Hansen,
Inc. (pension
consulting
firm)

Senate Labor
Subcommittee ;
Committee on
Labor and
Public Wel
fare

65.72

1.75

2.48

1.75
TooM

3.78
100.0$

(1) 56.5% of the plans have
some kind of vesting
(2 ) 3 0 . 6 employees currently
vested
(3 ) 7 2 .4$ employees age 55-65
vested
(4) 71.7&?° employees with
15-20 yrs. of service vested;
with more than 20 yrs of ser
vice, 84.6$ are vested
(5) Expected to qualify for
vested benefits in a succeeding
plan1 (age)
Below 25-35
72.2$
35-45
17.0
Over 45
5*8
(1) Requirements By
By Parto be eligible
Plan ticipant
for vesting_______ _
Service o n l y 4 7 $ 4 4 $
Age and Service
37
43
Age only
1
1
No vesting
13
10
Vague or no
Response
__ 2
2
100$
100$
(2 ) 90$ vested by at least
9 years of service
(3) Deferred full vesting is
the most popular form (76$
employees covered under that
form)
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TABLE 2— Continued
Study

Study Sponsor

Industry
Survey

National Society of Professional
Engineers

Summary Results
Years of
Percent with Rights
Service_________ Accumulated
less than 1
29
50
1-3
62
^-5
6-10
71
more than 10
90
Total (average)

76

U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means,
Tax Proposals Affecting Private Pension Plans. Hearings
before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Represen
tatives, on H.R. 12272, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, p. 2 7 6 .
y .

Vesting coverage calculated from Standard and Poor's
Intercapital, Inc., "Second Annual Standard and Poor"s/lntercapital, Inc. Pension fund Management Survey,” Unpublished
Survey Conducted by MacGraw-Hill Publications' Depart
ment of Economics, New York, October, 1972, Table XXII.
Calculated from Tables V and VI in Bankers Trust
Company, 1970 Study of Industrial Retirement Plans (New
York: Bankers Trust Company, 1970), pp. 10-12.
Calculated from Figures 1 and 2 in: Richard C.
Keating, "Employee Expectations in Private Pension Plans,"
Pension and Welfare News. VII, No. 11 (November, 1971)» ^7.
eU.S,, Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Labor, Statistical Analyses
of Major Characteristics of Private Pension Plans. 92d
Cong., 2d sess., September, 1972, pp. 12-16.
f
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and
Means, Hearings on H.R. 12272, p. 3^5*
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of the plans with a service only vesting requirement
provide ". . . that employees are entitled to full or
partial vesting benefits when they complete 15 years
of service."®
Vesting Cost
If vesting is indeed a widespread practice, then it
is reasonable to assume that vesting costs should not
significantly increase future annual contribution costs.
The results of various cost studies of vesting are pre
sented in Table 3«

It is difficult to compare the studies

in Table 3 since each report is based on different samples
and cost methods.

The greatest problem in comparing such

studies is that some consider only the cost of future
benefits while others examine the cost of all accrued
benefits.

The authors of the Treasury Study and the

Standard and Poor*s Industry Survey considered prospectively
accrued benefits, and thereby estimated that the cost
of vesting would be 1.5 - 3*2 percent higher than
current costs.

The remaining studies in Table 3 examine

total accrued benefits and consequently assess the cost
increase to be in the 7 - 2 0
of existing pension plans.

percent range for a majority
The extremely high cost

estimate cited in the Dreher study is due to (1) the fact
O

U.S., Congress Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Subcommittee on Labor, Statistical Analyses
of Major Characteristics of Private Pension Plans, 92d
Cong., 2d sess., September, 1^72, p. il.
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TABLE 3
STUDIES MADE ON THE COST OP VESTING
Study Made By
U.S. Depart
ment of
Treasury

Summary Results

Rule
o£.JO.

(1) All Private
pension plans
(prospective
benefits)
Increase of
Plan costs {%) 5 .0
Increase in
^a^roll costs
.3
Increased cost
per employee
per hour
1.50
(2) Private Pen
sion plans with no
Vesting
Increase of
plan costs (%) 8.0
Increase of pay
roll costs (%)
.k
Increased cost
per employee
per hour
1.8^

10 Yr.
Service

Vesting at
10fo per Yr.
Beginning
at Yr. 6

8.6

11.1

.5

.6

2.50

3.20

1^.0

18.0
.9

3.20

Howard Winkle- (1) Population Maturity Stages (%)
voss of the
Wharton School
for the
Department of Cost Method
Present Value of Expected Benefits
Labor
Accrued Benefit Normal Cost
Projected Benefit Normal Cost
Accrued Benefit Accrued Liability
Projected Benefit Accrued Liability
(2) Termination assumptions employed
(light to heavy)

k •10

Cost Range
over all
Maturity
Stages
13-22
6-Zk
12-16
18-25
13-22

TABLE 3"— Continued
Study Made By

Summary Results
Approximate
Overall
Cost Range
Cost Method__________________________ Increase
Present Value Expected Benefits
7-32
Accrued Benefit Normal Cost
5-17
Projected Benefit Normal Cost
8-22
Accrued Benefit Accrued Liability
10-38
Projected Benefit Accrued Liability 7-33
(3) Vesting cost ratios for Rule of 50»
10-year service and vesting foi 10# per year
beginning at year 6 did not appear to be
significantly different. Maturity stage
and termination assumptions only signifi
cant variables.

C.V. SchallerKelly—
Canadian
Actuary

William A,
Dreher and
Associates—
Study of Large
Food Chain
which had
little
vesting

Studied only cost for 10 year vesting
(using UAW turnover rates)
(1) 90% of the plans with no disability
benefits would have costs increased by
8.1 - 1 6 .0#
(2) 99# of the plans with disability bene
fits would have costs increased by il - 10.
Additional Cost for Vesting (%)
Vesting Formula_______ Mature Plan
New Plan
50# after 15 yrs. to
44.1#
100# after 20 yrs.
24.9#
100# at age 40 with
10 yrs. service
34.9
51.9
Rule of 50
35.3
52.5
10# after 5 yrs. to
38.8
100# after 14 yrs.
57.7
100# after 10 yrs.
service
39.3
58.3
50# after 5 yrs.
46.6
64.8
service
100# after 5 yrs.
52 .8
72.1
service

21 Industry Survey— Estimated cost of Pro
Standard and
viding
for vesting after 10 years of
Poor*s Inter
capital, Inc., creditable service— J
Pension Fund
Management
Survey
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TABLE 3—
Study Made By
Donald S.
Grubbs, FSA
Prepared for
the Senate
Subcommittee
on Labor

Continued
Summary Results

(1) Range of Increase in Pension Plan Costs
for Mandatory Vesting Provision
Vesting Formula_______ # Payroll # Plan Costs
30# at 8 yrs ., graded
no PS benefits to
0-.6#
be vested
0-2 5 .0#
30% at 8 yrs., graded,
0-1.4
including PS
0-53.0
30# at 8 yrs., graded,
PS vested for mem
0-1.2
0-44.0
bers age 45 and over
Rule of 50, no PS
benefits vested
0-28.0
0-.7
(2) 77# of the plans in the U.S. will have
only minor cost adjustments if the second
vesting plan above is adopted, based on
current vesting practices.

Sourcei

The complete title of each study is cited in
the bibliography by author. Summary results
are quoted directly— no calculations or
adjustments have been made to the authors*
figures.

6?

that the pension plan of the food chain examined currently
provides little vesting and (2) the high rate of employee
turnover that characterizes the retail food industry.
The most recent study in Table 3 was conducted by
Donald S. Grubbs, Jr. for the Senate Labor Subcommittee.
The results of this report further emphasize that cost
estimates for vesting in U.S. pension plans vary widely.
Since, however, only 23 percent of these plans will have
major cost adjustments, the cost of vesting for most
plans will be on the lower end of the cost scale.

It

is evident that the strength of the vesting provision will
determine the cost of that benefit.

Although an upper

cost limit of 30 percent is suggested by the studies, it
must be remembered that this estimate is only an average.
The Rule of 50 could result in a cost increase anywhere
from " . . .

g
zero to 85^, depending upon the situation."7

Since vesting costs will fluctuate depending on the indi
vidual plan, no clear conclusion can be drawn other than
there will be some increased cost as vesting is established.
The proponents of mandatory vesting point out that
the cost estimates for vesting may be overstated.

For

example, vested benefits for younger persons do not add
much to costs since there is a long period in which
^"Williams-Javits Bill Rapped at Western Pension
Conference Meeting," Weekly News Digest. Employee Benefit
Plan Review. June 9» 1972, p. 2.
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to earn income from the reinvestment of assets.
Great alarm has been expressed about the crippling
cost of vesting.
It is often greatly exaggerated. As
noted, the more effective credits an employee accumu
lates, the lower is the cost of each unit. Moreover,
the earlier a vested credit is earned and funded,
the lower is the yearly cost for any given level of
benefits — because of the double action of longer
periods of earnings and earnings on earnings.
The increased cost of vesting is thought to be in
significant for other reasons which may not be reflected
in the cost studies.

First, since turnover among older

employees is relatively low, the cost of vesting is
11
not much higher than the cost of the benefit.
Second,
the cost of benefits for transient workers can be reduced
by specifying a waiting period before benefits vest, either
retrospectively or prospectively.

Third, future costs will

not be as high as initial costs after employees build up
their vested credits.

That is, one employer eventually

will not have the responsibility of providing a full vested
pension.

Fourth, the increased security of a vested

retirement income may lead to better employee morale and
10

"Legislative Forum," Pension and Welfare News.
VII, No. 9 (September, 1972), 62.
11Treasury Department cost studies reveal that
the cost of providing a 55 year old employee a $100
annual pension to begin at age 65 is $570 while the same
benefit on a vested basis costs only $585J from "Text of
Fact Sheet Released by Press Secretary; The White House
Fact Sheet Pension Reform Program," Employee Benefit Plan
Review. Research Reports, December, 1971.
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thus higher productivity.

12

Finally, if mandatory vesting

is established in a period of high turnover, the cost of
vesting may be offset to a large degree by the recapture
of funds due to terminations.
Future of Vesting
Most of the pension reform factions now support
some form of minimal vesting of accrued benefits.

Federal

legislators and labor leaders traditionally have supported
the concept of vesting; at the same time, pension adminis
trators and the industrial community in general have been
reluctant to endorse the vesting principle.

Despite this

historical pattern, there seems to be a change in the
attitude of both pension administrators and business
representatives in the form of growing support for a
minimum mandatory vesting provision such as the Rule of 50.
Indicative of this changing attitude is the testimony
of the members of the American Bankers Association
(representing bank trusteed plans) at recent House
Senate hearings in support of the Rule of 50.

and

The American

Bankers Association has traditionally opposed mandatory
13
vesting in the past. J
12

Thomas C. Edwards, "Trends in Portability and Ves
ting of Pensions," Best*s Review; Life and Health Insurance
Edition, LXX, No.
(August, 1969)i 1^. E The validity of
pensions as an incentive recently has been questioned, but
the absence of vesting could cause worker unrest and a sub
sequent decline in productivity.
Thus, vesting may be
necessary in the future to maintain current productivity. ZL
1-^Kenneth A. Kaufman, "Pension Bill;
Going Back
Into Retirement? Iron Age, CCIX, No. 20 (May 18, 1972),
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Recent defense industry layoffs as well as the
general recession could create an environment favorable for
instituting mandatory vesting.

Moreover, further induce

ment is found in the cost estimate studies discussed above
which demonstrate that the initial cost may not be ex
cessively burdensome.

It thus is clear that as much

of the opposition to vesting continues to decline, and
some form of mandatory vesting becomes increasingly
i ii

probable,

the subsequent outcome may make a portability

system a nearer reality.
Funding
Variations of Funding
The funding (or financing) of pension benefits
may be categorized on one of two basest
disbursement or (2) funded.

(1) current

Under the current disburse

ment approach, retirement benefits are paid as each payment
becomes due.

There is no accumulation of assets for

interest accumulation to offset benefit costs prior to
an employee's retirement.

Such a system is actually a

continuation of payroll since benefit payments are provided
out of current operating income.

Alternatively, under the

funded approach, the employer irrevocably sets aside funds
with a trustee or insurance company prior to the date each
Ik

The political problems involved with the passage
of pension legislation will be discussed in the next
chapter.
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benefit payment is due.

Such funding may be on a

terminal or advance basis.

In terminal funding, the

employer sets aside for each employee, on the date the
latter retires, a single premium sum sufficient to pro
vide the monthly retirement benefit.

Advance funding

requires the employer to set aside funds on some systematic
basis during the employee's working career so that there
will be sufficient funds available at the time of the
employee's retirement to pay for the retiree's pension
credits.

Because of the income earned on the earmarked

assets, advance funding is clearly the least expensive means
of providing a pension benefit and is the most prevalent
means of financing retirement plans.
Current Funding Regulation
There are two sources of regulation applicable to
the funding of pension planst

(1) The Treasury Department

and (2) The Accounting Principles Board, Opinion 8.*^
For a plan to qualify as a deductible item for fed
eral income tax purposes, the Treasury Department requires
a minimum annual contribution equal to the plan's normal
cost (annual cost for benefits accrued in that year) plus
interest on any unfunded past service (i.e., supplemental)
liability (costs for benefits earned prior to the inception
of the plan).

The maximum amount deductible in any one

*^See Appendix B for a detailed analysis of the
Treasury regulations and the Accounting standards.

year is the normal cost of the plan plus 10 percent of the
unfunded supplemental liability.

This limit is applied so

that the employer will not take excessive deductions during
profitable years to avoid paying taxes.

In addition, the

deduction maximum ensures that the plan does not become
overfunded (if overfunding becomes prevalent, economic
concentration in the equity markets could be adverse).

It

should be emphasized that the only punishment for noncom
pliance with Treasury Department regulations is loss of
pension contribution deductibility for federal income
tax purposes.

The employer thus has an incentive to comply,

but may forego the deductions if noncompliance is deemed
more profitable.

Noncompliance may be encouraged further

due to the inadequacy of Treasury Department regulations
in failing to require the amortization of a plan's initial
unfunded liability.

The liability for past service benefits

simply must not increase and even a fully qualified plan
may be indefinitely unfunded.

The risk involved with an

unfunded plan already has been discussed*

if the plan

is terminated, there will not be sufficient assets to
pay for accrued benefits.
The Accounting Principles Board has attempted to
increase funding standards by requiring that the minimum
annual cost must equal the normal cost plus a payment to
insure a twenty year amortization of unfunded vested
benefits.

Maximum contribution limits are similar to the

Treasury regulations.

The only penalty, however, for
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noncompliance with the rules of the Accounting Principles
Board is denial of accounting certification.

It is hoped

that this denial as well as disclosure of a plan’s
funding level will provide employers with the incentive
to move towards a fully funded position.
Current Level of Funding
The studies which have been conducted to date on the
current level of pension plan funding are presented in
Table 4.

The results of these studies are contradictory

and largely incomplete.

The Griffin-Trowbridge study of

1966 found a high degree of funding; 98 percent of vested ,
benefits were 100 percent funded when past service funding
had been in effect fifteen or more years.

The Senate

Labor Subcommittee, on the other hand, found that only
81 percent of vested benefits were 76 - 100 percent funded
when past service funding had been in effect twelve or
more years.
Both of these studies are limited by the narrow
scope of the analysis.

The Griffin-Trowbridge study

included only those plans that had been in existence ten
or more years and whose administrators were willing to
participate in the project.

In addition, this study did

not include an adequate representation of "collectively
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Statistical Analyses, p. 22. (Calculated
from figures in Table 4-2A)

TABLE 4
STUDIES OF FUNDING LEVEL
Study, Date, Sample

Summary Results

(1) Definition of terms
Griffina) BSR— Benefit Security Ratio, the ratio
Trowbridge ;
of market asset value to present value of
Wharton
School, 1 9 6 6 ;
accrued benefits
b) VBSR— Vested Benefit Security Ratio,
1047 plans
covering
the ratio of market asset value to pre
4,562,000
sent value of accrued vested benefits
participants (2) Security Ratios by Effective Period of
Past Funding
(25% of the
Weighted
Weighted
universe at
that time)
Averages
Averages Based
Based on Ad- on Unadjusted
.iusted Ratios* Ratios **
Effective Period
VBSR BSR
of Past Funding
BSR
VBSR
Less than 10 Yrs.
10-14 Yrs.
15-19 Yrs.
20-24 Yrs.
25-29 Yrs.
30 Yrs. or More

62.4%
86,6
95-9
94.8
97.4
89.6

6 8 . 3%
94.1
98.2
99.2
99.2
99.2

6 3 .2%
108.7
115.6
114.5
112.9
103.5

72.4%
135.5
143.7
143.4
135.8
144.4

All Periods
Combined
84.9% 90 .2% 99.9%° 123.3%
*Individual plan ratios limited to 100%
**Individual plan ratios not limited to 100%
(3) Summary Conclusions;
94.4% of all accrued
benefits funded under plans whose effective
funding periods were 15 years or more.
Senate Pen
sion Plan
Study;
Senate
Labor Sub
committee ;
1972, 469
plans
covering
7,100,205
employees

(1) Assets at Market Value as a
Present Value of
Accrued Bene
fits (Total)
Parti
cipant
Plan
8%
7%
25% or less:
26- 50%
25
25
22
30
51-75%
76- 100%
17
25
12
101-125%
13
4
2
126- 150%
1
2
151-175
4
Over 175%
— 2
100%
100%

percentage of
Accrued Vested
Benefits
Parti
Plan cipant
2%
2%
9
5
14
24
21
23
17
19
8
12
8
6
21
__2
100% 100%
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TABLE— Continued
Study, Date, Sample

Summary Results

(2) Summary results of study:
a) 27$ of the participants have accrued
benefits 76$ or greater funded
b) Almost 70$ participants have vested
benefits 76 $ or greater funded
c) The more mature the plan, the greater
the degree of funding
Department
of the
Treasury
and Depart
ment of
Labor;
Interim
Report;
February,
1973

(1) Study of terminations in first 7 months of
1972
a) Terminated plans — 683
b) Number of claimants— 20,731
c) Plans with losses— 293; affecting 10,469
participants of which 8,357 experienced losses
due to unfunded liabilities amounting to $20
million (net present value of benefits lost)
d) Average losses perclaimant were $2,400
overall and $ 3|600 for retired, eligible for
retirement and vested employees
e) Amount distributed as $ o f present value
(See termina
of benefits
tion studies
for a com
Retirees
58$
plete sum
Eligible to retire
41
mary of
Eligible to retire early
43
terminated
Vested participants
35
plan
Vested terminated persons
3
Other active
42
character
Unclassified
64
istics )
AVERAGE
42$
f) 70$ lost at least 50$ of Present Value
of benefits
g) 34$ lost all benefits
(2) Study of multiemployer plans— 1965-71
a) 674 participants of 571690 participants
(or 1 .2$) in the 64 plans studied lost
benefits
b) Benefit losses were 100?? or close to 100$
Source:

The complete title of each study is cited in
the bibliography by author.
Summary results
have been quoted directly— no calculations
or adjustments have been made to the authors'
figures.
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bargained multi-employer plans and the smaller (fewer
than 100 participants) single-employer p l a n s . T h e
results of the Senate study possibly may be questionable
for two reasons*

(1) the limited sample size and (2) the

use of a complicated and lengthy questionnaire.

Plan

administrators filling out the form may not have been
willing or able to supply the information required.
The Interim Report on the study being jointly con
ducted by the Departments of Labor and the Treasury indicate
that when plans are terminated, claimants with benefit
losses (40 percent of all claimants in the plans studied)
receive only 42 percent of the present value of their
benefits and 34 percent of these claimants experienced
loss of all benefits.

Like the Griffin-Trowbridge and

Senate inquiries, this study is severely limited in scope
and, in addition, may overstate the funding problem
since only terminated plans were examined.

Continuing

pension plans may be more soundly funded.
Future of Funding
To date, legislative proposals for funding reform
have been hindered because of the indeterminateness of
the need for and costs of such proposals.

Since the

Labor and Treasury Departments* Interim Report is limited
to the analysis of terminated plans, little insight is
*^Frank L. Griffin, Jr. and Charles L. Trowbridge,
Status of Funding under Private Pension Plans (Homewood,
111.* Richard D, Irwin, Inc., 19^9), p. 25.

gained about the extent of funding of existing plans and
the cost of additional funding requirements.

Despite

these deficiencies, the concept of mandatory funding was
given new support when a funding requirement was added to
the Nixon Administration's pension reform bill for the
93d Congress (H.R. 7157)•

Passage of some form of re

quired amortization of the unfunded liability over a
period of twenty to forty years means that portability
will be feasible.

That is, a transfer system can be

reasonably implemented since fund assets would be suf
ficient for a terminating employee to port credits to a
succeeding fund,
Reinsurance or Insurance of Unfunded Liabilities

18

The Guaranty Fund Concept
The insurance of unfunded liabilities of a pension
plan has been deemed the "most controversial of all the

19
pension issues." 7

Any proposal to insure the unfunded

liabilities of a pension plan includes some type of
insurance pool or guaranty fund.
As of any given time, the assets of a pension
plan may be less than the actuarial value of the
accrued benefits because of inaccurate estimates
of cost, failure of the employer to undertake a
1R

These two terms are used interchangeably in the
pension literature even though, technically, the latter
may be more correct.
*^Jay Kobler, "Pension Reform and the Life Insurance
Industry," Best's Review; Life and Health Insurance Edition,
L XXII, No. 5 (September, 1971). 72.

funding program that would ultimately meet all costs,
lack of time for the completion of a realistic funding
objective, or loss of asset values through realized
or unrealized capital losses. A pension guaranty
fund would be designed to deal with an insufficiency
of assets, as respects covered benefits, at the time
of plan termination, or under other specified
circumstances.
Participating pension plans would pay premiums,
the amount of which would be determined by the level of
the unfunded liability.

When a participating plan does

terminate, the guaranty fund then would fund all unfunded
liabilities so that all accrued benefits can be realized.
Insurance of unfunded liabilities generally is
felt to be supplementary to a sound funding system.

Even

a plan which is considered to be soundly funded on an
actuarial basis may not have adequate assets to fund all
accrued benefits should the plan be terminated.

If the

plan provides for amortization of the unfunded liabilities
over a reasonable period (e.g., twenty to thirty years) and
if the unfunded liability is insured until full funding
is achieved, then accrued benefit security is assured even
if the plan is terminated.

Sufficient assets would always

be available should an employee want to transfer his
credits to a succeeding plan in the event of his job change
or the termination of the plan.

Portability thus could be

achieved without the fund adequacy being endangered by
adverse turnover experience.
20

Dan M. McGill, Guaranty Fund for Private Pension
Obligations (Homewood, Ill.i Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
1970), p. 92.
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Supporting Arguments
Although most of the support for some sort of
insurance of unfunded liabilities centers around the
inequitable treatment of employees who are participants
in a terminating plan, there are two other arguments
often presented by legislative proponents of the insurance
concept.

First, the cost of the insurance would be spread

among all participating plans so that maximum protection
for any one plan could be obtained at minimum cost (e.g.,
the premium could be two percent of the value of the
21
unfunded liability ). Second, the guaranty fund is
viewed as being comparable to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (F.D.I.C.), the insurance pool for commercial
bank deposits.

The success of the F.D.I.C. is used as

a measure of the probable success of a pension insurance
pool for unfunded liabilities.
Op-posing Arguments
The opponents of a guaranty fund question " . . .

whe

ther the contingency of plan termination is an insurable
risk.

. . . Employees, as part of their employment respon

sibilities, assume the risk of continued plant operations
22
until the pension plan is fully funded.”
In addition,
the F.D.I.C. analogy may be misleading since the purpose
21This figure was incorporated in Rep. Dent's bill
(H.R. 1269) and has been used in several similar bills.
22
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Interim Report, p. 22.

of bank deposit insurance is to protect depositors against
loss of money which was there at one time.

Unfunded

pension liabilities, on the other hand, have not been
supported by assets at any time in the past.
There are a number of other arguments against
the guaranty fund concept.

First, the cost may be too

high for marginal plans which have a large unfunded
liability.

Second, the amount of the premium may be

difficult to calculate.

A uniform assumption regarding

the probability of termination must be made and, realis
tically, this probability would not be uniform among
various plans.

The problem of premium calculation leads

to the third, and perhaps most potent, argument against
insuring unfunded liabilities!

why should well-established,

sound pension funds support marginal funds by paying
premiums to a pool from which only the terminating plans
derive any benefit?

Finally, the guaranty pool concept

may lead to plan uniformity and be used as a substitute
for funding.
Future of the Guaranty Fund Concept

Implementation of an insurance pool for unfunded
liability protection is dependent on the proven need for
such a mechanism.

The major studies conducted in this

area to date are presented in Table 5»

Although it is

very difficult to draw conclusions from the data, the
studies seem to indicate that only .04 - 2.0 percent of
all covered employees are affected by pension plan
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TABLE 5
PRIVATE PENSION PLAN TERMINATION STUDIES
Study, Author

Summary Results

Internal Reve
nue Service
reported in
Employee
Benefit Plan
Review

Emerson H.
Terminations
from 1955-65
Joint Study
by IRS and
BLS

(1) Since the IRS has been keeping records
on qualification, 19*989 plans have ter
minated to the end of 1971 (representing
6*95% of all the plans).
(2) Total number of employees involved in
terminated plans— 8 0 0 ,0 0 0 .
(3) In 1971 alone, 3*335 plans terminated,
affecting 125*000 employees.

(1) Age of Plan at Termination
Plans
in Years
Number .. Y
Number
w
1 or less
284
5.8
6.7
13
2
12
468
11.9
5.3
11.6
8.4
19
3
495
4
8
380
3.6
8.9
8.0
5.8
5
339
13
6
286
14
6.2
6.7
16
278
7
7.1
6.5
8
7.6
211
5.0
17
16
168
3.9
7.1
9
12
10
4.5
5.3
193
12
164
11
3.9
5.3
12
12
3.6
152
5.3
10
4.4
126
3.0
13
8
108
3.6
14
2.5
11.2
16.0
15 or more
478
36
3.0
Unknown
___Z
, 129
1 0 0.0
100.0
225
4,259
(2) Reason for Termination
Participants
Plans
No.
No.
Reason
*
32.4
1 ,2 7 6
30.0
Merger or Sale
73
Financial
38
Difficulties
1,087 2 5 . 5
16.9
18.1
Business Dissolved
19.1
771
43
Change to Profit
14
6.2
214
5.0
Sharing
4.2
180
11
Agreement with Union
4.9
4.1
11
Transfer to Other Plan 175
4.9
Lack of Employee
8
3.6
Interest
2.9
125
2.6
Few Employees Eligible 111
7
3.1
7.6
20
320
Other
8.9
100.0
4,259 100.0 225
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TABLE 5— ’Continued
Study, Author

Summary Results
(3) Number of Participants per Plan Terminated
Plans
Part i cipant s
No.
No.
-1 ft
Under 10
44.4
4.0
1,691
9
10-24
7.6
17
1,093 2 5 . 7
18
8.0
25-49
499 1 1 . 7
8.6
26
11.6
367
50-99
40
17.8
100-249
5.9
253
90
2.1
13.8
250-499
31
42
1,0
500-999
29
12.9
•6
1000 and over
24
24.4
15
^,251 100.0 225 100.0

Senate Labor
Subcommittee
Examination
of 115
terminated
plans

(1) Incidence of terminations is increasing,
especially where foreign imports have cut in.
(2) Insufficient funding implies the need for
mandated funding and reinsurance.
(3) If the company voluntarily closes down,
then that company should bear part of the
termination cost, but if the closure is in
voluntary (bankruptcy, etc.), then reinsurance
would cover the termination.
(4) Communication to employees was very
shallow and needed to be improved.
(5) Terminations are often preceded by an
increase in benefits, so funding cannot be
the full answer; reinsurance is necessary to
supplement benefit security.

Department of (1) Study of terminations in first 7 months
of 1972
Treasury and
No.
Department of
# of
a)
Terminated
plans
Labor;
" W
b) Terminated plans— num
Interim
ber of claimants
20,731
c) Plans with losses
293
d) Claimants in loss plans 10,469 5196 of (b)
e) Claimants with losses
8,357 40# of (b)
or .04# of
all workers
covered

n
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TABLE 5— Continued
Study, Author

Summary Results
No.
f) Claimants with lossest
Retirees and bene
ficiaries
Eligible for Ret.
Vested
Active
Unclassified

# of ()

0
•
0
0

658 7.8 7#
391 4.67
2,027 24.2?
5,192 62.30
89 1 . 0 6
8,357
42#
34# of (e)
17.6#
11.9
70.6
0
•
0
0
H

g) Amount distributed as #
of present value of
benefits for (e)
h) Claimants losing all
benefits
2,847
i) Claimants in terminated
plans with lossest
With superseding plan
1,469
Other new plan (e.g.,
progit sharing plan)
992
No superseding plan
-.5.1-8,96
8,357
Type
of
plan
(by
j)
claimant with losses)s
1,286
Insured
Self-Insured
6,153
628
Split-funding
281
Other
Unknown

15.39#
73.62
7.51
3.36
.10

§,357 100
k) Reason for termination
(by claimant)
Sale or transfer of
ownership
904
Merger
181
New superseding plan
1,209
Lack-employee parti
cipation
173
Adverse business earnings 920
Liquidation or dissolu
tion of company
1 494
Sale or transfer of
ownership and either ad
verse earnings or
656
liquidation
Merger and either adverse
0
earnings or liquidation
164
Combination
618
Other or Unknown

.

11#
2
14
2
11
18

8
0
2
7

TABLE 5— Continued
Study, Author

Summary Results
No.
Closure of plant, di
vision or subsidairy
but not entire firm

2,038

* of ()
2k

6,357 100$

(2) Present value of total benefits lost—
$20 million
(3) Study of Multiemployer plans— 1965-71
a) Number of plans— 6k
b) Number of participants— 57,690
c) Median number of participants per plan—

355
d) 68$ terminated prior to 1969 with smallest
number terminated in 1971
e) 97$ terminated because of pending merger
into a succeeding plan
f) 78$ of
the plans were at least 5 years old
g) 67$ of the plans were in manufacturing
and 21$ in wholesale and retail
h) 61$
ofthe plans were self-insured»
38$ were insured (Deposit Administration)
Source*

The complete title of each study is cited
in the bibliography, by author. Summary results
have been quoted directly— no calculations or
adjustments have been made to the authors*
figures.
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terminations! and the Interim Report of the joint TreasuryLabor Departments' study indicates that 70 percent of the
claimants with benefit losses are not covered immediately
under a superseding plan.

The total cost of insuring

unfunded liabilities for the first seven months of 1972 would
have been $20 milliont the present value of all benefits
23
lost. J

The partial results of the joint agency study do

not permit at present a well-defined estimate of the
future of the guaranty fund concept.

On the one handf

the relatively low cost of insurance of unfunded liabilities
($20 million) may encourage legislators to pass regulation
in this area of pension reform.

Converselyt the element

of low cost combined with the fact that few (.04 percent)
employees are affected by the plan terminations! lends
credence to the position that insurance of unfunded
liabilities is not necessary.

In addition, there is

considerable opposition to legislation in this area by
pension and business leaders so that successful passage
is unlikely even if the need is determined.

24

Possible

alternatives to insurance of the unfunded liability
include (1) the extension of Opinion 8 of the Accounting
Principles Board and (2) legislation of plan termination
priorities.
2^U.S., Department of the Treasury and Department
of Labor, Study of Pension Plan Terminations. 1972 ^ Interim
Report (Washington, D.C.« Government Printing Office,
February, 1973)* P* 2.
24
Anderson, private interview, August 10, 1972.
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Disclosure and Fiduciary Responsibility
Interrelationship of Two Pension Issues
Although disclosure and fiduciary responsibility
often are referred to in a joint context, the two issues
may be considered on an individual —
collective —

basis.

rather than

Fiduciary responsibility as a current

issue in pension reform literature refers to the estab
lishment of performance standards for persons having
authority over the control and disposition of pension
funds.

Such standards may include investment practices,

rules of conduct, degree of personal liability and regular
ity of outside audits.

Disclosure refers to keeping

employees adequately informed about pension benefits as
well as the circumstances under which employees would be
disqualified for coverage.

Since disclosure standards

could easily be included within increased fiduciary
responsibility provisions, the close association of the
two issues is natural.
The relationship between disclosure and fiduciary
responsibility has been strengthened further by the fact
that legislative proposals for pension reform generally
have dealt with both issues as a single entity.

For

^ S e e Appendix A for examples of legislative pro
posals.
The original Nixon Administration proposal, H.R.
3272, is an example of the close association between
disclosure and fiduciary responsibility.
This bill was
introduced much earlier than the Administration’s pension
reform proposals on vesting and tax reforms, H.R. 12272.

8?

example, the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act
(see Appendix B) imposes such standards in the areas
of both disclosure and fiduciary responsibility.
Supporting Arguments
Proponents of pension reform feel that the Welfare
and Pension Plans Disclosure Act is inadequate.

Individual

occurences of abuse such as the following often are cited
as reasons for extending legislation in the area of
disclosure and fiduciary responsibility!

(1) benefits

forfeited by employees who do not know they are eligible
recipients,

(2) plan descriptions distributed to employees

that often are complicated and vague, (3) unsound invest
ment practices and (**•) misuse of pension funds.
Opposing Arguments
Persons who oppose legislation for broader dis*closure and fiduciary standards contend that employees pro?
bably would not be interested in reading additional
descriptive material on pension plans.

26

Moreover, the

increased paperwork involved would be expensive and possibly
unnecessary.

In addition, since the Labor Department

is not able to handle the work it now has responsibility
for under the Pension and Welfare Plans Disclosure Act,
opponents allege that further requirements for that agency
to enforce may be useless.^

A final objection to increased

2^Dan M. McGill, Fulfilling Pension Expectations
(Homewood, 111.i Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962), pp. 2^9-52.
2^Anderson, private interview, August 10, 1972.

disclosure standards is the possible adverse effects
in the equity market if all pension fund investment
po
transactions are disclosed.
Conclusions
Legislation in the areas of disclosure and fiduciary
responsibility has been successful in the past and will
probably be strengthened in the future.

Since few legis

lators or even members of the pension and business sectors
oppose this type regulation, additional disclosure and
fiduciary responsibility regulations may be enacted.

By

synchronizing these regulations with other pension reform
legislation (including portability), employees will be
adequately informed of their rights and assured of the
receipt of all accrued benefits.
Miscellaneous Pension Issues
In addition to the pension reform issues discussed
above, there are a number of relatively minor pension
problem areas being considered by legislators.
Investment of Pension Funds
The increasing concentration of pension fund assets
invested in the equity markets is of concern to legislators
for several reasons.

First, pension fund managers can

engage in the transaction of large block trades, thus
Jay Kobler, "Employers, Pension Plans, and
Insurers," Best*s Review; Life and Health Edition, LXXII,
No. 6 (October, 1971)» 54.

influencing the prices of common stocks.

Equity market

vulnerability is feared by market analysts due to the
economic concentration of pension funds.

29
7

Second,

should there be a serious deterioration of stock market
prices, pension fund asset values might be decreased.
Finally, if strong portfolio restrictions are placed on
the investment of pension funds, it is possible that a
substantial source of equity capital could be lost.
Tax Incentives
In addition to the tax free transfer proposals and
relief for self-employed individuals included in the Nixon
Administration bill (H.R. 7157 )> there have been several
suggestions for providing other tax incentives.

For

example, tax free transfers could be allowed for any part
of a benefit transferred to a succeeding fund.

Such

transfers also could be allowed in the event of not only
employee termination, but also plan termination or partial
termination brought about by a plant's closing.

Although

H.R. 7157 only permits tax free transfers between qualified
individual retirement accounts and qualified employersponsored plans, further transfers could be allowed
between Keogh plans and tax deferred plans.

30

^ " T i g h t e r Rules for Private Pensions— The
Outlook Now," U.S. News and World Report, October 2,
1972, p. 62.
-^°Norman H. Tarver, "Preservation of Pension Bene
fits," Best's Review; Life and Health Insurance Edition,
LXXII, No. 11 (March, 1972), 22-24.

A final tax incentive to increase pension coverage is
the allowance of extra deductions for contributions made
by small employers; e.g., 115 percent of contributions
allowable as deductible expenses.
Reorganization of Regulatory Agencies
Pension reform advocates often acclaim the need
for a reorganization of pension regulatory agencies into
some sort of central pension bureau.

The pension regula

tory powers of such agencies as the Labor Department, the
Treasury Department, and the Securities and Exchange Com
mission would be involved in this reorganization and it is
. questionable whether the various bureaucracies
would relinquish their powers."^1

Reform advocates claim

that if such a central agency cannot be established, then a
central pension registry office should be created to
record all the scattered benefit credits of a given
employee.

Other reorganization suggestions include dual

administration under the Treasury Departmenti

one office

would protect employee interests by imposing penalties for
noncompliance and a second office would protect revenue by
32
encouraging compliance through tax incentives.
-^Kobler, "Pension Reform," p. 7^»
-^Charles*D. Spencer, "Who Will Have Jurisdiction
When Pension Legislation Finally Becomes a Reality?"
Recent Developments in Pension Benefits. Employee Benefit
Plan Review, November 17» 1972, p. 1.
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Portability for Government Contract Employees
Congress also is concerned that employees who
frequently are affected by changes in government contracts
(e.g., engineers in the defense industry) not be put at
a disadvantage relative to other workers because of govern
ment policies.

Consequently, there has been interest in

requiring portability as part of any government contract. ^
Locking-In
Many pension contracts provide that, upon termin
ation, an employee can elect a cash settlement for his
accrued pension credits.

Proponents of pension reform

contend that employees should be protected from themselvesj
i.e., pension contributions should be locked in and not
available as cash distributions.
Expansion of State Regulation
As an alternative to federal regulation, state regu
lation of pensions could be expanded.
The application of state insurance regulation to
private pension plans is called for.
The reasons
for this are purely pragmatic.
The basic legislation
existsj principles have been worked out a^d have been
well testedj organizations are in being.
This proposal has not received wide attention because of
-^"Pension Legislation Gets Surprise Entry,"
Industry Week. September 11, 1972, p. 24.
-^Murray W. Latimer, "The Need for Regulation of
Private Pension Plans," Best's Insurance News* Life
Edition, LXVIII, No. 6 (October, 1967), 52.
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the obvious disadvantages of nonuniform state regulation
of interstate pension plans.
Overfunding
35
Overfunding-'-' is a pension reform issue' that has

received rather wide attention in the 93d Congress due to
the publicized abuses of the administrators of the Elgin
Watch Company pension plan and similar cases.

The Elgin

Watch Company's pension plan which had been in existence
since 1918, became overfunded in 1958 as the result of
outstanding investment returns on plan assets and a
reduction in the company's workforce.
employer contributions were stopped.

At that time,
The fund currently

has an asset value of approximately $30 million.

The

plan administrators are attempting to terminate the plan
and purchase insured annuities for employees.

The cost

of insuring all accrued benefits amounts to about $18
million.

The remaining $12 million in the fund would revert

to the company as a tax free gain since the revenue losses
from manufacturing operations for Elgin amount to about
-^Overfunding occurs when the assets of the fund ex
ceed the present value of all benefits due. This situation
usually is prevented by the Treasury Department's quali
fication rule that annual contributions may not exceed the
sum of (1) the normal cost of the plan, plus (2) 10 percent
of the unfunded supplemental liability plus (3) interest
on the remaining unfunded supplemental liability.
Should
overfunding occur, the Internal Revenue Service has the
authority to handle the abuse by disallowing qualification
of the plan as a deductible expense for federal income tax
purposes.
In the event of plan termination, the Internal Re
venue Service also has the authority to compel compliance by
enforcing the vesting provisions under termination proceedings.

$16 million* i.e., the $12 million gain can be netted
against the $16 million loss.
Legislation has been deemed necessary to prevent
the excess assets of a terminating pension plan from
reverting to the company or succeeding corporation if
a merger or sale is involved.

Opponents ;of overfunding

legislation point out that if the Internal Revenue Service
had enforced its own rules, the Elgin situation would not
3?

have occurred.^'

Summary and Conclusions
Should pension reform legislation in the near future
be successful, it is likely to include some form of
minimum vesting and funding standards, tax relief for
transfer of pension credits by terminating employees and
increased disclosure and fiduciary responsibility standards.
Any legislative effort in the area of insurance of
unfunded pension liabilities probably will encounter strong
opposition from pension administrators and business repre
sentatives.

The evidence to date in this latter area of

pension reform indicates that reform may indeed be unneces
sary.

Moreover, mandatory guaranty fund provisions may

3^U,S.# Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Retirement Income Security for Employees
Act. 1973. Hearings before a Subcommittee on Labor of the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Senate, on S. k and
S. 75. 93d Cong., 1st sess., February 15, 16, 1973»
pp. 193-202.
37Ibid.. p. 385.

may restrict pension coverage growth and benefit expansion
and encourage the substitution of insurance for sound
funding practices.
Pension legislation, including vesting, funding
and tax relief for transfer of pension credits, should
make a portability system a realistic future development.
The vesting standard would provide a terminating employee
with a minimum nonforfeitable pension to transfer and
the funding standard would ensure that assets are available
to transfer.

The tax-free transfer provision is one

means of effecting the transfer and may encourage plan
administrators to provide portability for terminating
employees.
Now that the various pension issues have been
examined to determine the content of a future pension
reform package, past legislative efforts and the reasons
for their lack of success will be discussed in the next
chapter.

The causes of the changing climate for pension

reform also will be explored in order to determine the
future of pension regulation.

CHAPTER IV

PAST FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE ACTION AND
CURRENT PENSION CONTROL CLIMATE
Basis of Legislative Interest in Pension Control
Private Pensions— A Public Concern
The private pension industry has become an area
of concern to federal legislators and the focus of this
attention has been mandated reform of private pension plans.
One of the earliest and clearest statements of the position
that private pensions are a public concern is found in the
1965 Report to the President on Corporate Pension Funds by
a special White House study committee 1
Although the development of private retirement
plans has largely been the result of business and labor
initiative, public policy has encouraged and protected
these plans through tax laws, labor relations, statutes,
standards of fiducial obligations of trustees, and more
recently through specifically designed legislation
requiring public disclosure of various aspects of
retirement and welfare plans.
Financial and Cultural Environment.— Since the
private pension industry has achieved much of its growth
President*s Committee on Corporate Pension Funds
and Other Private Retirement and Welfare Programs, Public
Policy and Private Pension Programs, A Report to the Presi
dent on Private Employee Retirement Plans (Washington. D. C . 1
Government Printing Office, 1965)* p. 1.
95
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through the protective federal income tax status afforded
qualified pension plans, private pensions are felt to be a
public concern.

The favorable tax situation for private

pension plans essentially means that employees who are not
covered by a private system are being discriminated against.
They enjoy no tax advantages of planning for retirement
directly or indirectly through their employer.
In a more general perspective, the concept of
private pensions has been accepted as part of the American
way of life for several reasons.

First, private pensions

are viewed as supportive of the popular American work
ethic

since retirement benefits of private plans usually

are related to years of service with an employer.

In

addition, private pensions often are associated with the
Social Security system; i.e., private pensions supplement
the floor of protection afforded by Social Security benefits.
Federal legislators would like to improve the private pension
system because

"heat would be taken off the constant

esca

lation of the social security benefit because of the

pres

sures of economics, if there was a much more intelligent
private pension plan system."-^
Protection of Individuals.— With increasing re2

U.S., Congress, Senate, Debate regarding Pension
Reform and the Senate Finance Committee action on S. 3598,
92d Cong., 2d sess., September 27, 1972, Congressional
Record. CXVIII, S.I6 0 5 6 .
3
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means,
Tax Proposals Affecting Private Pension Plans, Hearings
before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representa
tives, on H.R. 12272, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, p. 210.
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liance by the American labor force on private pensions for
retirement income, there is constant pressure for legis
lators to extend such coverage.

For example, approximately

half of the nation's workforce is not covered by private
pensions.

k

For many of the employees covered under a pri*

vate pension plan, the coverage is inadequate.

Persons

who change jobs frequently may never become eligible
for benefits.

The inadequate or nonexistent coverage of

employees has been " . . .
small employee groups.

obviously concentrated among

Employers include proprietors,

partnerships and small incorporated b u s i n e s s e s . I n
particular, benefit coverage has been cited as inadequate
in the areas of spouse benefits^ and benefits for women
employees.^
Not only are many employees not covered under a
George B. Swick, "Report of the Legislative Panel
of the Society of Actuaries," Address presented at the
Society of Actuaries' Regional Meeting, New Orleans,
Louisiana, March 20, 1972, p. 3»
(Mimeographed)
-\james H. Schultz, Pension Aspects of the Economics
of Agingi
Present and Future Roles of Private Pensions,
A Working Paper in Conjunction with the overall study of
Economics of Aging« Toward a Full Share in Abundance
prepared for the Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate
(Washington, D.C.i Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 27.
^"Nader Charges'Fraud' on Private Pension System,"
Pension and Welfare News. VIII, No. 7 (July, 1972), p. 31*
7
'U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Retirement Income Security for Employees
Act. 1972. Hearings before the Subcommittee dn Labor of
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Senate, on
S. 3598, S. 302*J>, S. 3012 and other Bills, 92d Cong.,
2d sess., 1972, p. 3 0 3 *
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private plan or are inadequately covered, but there has been
a decrease in the extension of coverage in recent years.
There has been some slowdown in the rates of growth
since i9 6 0 . This slackening indicates that, tinder the
existing structure and operation of private pension
plans, a large proportion of the employed labor force
is having difficulty in securing supplemental retirement
protection.
The most accessible groups are already
covered, and future expansion must be in industries in
which small businesses are prevalent.
Current trends
indicate that the vast majority of newly established
plans are in this category.
Legislators recognize that many employees do not
participate in the establishment of pension plans (except
in the case of negotiated plans), nor are they able to
understand the provisions of the contracts.

Many employees

simply do not face the need for provision of retirement
income.

In these cases, the protection of such individuals

is felt to be the responsibility of the federal government.
Most pensioners cannot be expected to read the fine
print, nor to understand it. What is at work is the
fundamental notion of fairness— the kind that invar
iably ends up in legislation, sooner or later.
Hazards of Private Pension Plans.--In addition to
the inadequacy of benefits and benefit coverage, there are
a number of hazards in the private pension concept from
which employees are considered to need protection.
first hazard is underfunding.

The

Should the plan terminate

before funding is complete, there will not be sufficient
Q

Schultz, Economics of Aging, p. 7 .

Q

7Frank Cummings, "Private Pension Plans* Vesting,
Funding, Portability," Columbia Journal of World Business.
Ill, No. 5 (September— October, 1 9 6 8 ), 80.
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assets to provide the benefits promised.

When firms are

caught in a profit squeeze, there is also the temptation
to borrow from the fund or simply to renege on funding
pension contributions.

For example, "Ford Motor Company

owes $480,000,000 to its pension fund, while Uniroyal and
Western Union owe $450,000,000 and $364,000,000, respec
tively."10
A second hazard which employees covered under
private pension plans may encounter is that of inadequate
investment performance, or even wide asset deterioration
in the event of adverse market conditions.

Even a well

funded plan may prove inadequate if serious individual
security or market adjustments are experienced.
A final area which could affect the pension security
of an employee is that of changing market conditions within
an industry.

The defense industry is well known for its

frequent layoffs and resulting loss of pension credits
for its employees.

Although not all market changes are

experienced as suddenly as in the defense industry, manu
facturing firms also may be required to make production
and labor adjustments when demand changes or perhaps when
imports drastically affect the market or product price.
In addition, any period of conglomerate activity involving
acquisitions or spinoffs can result in pension plan
10Rep. Seymour Halpern, "Radical Departure Needed
in Pension Legislation." Pension and Welfare N e w s , VIII,
No. 9 (September, 1972), 67 .
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terminations* the plan involved may or may not be super
seded by another plan.
In summary, private pensions are a public concern
due to the preferential tax status of qualified plans, the
establishment of the private pension system as a needed
supplement to Social Security benefits and the contention
that employees need to be protected against inadequate
or nonexistent benefits.

Thus, pension coverage should be

extended in order to prevent discrimination against
employees who are not covered.

In addition, those employees

who are covered are deemed to need the protection of a
guarantee of pension benefits.

Underfunding, adverse

investment problems and market competition fluctuations
can create situations where even a long-service employee's
pension is unsafe.
Private Pension Fund Abuses
Although the theoretical basis of federal legis
lative interest in pension control has been established,
it is quite likely that many legislators would not have
been active in pressing for reform had not publication of
specific pension fund abuses brought the issue to their
attention.

The inappropriate use of pension funds by

administrators has been examined at Senate hearings.
Examples of fund misuse include (1) the loaning of pension
funds to a trustee at low interest rates,

(2) contribu

tions mady by promissory motes which may not be collectible
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and (3) as a specific case* the depositing of tens of
millions of dollars of assets of the United Mineworkers
Pension and Welfare Fund into a union run bank account
11
which earned no interest.
Ralph Nader has charged
that management uses pension funds to perpetuate the con
trol of corporate management, finance its own activities,
exercise control over other corporations and support
12
interlocking directorates.
In addition to the misuse of pension funds, liter
ally thousands of abuses involving individual employees0
pension credits have been brought to legislators0 atten
tion in Congressional hearings, by individuals contacting
their Senators and Congressmen and by the press and
13
television. J

Long-service employees who are terminated

just prior to retirement or vesting, or victims of unfunded
terminated plans, or mobile employees who never quite
qualify for a pension benefit are often presented in
1:*U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Hearings on S. 3598 and Other Bills,
1972, p. 373.
1^Ralph Nader, "Ralph Nader Looks at Private Pen
sion Plans." Pension and Welfare News, VII, No. 9 (Septem
ber, 1971), 28.
1-^Examples of the publication of unfair practices
by employers regarding pension credits include the fol
lowing:
"The Big Pension Myth," Chicago Daily News. March
8, 1971, p. 6; "The Light and Dark Corners of Disclosure,"
Forbes, March 15, 1972, p. 3; "NBC Reports," N.B.C. tele
cast, September 12, 1972:
"Pensions:
The Broken Promise,"
Narrator, Edwin Newman; "Phantom Pensions in Industry," New
York Times. April 17, 1971; "Urged; Tighter Rules on Pen
sion Funds," U.S. News and World Report. April 12, 1971,p.7;
George Lardner, Jr., "Pension Plan Study Reveals Big Ma
jority No Benefits," Washington Post. April 1, 1971, p. 2.
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television appeals for pension reform.

The most recent

comprehensive criticism of the private pension system is
the book You and Your Pension by Ralph Nader and Kate
1 *5

Blackwell. J

The authors present the plight of 500

disappointed pensioners in a book that undoubtedly will
be widely read by legislators and constituents alike.
History of Legislative Interest
Pension and Welfare Plans Disclosure Act
A chronology of major federal legislative acti
vities in the area of pension reform is presented in
Table 5»

Nearly every Congress during the past twenty

years has been concerned with pension control legislation.
Numerous studies have been funded and conducted by Con
gressional Committees and numerous hearings have been
held by at least eight committees and various subcommittees
of those committees.

The only legislation resulting from

all of this activity was the enactment in 1958 of the
Pension and Welfare Plans Disclosure Act, and its sub
sequent amendment in 1962.
14

Under this act all plans

.

Many of the publications and news presentations
have been criticized on the grounds that both sides of the
issue are not presented} i.e., the employer's position has
been unfairly represented. The telecast by N.B.C.'s Edwin
Newman on "Pensions: The Broken Promise," September 12,
1972, has been cited by the Federal Communications Commis
sion for not complying with the agency's fair reporting
standards. Although the program was presented the 1972
George Foster Peabody Award for outstanding TV journalism,
N.B.C. must present additional viewpoints.
(Wall Street
Journal. May 7» 1973* P» 5* )
^ R a l p h Nader and Kate Blackwell, You and Your
Pension (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973)*
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TABLE 6

CHRONOLOGY OP MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS
Congress Date
83d

1953-

Activity/Title
Hearings

House Committee on
Education and Labor

Hearings and Study

Subcommittee on Wel
fare and Pension Funds,
Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare

195^
83d84th

19531956

Legislative Body

85th

19571958

Hearings by two
separate Congres
sional Committees

(1) House Committee on
Education and Labor
(2) Senate Committee
on Labor and Public
Welfare? Subcommittee
on Labor

85th

1958

Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act

U.S. Congress

87th

1961

Money and Credit}
Their Influence on
Jobs, Prices» and
Growth

Commission on Money
and Credit

8?th

19611962

Hearings

Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Wel
fare? Subcommittee on
Labor

87th

1962

Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act
Amended

U.S. Congress

87th

1962

President John F, Ken- Executive Branch
hedy established the
President's Committee
on Corporate Pension
Funds and Other Pri
vate Retirement and
Welfare Programs

89th

1965

Public Policy and
Private Pension Pro
grams? A Report to
the President

President's Committee
on Corporate Pension
Funds and Other Pri
vate Retirement and
Welfare Programs
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TABLE 6—
Congress Date
89th

196519 66

Continued

Activity/Title

Legislative Body

Hearings by three
separate Congres
sional Committees

(1) Senate Special
Committee on Investiations
2) Senate Finance
Committee
(3) Joint Economic
Committee ? Subcom
mittee on Fiscal
Policy

f

89th

1966

Joint Economic Com
mittee Staff Report
prepared by Nelson
McClung

Joint Economic Com
mittee? Subcommittee
on Fiscal Policy

90th

1967-

Hearings

Senate Special Select
Committee on Aging

1968
91st

19691970

Hearings by three
separate Congres
sional Committees

(1) House Education
and Labor Committee;
Subcommittee on Labor
(2) Senate Labor and
Public Welfare Com
mittee? Subcommittee
on Labor (hearings on
pension fund of the
United Mine Workers)
(3) Senate Special Se
lect Committee on
Aging

92d

19711972

Hearings by three
separate Congres
sional Committees

(1) House Ways and
Means Committee
(2) House General Com
mittee on Education
and Labor; Subcommittee
on Labor? Hearings!
a) General Pension
Reform
b) Teacher Portability
(3) Senate Committee
on Labor and Public
Welfare? Subcommittee
on Labor? 3 hearings:
a) General Reform
b) Terminations
c ) General Reform
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TABLE 6— Continued
Congress Date

Activity/Title

Legislative Body

92d93d

19711973

Study; including
comprehensive pen
sion plan survey;
results released in
several Committee
prints

Senate Committee on
Labor and Public
Welfare; Subcommittee
on Labor

92d93d

1971*
1973

Study on Funding
and Plan Termina
tions authorized by
President Nixon

U.S. Departments of
Labor and the
Treasury

92d93d

1971*
1973

Study on Compre
hensive Pension
Reform

House Pension Task
Force; Committee on
Education and Labor

93d

1973

Hearings by four
separate Congres
sional Committees

(1) Senate Committee
on Labor and Public
Welfare; Subcommittee
on Labor
(2) House Committee on
Ways and Means (Joint
Committee on Income
Tax)
(3) House Committee on
Education and Labor
(^) Senate Committee on
Finance; Subcommittee
on Pensions

93d

1973

Study on Funding
and Plan Termina
tions— Interim Re
port released

U.S. Departments of
Labor and the Treasury

Source:

89th-93d Cong., Hearings before the House Com
mittee on Ways and Means, Senate Subcommittee
on Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, House Committee on Education and Labor;
Joint Economic Committee and Senate Special
Select Committee on Aging; 83d-87th C o ng.,
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Interim Report of Activities
of the Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study,
by the Subcommittee on Labor, S. Rept. $2-634,
9*2d Cong., 2d sess., 1971, PP* ^-5» 27.

covering more than twenty-five employees must file with
the Office of Labor-Management and Welfare-Pension
Reports (Department of Labor) a plan description within
ninety days after establishment of the plan.

In addition*

if a plan covers 100 or more employees, the plan adminis
trator also must submit an annual financial report within
150 days of the end of the annual accounting period.

Plan

administrators further are required to make available for
examination by any participant or beneficiary copies of
the filed plan description and the latest annual report.
The Secretary of Labor may prosecute through the federal
judiciary system to compel compliance with the provisions
of the act.
The President's Report
The drive for pension legislation was not arrested
by the passage of this legislation.

The findings of the
16
Commission of Money and Credit in 1962
served as a point

of departure for the study conducted by the President's
Committee on Corporate Pension Funds and Other Private
Retirement and Welfare Programs which was established by
President John F. Kennedy in 19 62.

Although the Commission

on Money and Credit was mainly concerned with the fiducial
investment practices of pension managers, the President's
Committee encompassed a broad, in-depth study of the
16

Commission on Money and Credit, Money and Credit:
Their Influence on Jobs. Prices, and Growth (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.t
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1 9 6 1 ), pp. 175-1??*
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private pension system.

The findings of this Committee

have served as the basis for many of the bills, intro
duced in the Congress after the study was completed in
19 65.

The Committee expressed a sound commitment to the need

for continued public support of the private pension system
through indirect tax subsidies even though current
pension practices were viewed as inhibiting labor mo17
bility.
The specific recommendations of the President's
Committee included (1) minimum vesting as a condition of
qualification for favorable federal income tax treatment,
(2) a thirty year amortization period for unfunded
liabilities as an additional IRS qualification requirement,
(3) further study in the areas of portability and termina
tion insurance,

(4) miscellaneous tax adjustments and (5)

increased fiduciary responsibility and disclosure standards.
Joint Economic Committee Staff Report
The staff report by the Joint Economic Committee,
prepared in large part by economist Nelson McClung, was
the first report on the entire pension field prepared by
a Congressional Committee.
Whereas the Presidential report implicitly
accepted the economic and social justification for a
private pension system, the JEC staff report ex17

'See Appendix C for a summary of the more recent
studies on labor mobility.
Inhibition of labor mobility by
private pension plans is no longer considered a valid
concept.
18

'’Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations of
President's Committee on Corporate Pension Funds,1962,"
Employee Benefit Plan Review Research Reports. February,
19o5» PP. 1-2.

18
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plicitly calls into question that premise.
In other
words, this report is not another federal document
calling for reform in the system— it is largely an
indictment of thegVery existence of such a system,
reformed or not. y
The specific conclusions of this committee included (1) re
quiring all plans to be noncontributory,
funding,

(3) vesting,

reinsurance,

(b)

(2) minimum

extension of coverage,

(6) additional supervision,

(5)

(7) tax relief for

employee contributions and (8) the irrevocability of
pension credits to be established through either plan
merger, immediate vesting or portability.^®
The rather advanced conclusions of the Joint
Economic Committee prompted employers and the pension
industry to become concerned with pension reform.

Although

hearings have been held by several Congressional com
mittees on numerous reform bills in the 89th through the
92d Congresses, to date such legislation has been
proposed unsuccessfully.
Obstacles to Enactment of Comprehensive
Pension Reform Legislation
Need for Pension Control Not Urgent
Pension control has not been categorized as an
item of urgent priority by the members of the U.S. Congress.
19

'Joint Economic Committee Staff Report on Pensions
Indicts System as Thoroughly Irrational and Inefficient,"
Employee Benefit Plan Review Research Reports. December,
1 9 6 6 ,

p .

1 .

20Ibid.. pp. 5-6.
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Traditionally, such controversial measures as welfare,
health reform, Medicare, not to mention nonrelated issues
such as Viet Nam and international affairs, have been
given preliminary consideration over pension reform
proposals.

The concentration by legislators on Social

Security improvement seems to resolve the need for ad
dressing the plight of the elderly.

"Persons over age

6 5 , of course, are well aware of one area in which Congress
has taken action— Social Security benefits are up."

21

Although many disappointed pensioners have com
plained to individual Congressmen, there is no strong
public interest group promoting pension reform; i.e., there
is an "absence of representation of the interests of
beneficiaries before the Congress."

22

In the past, there have been no powerful sponsors
for pension reform bills.

Senator Jacob K. Javits (R— N.Y.)

and Rep. John Dent (D— Pa . ) have been the most active in
pushing for pension reform but their sponsorship alone has
been inadequate to elicit sufficient support for passage of
such legislation.

Members of Congress have been unwilling

to support reform legislation without concrete evidence of
need.

Prior to the studies conducted during the 92d and

93d Congress by the Senate Labor Subcommittee, the House
21

"Little Government Action on Health, Pensions,
During 1969--1970 May be a Different Story," Weekly News
Digest, Employee Benefit Plan Review Research Reports,
January 23, 1970, p. 2.
77

"Nader Charges 'Fraud,'" p. 33*
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Pension Task Force, and the Departments of Labor and
Treasury, a strong need for reform was not demonstrated;
instead, only isolated incidents of abuse were emphasized.
Many of the bills proposed prior to the 92d and
93d Congresses contained "loopholes" designed to benefit
multiemployer pension plans.
There are in addition a number of technical
defects which are obviously the result of inadequate
study of the problem, but which if not corrected in
the legislative process, could cause substantial and
unnecessary difficulties in administering even the
best of plans. J
Some bills are vague in definition and provision, leaving
the details of development to the administering agency.
For example, "one bill which had been introduced in the House
specified that the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare should design the details of a portability system
O/l,

utilizing the Social Security System."

Ambiguities,

defects and loopholes clearly decrease the chance of
passage.

Moreover, the scarcity of intelligent, logical

bills with strong sponsorship supports the premise that
pension control has not been an urgent reform issue.
Recognition of Administrative Problems
The private pension plans currently in existence
represent a diversity of plan types, benefit provisions
^Cummings, "Private Pension Plans," p. 80.
214.
"Tarver Suggests Changes in Nixon Administration
Pension Bill: Pension Legislation a Certainty," Recent
Developments in Pension Benefits. Employee Benefit Plan
Review, Research Report, November 17, 1972.
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and funding methods» thus increasing the difficulty of
developing a set of comprehensive governing rules for
pension reform.

Even if all-inclusive legislation were

drafted, there still remains the problem of determining
the appropriate government agency to administer the
program.

In a television interview, Charles Ruff of the

U.S. Justice Department said, "There is no government
agency large enough to handle government regulation of
pensions.
The administrative agencies most frequently
suggested are the Labor Department, Department of the
Treasury, Department of Health, Education and Welfare and
a newly created Department of Pension Administration.
Since some of the pension reform bills with the strongest
sponsorship come from the Labor Committees in both the
House and the Senate, these Committees advocate regulation
by the Labor Department.

Because regulation by the Labor

Department would be enforced through the federal court
system, this type of reform is termed "penalty legislation."
Administration of pension protection legislation by any
agency, however, will result in dual regulation and the
possibility of a conflicting interests.

The Department of

the Treasury regulating plan qualification has, as its
prime responsibility, protection of revenue.

The Labor

Department would have the responsibility of protecting the
individual's benefits.

Particular conflict of interest

2^"NBC Reports," September 12, 1972.

could arise in the area of funding? e.g., benefit security
of rapid funding versus revenue losses due to rapid
funding.
Other parties interested in pension reform advo
cate pension regulation that is administered through the
Department of the Treasury.

The Nixon Administration, the

House Committee on Ways and Means, the Senate Finance
Committee and various private industry groups have supported
enforcement of reform by amending the Internal Revenue
Code to require additional standards for plan qualification.

26

Since employers would have the incentive of

favorable tax treatment, regulation by the Treasury Depart
ment is termed ’'incentive legislation."

There are several

problems involved with incentive legislation.

First, if

vesting and funding are required as IRS qualification
standards, an employee has no ready means of recovering
damages for noncompliance.

Second, it may be neither

practical nor possible for an employee to recover damages
because of an employer's failure to meet tax law require
ments.

Finally, with dual administration: by the Treasury

Department and the Labor Department (under the provisions
of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act), it is
possible that only cursory checks of compliance will be made.

26

"Jurisdictional Problem Poses Some Realistic
Questions in Connection with Proposed Pension Plan Legis
lation," Employee Benefit Plan Review Research Report,
March, 1973 » P» !•
27Ibid., pp. 3-5.
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Since dual administration of pension plans already
exists, legislators must evaluate the problems involved
with additional regulation.

The determination of the

appropriate regulating agency and the means by which con
flicts of interest under dual administration may be mini
mized have been among the major deterrents to passage
of pension legislation.
Differences of Opinion--Political
In addition to the problems directly related to the
drafting of an effective pension reform bill, there are
also several obstacles of a political nature to enactment
of pension legislation.

First, the House, Senate and

Executive branch all have different approaches to pension
28
reform.
It will indeed be difficult to construct a
piece of comprehensive compromise legislation aggreable
to each of these factions.
A second hindrance to pension reform legislation
is the fact that pension reform must pass through at
least four committees, Senate and House Committees on

28

Although some of the differences of opinion
relating to the administering agency previously have
been discussed, a more thorough analysis of the three
predominant approaches will be presented in a later
chapter.
The provisions of the bills representing the
three various approaches to pension reform are available
in Appendix D.
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29

labor and tax. 7

In addition to the " . . .

traffic jam

of bills on committee agendas, especially in the House
30
Ways and Means C o m m i t t e e , t a x reform legislation
traditionally has originated in the House Committee on
Ways and Means.
The House takes the view— and we must respect it
because it is in a position to insist on it— that
revenue measures must originate in the House. While
the Senate may amend it, the House is not going to
consider any legislation initiated in the Senate on
a subject like this E private pension plans!, which
the House has studied, on which it has conducted
hearings, and on which it insists on its right to act
further.
That also is generally how the President
of the United~States believes we should proceed on
this subject.
An example of the Committee jurisdictional rivalry
was demonstrated in the Senate during the closing months
of the 92d Congress.

Reform bill S. 3598 jointly sponsored

by Senator Jacob K. Javits and Senator Harrison Williams
and forty-one other Senators was reported out of the Senate
Labor Committee.

The Finance Committee, claiming juris

diction in the area of pension reform, diverted the bill
to the Finance Committee.

The bill, however, was so

29

Pension legislation traditionally has been felt
to be tax related (except for fiduciary responsibility
and disclosure) because of the favorable tax status afforded
qualified private plans.
That is, any change in pension
plan requirements which will increase the level of con
tributions by employers will implicitly decrease federal
income tax revenue.
■^Robert W. Gardner, "Will Private Pensions be
Retired?" Industry Week (March 13i 1972), p. 33*
-^Quoting Senator Russell Long, U.S., Congress,
Senate, Debate, September 27» 1972, S.I6 0 5 6 .
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strongly supported that the sponsors were able to specify
that the Finance Committee should be allowed only one week
for consideration.

During that one week, "the Finance

Committee gutted most of the bill, eliminating the vesting,
funding, reinsurance and fiduciary responsibility pro32
visions,"
and leaving only the disclosure and fiduciary
responsibility provisions in tact.

The Finance Committee

essentially removed all parts related to tax issues to pre
serve the tradition of House origination of tax reform.

The

reduced form of the bill was never brought to the Senate
floor in the 92d Congress.

The bill has been reintro

duced, however, in the 93d Congress in the original form.
Pension Industry Lobby Groups
The continuing strength of pension reform advocates
in Congress has led to the formation and extension of
private industry lobby groups.

The most active of these

groups include the United States Chamber of Commerce, the
National Association of Manufacturers, the American
Bankers Association, the Life Insurance Association of
America and the Association of Private Pension and Welfare
Plans, Inc.
In addition to the traditional distrust of regu
lation and the tendency for regulation to expand once it
is initiated, the pension industry fears that regulation
•^"Politics in the Pension Legislation Arena,"
Weekly News Digest, Employee Benefit Plan Review Research
Report, September 29» 1972, p. 2

116
will inhibit the vitality of the private pension system.
Yet without the freedom to adopt their own funding
and vesting practices and thus minimize initial costs,
many companies that now boast outstanding pension
programs-might never have taken the pension path
at all. ^
If you over-legislate, everybody will run to
profit-sharing plans.-3
The private pension industry has encouraged indivi
dual plan tailoring to meet the needs of employers in dif
ferent industries, with varying numbers of employees who
range in ages and pension needs.

Such varied interests

possibly may not be able to be met by a pension system
with complicated minimum standards.
All penalty legislation is designed to regulate
pension plans already in existence and does not affect
employers who have ho pension plan.

Also, there is

no inducement for employers to establish new plans under
such stringent regulation.

Quoting Hilary L. Seal, a noted

pension author, "Is the legislature justified in penalizing
the •good® employer and allowing the *bad® to go scot
free?"35
Lobby groups have been quick to point out that the
cost of increased pension legislation could be reduced
33
^"The Push for Pension Reform," Business Week
(March 17, 1973), p. 48.
34
J Vance Anderson, Special Counsel, House General
Subcommittee on Labor, private interview, Washington,
D.C.t August 10, 1972.

33James A. Curtis, "How Should the Pension Pie
be Sliced?" Pension and Welfare News, VII, No. 9
(September, 1971), 33*
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benefits for employees or even bankruptcy for employers.
Since employers have only a limited amount of money avail
able for labor costs, future wage increases may be lost
in order for the employer to meet pension contribution
schedules.

In essence, "the government will be telling

the employees they have to save now, rather than spend
on the here and now."-^

Thus, a question arises as to

whether legislators in fact have the right to regulate
the disposition of private wages beyond the satisfaction
of basic needs, which is accomplished through the Social
Security system.
Legislators and lobbyists alike fear the problems
of unintended distortions often associated with regulation.
For example, a minimum vesting standard could result in the
forced termination of employees who suddenly become entitled
by regulation to vested benefits.

Similar cost savings

could be made by employer manipulation of layoff periods in
order to keep an employee from becoming vested.
The private pension system is adament in the defense
of the performance of that system. In answer to accusations
of fund abuse, the industry points out that most of the
'Hanky-panky® in pension funds has been in union
situations.
When investigations were conducted prior
to the passage of the Federal Disclosure Act, not
one instance of insurer malfeasance was discovered. '
•^Peter M. Flanigan, "A View of Pensions from the
White House,” Financial Executive (February, 1972), p. 19.
•^Jay Kobler, "Employees, Pension Plans, and In
surers,” Best*s Review; Life and Health Edition, LXXII,
No. $ (September, 1971), 12.
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Underfunding frequently is cited as an abuse in need
of corrective legislation, but underfunding essentially
is a contractual problem.

As long as a business is a

going concern, underfunding is not a problem.

If a plan

does terminate, the contractual termination provisions
govern the disposition of fund assets.
promised by the plan is fulfilled.

Whatever is

The well-known

termination of the Studebaker plan is an example of this
implied misconception of the promises of pension plans.
It £ the Studebaker pension plan 3. didn't promise
anything that wasn't delivered. The union was aware
at every step exactly what the condition of the
pension plan was.
In what way could a situation like
that be handled through the federal government? Every
day some small shop or factory closes down because
there's no longer a demand for buggy whips or butter
churns*Q Studebaker was the same thing on a larger
scale.^
Pension plan administrators point to the improve
ment of pension funding.

According to this view, the

federal income tax relief available for pension contributions
and the Opinion 8 minimum funding standards for accounting
certification are responsible for the alleged improved
funding of pension benefits.

Finally, the pension

industry contends that the real problem facing legislators
is inflation.

"The loss of pension benefits resulting

from inflationary governmental policies is currently
running at more than 120 times the rate of loss due to
-^Jay Kobler, "Pension Reform and the Life Insurance
Industry," Best's Review; Life and Health Insurance
Edition, LXXII, No. 5 (September, 1971), 12.
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uncompleted funding under plans terminating.
Changing Political Climate for Pension
Control Legislation
With a long history of legislative concern for
pension control, the current political climate may be more
conducive to the enactment of pension reforms.

Many

feel that pension reform is an issue whose time is come.
Rep. John Dent* The time for reflection is drawing
to a close.
Congress is committed to* making the private
welfare and pension system perform its proper function—
that of providing a meaningful supplement to social
security for the millions of workers already covered
and the {pillions who will be covered as the system
expands.
Sen. Jacob K. Javitsj Previous hearing records
have been packed with debate over whether anything
should be done.
I think we have passed that point,
and what we need now is careful analysis of these
bills, with a view to making sure they are correct
in_each detail, properly drafted, and properly
tailored to fit tljie needs of pension participants
and their plans. ~
Wall Street Journalt At this point it's a good
bet that the main pension changes will become part of
this year's package pf tax revisions, possibly the
most important part.
Public Pressure
Congressional interest in pension control is
-^U.S., Congress, Senate, Special Committee on
Aging, Economics of Agingt
Toward a Full Share in Abun
dance . Hearings before the Special Committee on Aging,
Senate, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, p. 1731*
kO
"Legislative Forum," Pension and Welfare News.
VIII, No. 9 (September, 1972),
ki
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Hearings on S. 3598 and Other Bills,
1 9 7 2, p. 93.
Kp
Wall Street Journal. March 26, 1973» P« 26.
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increasing due to public pressure.

Widespread defense

and industrial layoffs and,pension fund abuses have brought
the pension problem to the attention of legislators.
Employees are becoming: increasingly aware of the need for
pension fund protection.

In a speech before Congress, Sen

ator Hubert Humphrey said that the primary concern of
workers is pensions:

"They E workers 3 are not asking

us to get a pension for them.
to raise their wages.

They are not asking us

They are asking us to protect

their pension funds." J
Problems with the Existing Structure
In the absence of federal regulation, state legis
latures will be free to pass their own regulations.

Con

flicting state regulations could create difficulties for
pension administrators of multistate employers.

Lh.

In

addition, conflicting state trust laws are sometimes
"permissive with respect to questionable practices.
For example, in some states it is possible to use pension
funds to effect corporate takeovers.
Under the present federal Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act, misconduct may be difficult to
^ U . S . , Congress, Senate, Senator Humphrey speaking
for "The Worker's Right to Retirement Income Security,"
S. 3598, 92d Cong., 2d sess., October 13, 1972, Congres
sional Record. S17986.
^ T h e r e is pension control legislation pending
before several state legislatures; e.g., Wisconsin, New
Jersey, Connecticut, Illinois and Pennsylvania.
^5"The Push for Pension Reform," p. 49.
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expose and prosecute since the annual reports filed under
this regulation are so general.

"It took many months,

for example, to develop evidence in the classic United
46
Mine Workers case."
Government

In the Congress, the strong pressure on legislators
for pension control may encourage sufficient compromise
to permit enactment of pension reform letislation.

The

strong sponsorship of the Williams-Javits joint bill,
S. 4, is indicative of increased support for such legis
lation*

there are at least fifty-three sponsors of the

bill, representing a majority of the Senate.

The adverse

reaction by other Senators to the Finance Committee’s
stripping of the Labor Committee's pension bill in the
92d Congress may make the Committee on Finance reluctant
to repeat its former action and perhaps even have a
stimulating effect in the Congress.

In fact, the Finance

Committee has expressed an interest in more thoroughly
examining pension issues by creating a Subcommittee on
Pensions for the 93d Congress and scheduling hearings on
pension reform by that Committee in May, 1973*
Increased support for pension reform is also evi
dent by the speeches on the floor of the Senate and
House by such influential legislators as Senators Ribicoff,
Hartke, Humphrey, Mansfield (Senate Majority Leader),
^6 Ibid.
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Griffin (Senate Minority Leader), Bayh and P e l l . ^

The

fact that pension reform legislation has been introduced
by the Nixon Administration indicates the support of the
Executive branch for legislation in this area.
Viewpoints on Pension Reform Indicating Growing Support
for Pension Legislation
The stated positions on pension control legislation
by various interested groups are presented in Table 7.
Most of the explicit viewpoints by labor and industry are
presented by union or association representatives at
Senate hearings.

Of particular interest in assessing

the climate for pension control legislation is any change
in position as expressed in more recent hearings.
Labor.--Labor seems to be split in its views on
pension reform.

Although several major unions as the

AFL-CIO, the United Auto Workers and the United Steel
workers have expressed support for pension reform, "many
other unions such as the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, were not
48
active in the drive for pension plan reform."

There

are various reasons for the absence of this support.

For

^ U . S . , Congress, Senate, Debate, September 27» 1972,
S16053? U.S., Congress, Senate, Sen. Ribicoff speaking for
pension reform, Amendments to S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st sess.,
Congressional Record, CXIX, S2714; U.S., Congress, Senate,
Sen. Humphrey— speech, October 13t 1972, S17985*
48
"Private Pension Plansi
Congress Considers
Action," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, XXX, No. 16
(April 15. 1972), 850.
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TABLE 7
STATED VIEWPOINTS ON PENSION CONTROL LEGISLATION
Organization
AFL-CIO;
Statements
by George
Meany

Summary of Position

Comment on Position

(1) Nixon's Bill not
strong enoughi
a) No termination
insurance
b) Benefit Protection
c) Tax advantages ac
crue to least needy
(2) Endorse;
a) Reinsurance
b) Federal fiduciary
statute through the
federal courts
c) 10-yr. vesting
d) Funding standard
(3) Think multiemployer
plans should be exempt

(1) Consistent
support for pen
sion reform

United
(1) Generally support S. 4
(except portability
Steelworkers;
Statements
unnecessary— better
on individual basis)
by I .W.
Abel
(2) Supports minimum stan
dards to be enforced
through Dept of Labor;
not tax incentives
(3) Think multiemployer
plans should not be
exempt

(1) Consistent
support for pen
sion reform

United Auto
Workers;
Statements
by Leonard
Woodcock

(1) Consistent
support for pen
sion reform, but
has changed from
supporting 10-yr.
vesting rule to the
Williams-Javits
deferred graded
vesting proposal

(1) Nixon's Bill not
strong enough;
a) No termination
Insurance
b) Benefit protection
c) Tax advantages ac
crue to the least
needy
(2) Supports WilliamsJavits Bill (S. 4)

U.S. Chamber (1) Support;
of Commerce;
a) Minimum fiduciary
Representing
standards
more than
b) Minimum disclosure
^0,000
(feel that excesbusinesses and
sive disclosure

(1) Previously sup
ported only disclo
sure and fiduciary
responsibility;
now back minimum
vesting
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TABLE 7— Continued
Organization

Summary of Position

Comment on Position

3,600 trade
and profes
sional groups

will be a financial
burden and may not be
of much help)
c) Rule of 50
d) Nixon's tax proposals
(2) Oppose j
a) Funding
b) Reinsurance
c) Portability

National
Association
of Manu
facturers

(1) Endorse minimum standards on vesting, funding, fiduciaries and
disclosure
(2) Oppose other forms of
pension reform

(l) Changed its forfer stand against
vesting and now
support minimum
early vesting

Endorse *
(1) Recent changes
in position repre
a) Rule of 50 (all
sent more liberal
credited service)
b) Disclosure and
views*
Fiduciary Responsi a) 3 yr. transi
bility
tion (5 yrs.
formerly)
c) Coverage of all
plans, no exceptions b) Funding (formerly
opposed)
d) Funding of minimum
benefits (essentially c) Insurance of
Unfunded lia
future service
bilities
benefits only)
e) Termination insur
ance of unfunded
vested liabilities?
loss assessment? not
premium insurance
f) Tax provisions of the
Nixon Bill
(2 ) Oppose portability

Towers, Per- (1)
rin, Forster,
Crosby, Inc.,
Pennsylvania
based Consul
ting firm?
Statements
by Charles D.
Root

American
Bankers
Association
(ABA)

(1 ) Support*
a) Coverage of all
plans, no exceptions
b) Rule of 50
c) Funding similar to
that of S. 4
d) Treasury administration
(2) Oppose reinsurance and
portability

(1) Recent changes
in position repre
sent more liberal
a) Funding (previously opposed?
e.g., in 1972)
b) Vesting (op
posed in 1968 ,
1970)
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TABLE ?~Continued
Organization
American
Life Insurance
Association
(ALIA)

Summary of Position
(1) Support Nixon Bill
(2) Oppose reinsurance and
portability

National
(1 )
Association
of Life
Underwriters (2 )
(NALU)

(1) Previously
supported only disclosure and fiduci
ary responsibility

Support both Nixon Bill (1) Position generand Williams-Javits
ally liberalized
Bill (S. 4)
Oppose portability

Advanced
(1) Support Nixon Bill
Association
(2 ) Oppose reinsurance and
of Life
portability
Underwriters
(AALU)
American
Society of
Pension
Actuaries

(1) Support t

National
Society for
Professional
Engineers

(1) Support»

Sourcei

Comment on Position

(1) Position gra
dually liberalized

(1) Position gra
dually liberalized
a) Minimum vesting
b) Funding
c) Disclosure and fidu
ciary standards
(2 ) Opposei
a) Requirements that
plans be certified by
an American Academy
of Actuaries member
b) Portability

a) Early vesting
b) Provisions of S.4
(except vesting)
Oppose
portability un
(2 )
less immediate vesting
not possible

(1) Interest in
pension reform
only recent

Hearings before the House Committee on Ways
and Means, Senate Subcommittee on Labor of the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and House
Committee on Education and Labor, with parti
cular attention paid to hearings held in
the 93d Congress.
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example, since the Teamsters are developing their own
portability system, major adjustments in their plan
would be required should legislation be passed.

The

clothing and construction industries are subject to such
high rates of turnover that minimum vesting standards
would be extremely costly and perhaps result in benefit
reductions for long-term employees.

The United Mineworkers

have also "appeared unenthusiastic about comprehensive
reform legislation.

The UMW had established no public

position on the issue.
Many smaller unions also have placed a low priority
on pension reform.

The union negotiators would rather

have the freedom to bargain for more immediate benefits
such as wage increases or even additional options for
existing pension plans such as death or spouse benefits
in lieu of reform measures.

These union officials realize

that there is only so much money available for employee
benefits and prefer to emphasize flexibility at the
bargaining table for benefit negotiation .^0
Union support for pension control also is subject
to the influence of other economic conditions in addition
to that of wages.

If industry profits are up, unions would

support pension legislation since flexibility at the bar
gaining table may not be a problem in such circumstances.

^ 9 Ibid.
^°Mike Gordon, Minority Counsel to the Senate Sub
committee on Labor and Aid to Senator Jacob K. Javits,
private interview, Washington, D.C., August 9t 1972.
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Similarly, in the face of federal wage controls from which
minimum legislated pension benefits could be exempt,
union officials are likely to support pension legislation.
Since pension benefits would not be categorized as part
of the aggregate wage increase, union members could receive
pension benefits plus the full maximum wage increase
allowed.
Even within the stated positions of union leaders,
there are further conflicting opinions on the subject of
pension reform.

For example, the AFL-CIO contends that

multiemployer plans, with their implicit portability
feature, should be exempt from vesting and funding require
ments.

Conversely, the United Steelworkers think that

such an exemption is not justified.

In short, then,

labor is far from united on pension control issues.
Pension Industry. Representing Employers.— Most of
the representatives of private industry support minimum
vesting (predominantly the Rule of 50 for only prospective
benefits), fiduciary responsibility, disclosure and increased
tax relief for employee contributions and self-employed
persons.

Preferably, such standards would be added to the

requirements for plan qualification in the Internal
Revenue Code.

The primary administering agency thus

would be the Department of the Treasury.

Until recently,

most of these groups have opposed funding and insurance of
unfunded liabilities.

On the basis, however, of recent

testimony on the Williams-Javits bill (S. *0 by Charles
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D. Root of the consulting firm of Towers, Perrin, Forster
and Crosby, Inc., it now appears that private industry
has altered its position to include support of a minimum
level of funding and insurance of unfunded liabilities
(although at a more conservative level than that of S.
This modification represents the first of the conservative
private interest groups to express such wide support for
pension control and is further indication of the changing
political climate for pension reform.

Predictably, however,

insurance companies have not been very vocal in voicing
an opinion on pension control.
Many company officials readily admit (though
rarely for attribution) that correction of abuse and
misuse in the pension system is necessary, . . .
Insurers would like to see insured, funded and vested
benefits.
But those reforms are going to cost employers
money and . . . insurers can ill afford to urge
^
measures that are going to offend corporate employers.
Conclusions
Although the concept of private pensions as a
public concern is well established, and the need for
regulation has been demonstrated by reports of countless
abuses and inadequate coverage, a number of problems
still face the advocates of pension reform.

Two decades

^ U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Retirement Income Security for Employees
Act. 1973. Hearings before a Subcommittee on Labor of the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Senate, on S. k
and S. 75» 93d Cong., 1st sess., February 15, 16, 1973»f
PP» 385-^08.
^2 Kobler,

"Pension Reform," p. 11.
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of federal legislative concern have produced only fiduciary
responsibility and disclosure standards, and these reforms
are so general that even fund abuse is difficult to
detect.

Nevertheless! public pressure and the universal

interest in reform expressed by legislators, the President,
some factions of Labor and even private industry, may
combine to make pension reform a reality.
a number of hindrances to quick passagei

There are, however,
(1 ) the prece

dence of landmark national health insurance legislation,
(2)

delays by Congressional tax committees,

over the appropriate administering agency,

(3) disputes
(4-) lack of

consensus of opinion on appropriate regulation provisions
and (5 ) the alleviate effects of recent increases in
Social Security retirement income benefits.
Should the culmination of twenty years of concern
be the passage of pension legislation, the resulting
regulation probably will not include a portability pro
vision.

As is evident from the data in Table 7, the one

issue on which Labor and industry is united is opposition
to portability.

At the present time, even highly mobile

labor groups prefer the use of reciprocal agreements to
promote benefit preservation.

Portability is not a serious

current reform issue because legislators and pension
experts cannot visualize the mechanics of such a system
or even determine whether portability is workable.

Toward

this end, the next section presents an examination of
portability prototypes, suggestions for implementation of

transfer of pension credits and the mechanics of a trans
fer system.

PART

II

GROWTH OF THE PORTABILITY CONCEPT

CHAPTER V

PROTOTYPES OF THE PORTABILITY CONCEPT
The concept of portability has gained further
acceptance from the successful implementation of pension
credit transfers both abroad and in the United States and
Canada.

Proponents of the portability concept in the

United States point to these successful implementations
of portability as proof of the technical feasibility of
a national transfer system.

The purpose of this chapter

is to examine the benefit transfer features of some of
the existing pension systems to determine any applicability
for a national portability program in the United States.
It should be noted, however, that while many of these
systems have been categorized as portability schemes,
in reality they are actually multiemployer or master
plans.

The degree of portability achieved in each system

will be identified, with particular emphasis on appli
cability to a larger national system.
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European Systems

i

Scandinavian Countries
Norway*— Vesting and portability of benefits is
required in all private pension plans in Norway.

The

entire retirement income system recently was revised to make
major regulatory and structural changes which could provide
some insight into the effect of similar legislation on
the pension industry in this country.

In 1966, the

National Insurance Act was passed which required employers
to provide insurance and pension benefits for employees.
The amount of the benefit is related to a "Basic Amount"
that is determined by the legislature to reflect the current
cost of living.

The objective of the act was to enable

employees to maintain this standard of living beyond a
retirement age of seventy.

The National Insurance Insti

tution administers the plan and contributions are made by
the employee and employer on the basis of salary.

Im

plementation of the national legislation resulted in a
40 percent decrease in the private pension business of
Norwegian insurance companies.

The latter administer

approximately 95 percent of all private plans.
Supplementary private pension benefits are provided
by some employers.

Such plans generally have the ambitious

1
Although additional material was used for the analy
sis of Great Britain, much of the information for this sec
tion came from:
U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Manage
ment Services Administration, European Regulation of Pension
P lans, Study prepared by Frank M. Kleiler (Washington,
D.C.:
U.S. Department of Labor, 1971)» PP« 1-18, 23- 56 ,
65-71, 75-90.
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goal of providing a combined retirement income equal to
two-thirds of an employee’s final salary.

The retirement

ages in the private plans often are earlier than age
seventy.

Tax relief is available for employers for

minimum amounts? e.g., eleven times the Basic Amount.
Qualification for tax relief is based on stringent vesting,
funding, disclosure and portability requirements.

When

an employee changes jobs, the insurance company or companies
involved arrange a fund transfer.

Hence, portability— a

part of the Norwegian private pension system both before and
after the National Insurance Act— is administered by the
insurance industry and ”. . .

has not been difficult

to handle."2
Finland.— Although portability is not part of
the Finnish pension system, the goal of benefit preser
vation is met through various regulations.

In 19^2,

legislation was passed to provide compulsory private
pensions for all workers to supplement the national insurance
flat rate benefit.

The supplementary private pensions

may be provided through an insurance company, a fund or a
foundation.

All vested pensions must be registered with

the Central Pension Security Institute.

When an employee

retires, all accrued benefits are paid by the pension
institution in which the employee was last covered.

A

general accounting of pension costs for retirees under

2Ibid., p. 48.

the various plans is made annually by the Central Institute
at which time full cash settlement can be made between
the participating institutions.
Employers can provide additional retirement
benefits over and above the mandatory supplementary pay
ments.

Voluntary vested benefits are provided in the

same manner as the compulsory vested benefits previously
described for a terminating employee.

Although fund

transfer is not a part of Finland’s system, nevertheless,
the goal of full benefit preservation is met.
Denmark.— The retirement income of Danes is pro
vided through a combination of a social security plan,
a contributory supplementary quasi-private institution
which provides a flat rate benefit to all persons aged
sixty-seven and approximately 5»000 private plans.
With the exception of 320 trust plans, most of the private
plans are administered by specialized pension insurance
companies.

Individual, rather than group, annuity policies

are purchased for employees and are fully portable upon
termination.

If the succeeding employer continues the

same level of premium payment, the policy remains unaltered
If the new employer's plan encompasses different premiums,
the transferred policy is amended.

Trust type private

plans are carefully supervised and are subject to
strict vesting, funding, investment, disclosure and
portability standards.

If an employee covered under a

trusteed plan terminates, employer contributions are

locked in.

Alternatives for fulfilling portability

requirements are a transfer of funds to a succeeding
employer's plan or purchase of an insured annuity
contract.
Continental Europe
The Netherlands.— In addition to the governmental
social security program, retirement income in the Netherlands
is available through private industry individual or
multiemployer plans.

Whenever appropriate, employers are

encouraged— or required, if petitioned by a union or
employer association— to join industrial pension plans.
Portability of benefits is available within a participating
employer group as is true for any multiemployer plan.

In

dividually established pension plans are regulated stren
uously with respect to vesting, funding and disclosure
provisions.

Although vesting generally is required after

five years of service, no portability feature is imposed
on individual plans. Employees terminating within the
five year period prior to vesting are entitled to a refund
of their contributions.
Switzerland.— No national portability system exists
in Switzerland.

There are, however, some portability

agreements between employers and various trade associations.
In these cases, city agreements are made as part of the
bargaining process.

"Most of such agreements relate to

private plans based on contracts with life insurance
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companies or to employees changing jobs within the public
sector.
France.— Frenchmen are provided with a limited form
of portability through that country's vast compulsory
multiemployer pension system.

By law in France, whenever

a major employer association enters into a collective
agreement with a union,

"the provisions of such agree

ment may be extended by decree to all the employers and
employees in a given industry or combination.of industries
within the occupational and territorial scope of the collective agreement."

if,

The result of this regulation has

been the development of several large and many medium-sized
multiemployer plans.
vary.

The benefit levels of the plans

Generally, however, benefits are determined through

a pension point system that is based on contributions.
The ultimate amount of an employee's pension depends on
the value of the point and the number of points earned
by the worker.

The value of the pension point fluctuates

every year on a cost of living basis.
thus may change from year to year.

Retirement income

France has been sub

ject to such intensive inflation over a long period of
time that it is only through an escalating quasi-public
pension plan that employees can be assured of maintaining
a reasonable standard of living in retirement.

■^Ibid., p. 1 6 .
^Ibid., p. 75.
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The compulsory multiemployer plans have fully
vested benefits, with portability available within the
scope of the industry plan.

Funding is accomplished under

a "distribution concept" which essentially is a pay-as-you-go
or current disbursement approach.

This type funding is

possible because of the constantly increasing base of
contributions arising from the compulsory nature of plan
participation.

Although the multiemployer plans in France

and the United States are similar in some ways, the French
features of compulsory participation, pay-as-you-go funding
and benefit escalation represent such overwhelming dif
ferences from the U.S. multiemployer pension approach that
the two systems essentially are incomparable.
United Kingdom

In Great Britain, retirement is provided by a
national insurance system (i.e., a state social security
program) in the form of a flat benefit and a wage-related
benefit (the latter added in 1959)•

As an alternative

to contributions to the national system, employers are
allowed to "contract out" (i.e., fund) the wage-related
portion to a private pension plan as long as the resulting
benefits are at least the equivalent of that which employees
participating in the national insurance system would re
ceive.

The contracted-out private pension plans are

tightly supervised with regard to funding, investment
practices and benefit maintenance.

Benefits under

contracted-out plans must be vested and portable.

(The
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British term for portability is "preservation of pension
rights.")

When an employee terminates, these wage-related

vested benefit credits must either be transferred to a
succeeding employer's contracted-out plan or preserved by
ah appropriate payment to the National Insurance Fund.
In contrast to the close supervision of contractedout pension plans, other private occupational pension
plans that provide supplementary retirement benefits have
been supervised only to that extent necessary to determine
that such plans are not simply tax evasion schemes.

Since

1966, however, an investigation of these occupational
pension schemes has indicated that additional regulation
may be necessary.

A government study's White Paper con

cluded that mandatory vesting and portability provision
should be the goal of future regulation of occupational
pension plans.
In general, schemes will have to ensure that
deferred pensioners are treated no less favorably in
relation to their period of pensionable service than
employees who stay on until pension age.-*
In summary, then, Great Britain has achieved
portability within the private pension system for the
wage-related portion of the national pension plan.

Parlia

ment also seems to be moving toward an extension of porta^Great Britain, Office of the Secretary of State
of the Department of Health and Social Security, White
Paper. 1971 (Londont
Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
September, 1971)? reprinted in Norman H. Tarver, "Proposals
for the Improvement of the Private Pension Plan System,"
Unpublished study prepared for Senate Labor Subcommittee
Hearings on S. 3598 (Toronto, Canada, 1972), p. 143.

bility to supplementary private occupational pension
schemes.

Portability thus will have been implemented

gradually over a period of time, possibly minimizing any
adverse effects on employers and the pension industry.
Canadian System
Comparison to the U.S. System
The legislative changes in the Canadian pension
system during the 1960*s have been viewed with interest
by U.S. pension experts since many of the changes in
the Canadian plan have been suggested for the U.S.
pension industry.

Moreover, the Canadian labor force,

salary structure and pension system are considered to have
greater similarity to the U.S. system than any other
national system.
There are, however, several major differences
between the two retirement systems which must be considered.
First, employees are allowed to deduct their contributions
(less employer contributions and subject to an upper
limit) from taxable income for federal tax calculation
purposes.

Second, the private pension system is supple

mentary to both a flat amount Old Age Security Benefit and
a wage-related social insurance benefit.

The social

insurance benefit is administered under the Canada Pension
Plan (1965 ) and its Quebec counterpart, the Quebec
Pension Plan (1965)*

The program is similar to the U.S.

Social Security system except that under the Canadian
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plan,

(1) contributions are not required on the first

$600 of income,

($5*300 ) is

(2) the maximum wage base

lower than the U.S. wage base,

(3 ) benefits are related

to a cost of living index and (4) age is the only eligibility qualification for benefit payment.

fi

A third major difference between the U.S. and
Canadian pension systems is attributable to the latter's
traditional Provincial government structure.

The Provin

cial governments do not permit the enactment of federal
regulation which would supersede Provincial supervision, a
conflict evident in the debate preceding the passage of
the Canada Pension Plan.

All Provinces except Quebec

were willing to participate in the federal social insurance
system.

Quebec, however, set up its own similar social

insurance plan.

The problem of conflict of interest

between Provinces has existed throughout the development of
Canadian pension regulation.

Employers concerned about

conflicting Provincial regulation have worked with legis
lators to ensure that pension regulation in the different
Provinces is similar.
The Ontario Act
Private pension legislation was originally passed
in Ontario in 1963 under the title of "The Pension Benefits
Act 1962 - 6 3 ," with most of the provisions to be enacted
^U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Management Services
Administration, Canadian Regulation of Pension Plans, Study
prepared by Frank M. Kleiler (Washington, D.C.s
U. S . De
partment of Labor, 1970),
pp. 28-29*
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by January 1, 196 5 .

This legislation was quite stringent

and required a minimum scale of vested benefits.

The

controversial "standard plans" provision of the act was
repealed, however, when Ontario legislators agreed for
the Province to participate in the Canada Pension Plan
(i.e., the federal social insurance program).

The amend

ment was enacted July 30, 19&5» and was known as the Pension
Benefits Act, 1965* or simply the Ontario Act.

The

legislation was designed to permit integration with the
newly created Canadian social security program.

Similar

legislation subsequently has been enacted by the Provinces
of Quebec, Alberta and Saskatchewan.

In 1967 the federal

government passed the Pension Benefits Standards Act,
which calls for regulation similar to the Ontario Act
of pension plans of banks, railways, shipping companies,
radio stations and other communications companies as well
as for pension plans in the Yukon and Northwest Territories
and any other pension plans within federal jurisdiction.
In short, most Canadian private pension plans are regulated
by different laws, all of which are patterned after the
Ontario Act.
The principal provisions of the Ontario Act
include

(1) establishment of a Pension Commission to ad

minister the standards,

(2) vesting of prospective benefits

for employees age forty-five and over with ten years of
service,

(3) eligibility for participation of thirty years
7Ibid., p. 3.
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of age or six months service, (4) twenty-five year amor
tization of unfunded liabilities in existence upon Act
passage and fifteen year amortization of future unfunded
liabilities,

(5) fiduciary responsibility and disclosure

standards and (6) the establishment of a Central Pension
Agency.8
The authorization for the establishment of a
central clearinghouse, sometimes referred to as "Ontario's
portable pension law," has received much attention by legis
lators considering portability in the United States.

Al

though the capability exists to establish a central clearing
house under all governing Canadian laws, no such mechanism
has been established.

The need for portability was lessened

when the original stringent minimum statutory requirements
for benefits and vesting were repealed so that Provincial
regulation could be integrated with the federal social
security legislation.

The Canada Pension Plan is similar

to the U.S. Social Security system in that the former
allows labor mobility without loss of minimum benefits.
Since supplementary private pension benefits do not vest
until an employee reaches age forty-five with ten years
of service, there is no need for a central clearinghouse and
none has been established.
It is unlikely that many workers upon retire
ment will acquire rights to annuities from more than
two or three employers. . . . Employers who terminate
8 Ibid., pp. 37-97.
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with less than ten years of service usually receive
cash refunds of their own contributions.
Also it is
permissible under the laws to provide for the cash
payment of thecommuted value of a pension or deferred
annuity if the
amount thereof payable to the employee
at normal retirement age is less than $10 p month
payable during his lifetime. . . . The 'portability*
features of the Canadian laws are provided in the stan
dards set for vesting and locking in of contributions
and benefits and not in the authorization for a central
agency. There would be a greater need for such a
central agency
if thevesting requirements were
reduced below the '45 and 10* formula.
Canadians also are allowed to transfer any vested
benefits from one group plan to another registered plan or
to an individual registered retirement savings plan with
out incurring a tax liability.3-0

Tax free transfers,

late vesting requirements and deductibility of employee
contributions are the essential features of the Canadian
pension system which render a federal or even Provincial
portability system unnecessary.
Experience Under the Ontario Act and Similar Legislation
The U.S. legislators interested in pension reform
have watched the Canadian experience with interest.
Canadian legislation was passed on the basis of need for
extended coverage for the labor force and benefit preser
vation; in the U.S., attention has been focused on both
pension fund abuses and the need for additional coverage.
9Ibid., p. 94.

10Norman H. Tarver, "Preservation of Pension Bene
fits," Best's Review; Life and Health Insurance Edition,
LXXII, No. 11 (March, 1972), 70-71.
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Regulation of pension plans in Canada generally is felt
to have been successful and can serve as a prototype for
U.S. legislation since the Canadian pension industry is
similar to that in the United States.
In Canada, where 80 percent of the pension plans
are required by law to have mandatory vesting, there
have been almost no terminations and no evidence of
a slowdown in the establishment of new plans.
The Canadian experience thus far proves that
there is nothing impractical about regulating pension
plans by legislation prescribing minimum standards of
vesting, funding and management of intestments.
With regard to portability, however, the Canadian
system would imply that if early vesting is required, and
tax relief to individuals for contributions or fund trans
fer is not allowed, a national clearinghouse would be
helpful to effect fund transfers.
United States Systems
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (and College
Retirement Equities Fund)— TIAA-CREF
TIAA was founded in 1918 to provide a retirement
income system for the faculty members of colleges and
universities that would not restrict faculty mobility.

In

contrast to many older private pension plans, TIAA parti
cipants were active in the formation of their plan's
11

Rep. Seymour Halpern, "Radical Departure Needed
in Pension Legislation," Pension and Welfare News. VIII,
No. 9 (September, 1972), 6 8 .
12

P. 97.

U.S. Department of Labor, Canadian Regulation,
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provisions.

CREF, the variable annuity portion of the

system, was added in 1952.
at least ". . . 8 9

The entire system covers

percent of the faculty of private

colleges and 34 percent of the faculty of public colleges.
Faculty, clerical, administrative and service employees
may participate as plan members and may allocate 20 to
75 percent of their contributions to CREF.

"Given the

opportunity to choose, about 94 percent of the employees
currently covered by TIAA have also decided to participate
in CREF."1**'
Although the participating institutions may estab
lish the contribution levels and eligibility requirements
of a given plan, all benefits are fully vested and funded.
Members may transfer to other institutions within the
system without the loss of pension credits or participation
status.

Technically, since no actual transfer of funds

is made, true portability is not achieved;

TIAA-CREF is

more like a large multiemployer plan than a portability
system.

Benefits are purchased by the employer and/or

the employee on a money purchase basis.

The contributions

often are based on a fixed percentage of salary; i.e.,
whatever benefit can be purchased by the contribution is
■^U.S., Congress, Senate, Special Committee on
Aging, Economics of Aging»
Toward a Full Share in Abundance,
Hearings, before the Special Committee on Aging, Senate,
91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, p. 15&1.
*^Ibid., p. 1562.
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accrued to the employee's individual contract account.
When the employee retires* one aggregate benefit is paid
to him on the basis of credits accrued from contributions
made by the employee and all his employers.
The success of the TIAA-CREF system as a depository
and clearinghouse for members' benefits has caused legis
lators to wonder whether such a system on a larger scale
is possible.

For example, interested employers who join the

system could make contributions to either the central fund
or the employer's own pension fund.

In the latter case,

fund assets accrued on behalf of a terminated employee
would be transferred to the central fund.

There are,

however, several problems with such an application.

First,

many small employers would not be able to afford to join.*-*
Second, a tax law change may be necessary so that employees
would not incur a tax liability from the constructive
use of any transferred funds.

Finally, the defined

benefit plan is more popular than the money purchase approach
16
in the U.S.
and plan administrators would have to effect
major plan changes to adjust to a defined contribution
type formula.
*-*Mike Gordon, Minority Counsel to the Senate Sub
committee on Labor and Aid to Senator Jacob K. Javits,
private interview, Washington, D.C., August 9» 1972.
16
Joseph J. Melone and Everett T. Allen, Jr.,
Pension Planning (Revised ed. j Homewood, 111.i Richard
D. Irwin, Inc., 1972), pp. 32-33*
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Public Systems
Public School Retirement Systems.--Some state
retirement systems allow teachers to buy into their system
for out-of-state years of service.

Usually, the amount of

out-of-state credit allowed is very limited and the fund
level to be transferred in is also defined.

Should the

fund assets accumulated in another retirement system prove
inadequate, the teacher involved must personally supple
ment the fund assets.

A bill was introduced in the U.S.

House of Representatives in the 92d Congress to provide
federal assistance for teachers attempting to transfer
pension assets between state retirement systems.^

In

general, however, wider application of this system is not
practical since the transfer feature of public school
retirement systems is so limited with regard to the level
accepted by the succeeding system.
Law Enforcement Officers* Retirement Systems.— The
public retirement systems of state law enforcement officers
provide portability for members within the state in
Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, most of California, most
of Georgia, Massachusetts, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah and
17
rU.S., Congress, House, A Bill to Encourage State
and Local Retirement Systems to Adopt Provisions Facilitating
the Interstate Mobility of Teachers. H.R. 10216. 92d
Cong., 2d sess., 1971* (Similar bills have been introduced
in the 93d Congress, including H.R. 996, H.R. 7346, H.R. 4924.)

Washington.

18

Most of the retirement systems listed above,

however, do not provide for transfer from a state to a
municipality system.

Mobility thus is limited to the

state law enforcement system, although some reciprocal
agreements are being arranged between states.

The Massa

chusetts system provides a particularly interesting example
of a nonfunded portability system:
This state appears to have a nonfunded retire
ment system although employees contribute toward the
cost of their pensions.
Upon transfer, employee con
tributions go with the employee.
Employer costs are
determined when the employee retires and the cost is
prorated to each employer according to service with
that employer. . . . The benefit is determined in
accordance with the system from which the employee
retires.
Federal Systems.— Both the Railroad Retirement
System and Civil Service Retirement Systems are operated
by agencies of the federal government.

These federally

administered programs permit member mobility within the
system, but true portability'is not achieved because no
fund transfer is made.

The retirement programs essentially

are master plans, with contributions accumulated in one
fund from which accrued benefits are disbursed.
Private Systems
Union Plans.— Portability has been developed in
1R

i

U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assis
tance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice, Portable Police Pensions— Improving
Interagency Transfers, Prepared by Geoffrey N. Calvert of
Alexander and Alexander, New York, New York, 10007 (Washing
ton, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1971 )» PP* 19-23, 5
19Ibid. , p. 21.
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a number of union and craft plans essentially operating
as multiemployer type plans.

Each of the following plans

covers at least 100,000 or more workerst
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

The Central States, Southeast and Southwest
Areas Pension Fund (Teamsters)
Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Fund
The Amalgamated Insurance Fund--Pension Fund
(Clothing Workers)
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
Pension Benefit Trust Fund
The International Ladies' Garment Workers' Cloak
and Suit Pension Fund
The United Mine Workers of Americas
Welfare and
Retirement Fund (Covering the bituminous coal
industry)
2
Structural Iron Workers Pension Fund.
Other smaller plans include carpenters, bricklayers

plumbers, longshormen, brewery workers, bakery workers,
retail clerks, other retail, wholesale and department
store workers and meat cutters.

21

The plans vary widely in

transfer provisions? some plans provide for contributions
to be made to a central union fund while others act as
a clearinghouse for funds of employees changing jobs.
Again, if contributions are made to a central fund and no
transfer takes plane when an employee changes jobs within
the system, true portability is not achieved.
Trade Associations.— -Trade associations and pro
fessional groups are beginning to become active in en20

U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Labor Mobility and Private Pension Plans?
A study of Vesting. Early Retirement.and Portability
Provisions, sponsored by Office of Manpower, Automation
and Training, BLS Bulletin No. 1407 (Washington, D.C. j
Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 37-38.
21Ibid.
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couraging employers to participate in their multiemployer
plans#

One of the first of these groups to develop a

plan for its members is the American Chemical Society,
which organized "Pensions for Professionals" in 1970, a
non-profit corporation.

The organizers of this corporation

have sought the cooperation of several professional societies,
and is beginning operation with eight societies covering
500,000 professionals.
Greatest emphasis in this effort will be placed
on achievement of considerably improved 'portability.'
. . . PFP is nearing the end of the development
stage in setting its objectives, preparing a unique
prototype pension plan, obtaining IRS approval of
this plan, concluding a contract with a carrier to
provide investment and record-keeping services and
marketing assistance, providing for participating of
professional societies in the2gorporation and per
fection the PFP organization.
The corporation's prototype benefit plan is very
flexible and sefves only to guide the individual member
and his employer in developing the exact benefit.

Thus,

the benefit level, death benefits, options and eligibility
requirements are determined by individual negotiations
between the employer and the employee, with technical
assistance provided by the corporation managers.

Contri

butions by a member's various employers are made to the
insurance carrier of the societies* corporation.

When

an employee reaches retirement, an annuity is purchased
to provide the employee's retirement income on the basis
Arthur H. Hale,"Pensions for Professionals, Inc.,"
Unpublished description of a portable pension plan in the
process of being established, Washington, D.C., August
15, 1972, pp. 3-*f. (Mimeographed)
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of his asset accumulation.
The success of this trade association plan is yet
to be determined since it only recently has been developed.
Professionals may find their employers unwilling to parti
cipate in a plan, especially if the employers already have
established their own plans.

Although the term "portability"

has been applied to Pensions for Professionals, since no
asset transfer actually takes place the plan actually is
a master pension plan, not a prototype of portability.
Conclusions
Although portability has been successfully imple
mented in a number of European private pension systems,
application of their transfer mechanism to the U.S. is not
possible for several reasons.

First, most of the portable

pensions of the European plans examined are compulsory
minimum benefits.

Transfer thus is accomplished easily

since the benefit is readily determinable.

Second, European

private plans are very highly regulated with regard to
funding, vesting and investment practices to render sound
asset protection.

Moreover, vesting has been practiced

widely in European plans since as early as 1900.

Third,

most of the private pension plans of the countries examined
are administered by insurance companies, often on an
individual employee contract basis, so that fund transfer
is a matter to be worked out between insurance companies.
Fourth, particular regulations in individual countries
make comparison with the U.S. situation difficult.

For
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example, compulsory industry multiemployer participation
in France and the severe inflation problem in that country
make the French private pension system unique.

Similarly,

the structural changes in Norway's pension system brought
about by the introduction of compulsory minimum benefits
would not be likely to occur in the United States because
Social Security is well established as a floor of pro
tection in the U.S.
Portability of the wage-related minimum benefit
in British contracted-out private pension plans has been
quite successful because the benefit is easily determinable
and universally applied, and because government supervision
is tight.

Based on this success, Parliament may extend

required portability to all private occupational pensions.
The gradual implementation of portability, starting with
a defined minimum benefit and later extending to all
benefits, thus may be a useful prototype of portability
implementation in the United States.
Experience with regard to portability under
Canadian regulation is helpful in determining the need for
a national clearinghouse in the United States.

Since

vesting in Canada is not required until an employee reaches
age forty-five with ten years of service, and since em
ployees are allowed an income tax deduction for their own
contributions and can transfer assets directly from one
fund to another without incurring a tax liability, a
portability clearinghouse has not been needed.

Based on

the Canadian experience, therefore, if similar tax changes
are made and a vesting rule similar to the Rule of 50 for
prospective benefits is implemented, a national clearing
house will not be necessary for the United States.
Finally, although there are a number of limited
portability schemes in the United States, they are indi
vidually tailored to meet the needs* of particular employee
groups and provide little applicability to a national
system.

C H A P T E R VI

MECHANISMS FOR

IMPLEMENTING THE

PORTABILITY

CONCEPT

Introduction
A number of different mechanisms for implementing
the portability concept have been suggested by persons
both within and outside the private pension field.

In

some cases, the mechanism is only part of a comprehensive
pension reform program and in other cases, the mechanism
could be operative by itself or integrated with any variety
of other pension reforms.

The various systems examined

in this chapter will be limited to portability schemes:
an actual transfer of funds from one group plan to either
a succeeding plan, an insurance carrier or any other quali
fied individual plan.
Portability systems may be either on a national
basis or of a more limited scope.

For example, limitations

on portability may be in the benefit level; i.e., only a
minimum benefit is transferrable.

Another type of porta

bility limitation is the scope of transfer.

That is,

funds may be transferred only within an industry, a desig
nated employer group or geographic area.
Some portability mechanisms would necessitate a
155
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change in the Internal Revenue Code while others would
not.

Under current federal tax laws, if an employee

gains constructive receipt of any lump-sum distribution
of pension fund assets, the total amount is fully taxable
as income.

Certain portability systems thus would be

ineffective unless this law were modified.
National Portability Systems
The Clearinghouse Concept
A portability mechanism which would not require
a federal income tax change is the clearinghouse concept.
Although the clearinghouse could be operated privately,
most of the discussions related to the use of a clearing
house have embodied the federal government as the adminis
tering agency.

Specific responsibility for such a clearing

house could be within the Labor Department, the Department
of the Treasury or an independent pension agency.
The most comprehensively detailed proposal for a
national clearinghouse is one developed by Merton C. Bern
stein.

Under the Bernstein approach, the actuarial

present value of an employee's accrued pension may be
determined at any point in time.

An employee wishing to

change jobs would request his current employer to transfer
this present value to the clearinghouse.

These funds

would remain on deposit at the clearinghouse until the
employee requests transfer to a succeeding fund.

The

amount of the present value, plus interest, determines
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the level of benefits payable to the employee under the
benefit formula of the succeeding plan.

If the funds

are not transferred out of the clearinghouse, then the
clearinghouse could serve as a national group plan with
the amount accrued in an individual's account administered
on a money purchase basis to provide retirement benefits
for participating employees.

Thus, when an employee

reaches retirement age, an immediate annuity could be
purchased for the employee from an insurance company,
or the retirement benefit could be dispensed directly
from the clearinghouse fund.

This national group plan

also could be used as a master plan for small employers
who cannot afford high installation costs or systematically
substantial contributions to an individual group plan.
Participating employers could contribute to the national
group plan on a money purchase basis as their profits
permit.
A major problem of the national clearinghouse
concept is the determination of transfer values.

In

calculating the present value of a pension credit being
transferred, the employer may use liberal actuarial assum
ptions that result in a rather low asset value of the bene
fit being liquidated from his fund.

Conversely, the em

ployer who receives transferred pension assets may calcu
late the benefits due the new employee under the subsequent
plan on more conservative actuarial assumptions.

The

benefit thus calculated by the succeeding employer would
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be lower than the benefit available had the employee re
mained with his first employer.

Mr. Bernstein does not

see this as a problem if uniform actuarial assumptions
are legislated for transfer purposes.
There is a certain element of arbitrariness in
the whole system of actuarial analysis and compu
tation (necessarily so), and another slightly
1
arbitrary set of assumptions should be bearable.
A number of other suggestions regarding the mech
anics and possible simplification of a national clearing
house have been made by Mr. Bernstein.

First, the employer

could make installment payments to the clearinghouse over
a specified period of time, thus minimizing any adverse
liquidation problems to the fund due to the immediate
transfer of large asset values.

Second, the clearing

house could "maintain records of 'cold storage' vested
credits, with the credits themselves remaining with the
p
plan under which they were earned."
That is, the clearing
house would serve as a registry of all vested credits; even
employees who never change jobs would be registered with
the clearinghouse.

Third, to facilitate the registry ser

vice, " . . .

the low cost, high efficiency Social Security
3
record keeping facilities probably should be used."-'
1Merton C. Bernstein, The Future of Private Pensions
(New York:
The Free Press of Glencoe, 19^4) * p» 266.
2 Ibid., p. 2 7 0 .
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Special Committee on
Aging, Economics of Aging: Toward a Full Share in Abun
dance , Hearings before the Special Committee on Aging,
Senate, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, p. 1483.
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Fourth, the funds on deposit at the clearinghouse should
not he refundable to an employee; i.e., pension credits
should be locked in.

Finally, legislation should be

enacted to allow the assets held in the clearinghouse
to be invested in both public and private areas.

At present,

government agencies are allowed to invest only in federal
government securities.^
Individual Plans
Another means of implementing a national portability
system that may be devoid of federal income tax complica
tions is through the use of individual employee plans.
When an employee terminates, the present value of pension
credits accumulated by an employee is transferred on his
behalf to an individual retirement plan.

For example, the

employee can elect to apply his accrued benefit values
to the purchase of a nontransferrable annuity to provide
his retirement income.

The annuity may be either an

endowment policy utilizing a life annuity option for
settlement, a defined benefit pension plan annuity or a
pension plan flexible annuity (variable annuity).^
h.

,
.
Bernstein, The Future of Private Pensions, pp.

275-29^.
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Retirement Income Security for Employees
Act. 1972. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor of
the Committee on Labor arid Public Welfare, Senate, on
S. 3598, S. 3012 and Other Bills, 92d Cong., 2d sess.,
1972, p. 404.
(Treatment of insured individual retirement
plans, especially the endowment policy, may require a
federal tax change or ruling so that the terminating
employee does not incur a tax liability for employer-paid
premiums.)
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Individual annuity plans purchased to fulfill the pension
obligation of an employer to a terminating employee are
categorized as a form of portability for two reasons.
First, an actual fund transfer is effected from the pension
fund of the employer to the insurance company.

Second, a

major goal of portability is met through this system} i.e.,
pension preservation with employee mobility.
Another approach to the implementation of porta
bility through individual retirement plans has been sug
gested by the Corporate Fiduciaries Association of Illinois.
Upon termination of employment with vested rights,
an employee could elect to have the value of those
rights used to purchase a special Treasury bond which
either could be redeemed in full at age 59a as in
the case of HR-10 plans or paid over a period of
years by submitting payment coupons to the Treasury.
The bonds would have to be fully redeemed at a
certain age to eliminate the possibility of escaping
estate taxes.
The administration (and related costs),
of such a program would be practically nonexistent.
There would be no bookkeeping records by the employer.
The employee would have possession of the bonds
and the employer need not notify him of his benefits
sometime in the future or keep track of him.
Tax Free Direct Transfer
In order to allow an employee to transfer accumu
lated pension fund assets directly to a succeeding employer's
pension fund or qualified individual retirement savings
program, a change in the federal income tax laws would be
required to allow such a transfer to be tax free.
6I b i d . . p. 1282.

At

l6l

present, it is virtually impossible to make direct fund
transfers since all lump-sum distributions of pension
assets are taxed as ordinary income.

Rep. John B. Ander

son (D— 111.) has pointed out that a pension fund transfer
exemption would be natural even within the current federal
tax structure.
There is a solid precedent, it seems to me, in
our tax laws for this kind of reinvestment in kind.
We allow persons who sell their homes for a profit
and reinvest their gain in a new house within a
year, or I think it is 18 months, to have that
gain exempt from income tax.
There are two ways that tax free transfers of
pension funds could be allowed.

First, Section 401(a) of

the Internal Revenue Code which designates qualification
requirements could be amended to compel pension plan
administrators to allow fund transfers on behalf of ter
minating employees as a condition of favorable tax treat
ment.

In addition, it would be necessary for such an

amendment to require that benefits be locked in to prevent
income tax abuses by employees who willfully terminate
O
in order to gain control of pension assets.
Other sug
gested limitations on the tax free transfer involve the
type of plans between which such a transfer is allowedj
7
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and
Means, Tax Proposals Affecting Private Pension Plans.
Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of
Representatives, on H.R. 12272, 92d Cong., 2d sess.,
1972, p. 113.
O
Norman H. Tarver, "Proposals for the Improvement
of the Private Pension Plan System," Unpublished Study
prepared for the Senate Labor Subcommittee on S. 3598,
Toronto, Canada, 1972, pp. 40-43.
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e.g., transfers may be allowed only between qualified
pension plans, profit sharing, Keogh plans, qualified
individual retirement savings plans or other tax deferred
annuity plans.^
A second means of implementing a tax free transfer
involves no change in the Internal Revenue Code.

This

approach was outlined in a letter to Sen. Harrison A.
Williams (D--N.J.) from representatives of Towers, Perrin,
Forster, and Crosby, Inc., a pension consulting firm
interested in pension legislation.
Individual portability would be encouraged if
the Internal Revenue Service were to issue a revenue
ruling which states that the qualified status of a
plan under Section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code will not be affected adversely if the actuarial
reserve required to provide for a vested employee's
benefits is transferred at the employee's option and
with the employer's concurrence, either to:
(a) a legal life insurance company to purchase
an annuity to which the employee is entitled, or
(b) another qualified pension plan to provide such
veste^Qbenefits to the employee under such pension
The concept of a tax free transfer of pension funds
to implement pension portability has received rather wideg
70ne of the strongest legislative proposals in the
area of tax free transfers is found in the Nixon Adminis
tration pension reform program.
Although the entire reform
proposal will be discussed in a later chapter, it should
be briefly noted that the tax free transfer portion of
the Nixon program allows fund transfers between an employer's
fund and a qualified individual retirement account or a
succeeding qualified employer's plan.
(Additional con
tributions to an individual retirement savings account are
allowed tax free by both the employee and later employers.)
10

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Hearings, on S. 3598 and Other Bills,
1972, pp. 1028-1029.
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spread support.

Testimony by interested leaders of industry,

labor and pension groups at tax reform hearings has indi
cated that tax free transfer of pension credits is a
popular pension reform issue.

11

Opposition is negligible

because the cost of the reform would be reflected as lost
federal tax revenue? little increased expense would be
incurred by pension plans or employers.

Since there would

be some tax revenue lost through such transfers, an upper
limit would have to be set on the amount transferred.
The determination of an equitable upper limit on fund
transfers may be difficult.

12

While some pension plans

may create extensive asset accumulations that normally,
and legally, are eligible for possible transfer, the same
amount aggregated under other plans may involve discrimina
tory practices favoring more highly compensated employees.
In addition, any federal tax law change or revenue ruling
would have to specify that allowable asset transfers must
not discriminate in favor of officers, supervisors, share
holders or other highly compensated employees.

For

example, transfers may not be allowed for sums only in
excess of a specified amount for which few employees
would qualify.
11

U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and
Means, Hearings on H.R. 12272.
12

Mike Gordon, Minority Counsel to the Senate Sub
committee on Labor and Aid to Senator Jacob K. Javits,
private interview, Washington, D.C., August 9» 1972.

In summary, suggested mechanisms for implementing
national portability systems include utilizing a national
clearinghouse, individual insured annuities, U.S. Treasury
bonds and tax free direct transfers.

An inherent pre

requisite of the latter mechanism is the modification of
the current federal tax environment to permit pension plan
administrators to effect tax free transfers of pension
assets.

In the absence of this tax change, pension reform

advocates desiring pension preservation and labor mobility
will have to circumvent the problem of constructive receipt
by indirect transfers through a clearinghouse, insurance
company or U.S. Treasury retirement bonds.
Ralph Nader's Portability Program
The national portability systems discussed in
the above section require only a simple reform of the
present pension system.

The portability program suggested

by consumer advocate Ralph Nader, on the other hand, would
require a complete transformation of the U.S. pension
industry.
Mr. Nader's thorough censure of the private pension
system has been widely publicized both in speeches and
in his recent book, You and Your Pension, which is
co-authored by Kate Blackwell.

Denunciations such as the

following are indicative of the Nader-Blackwell belief
that the present private pension system must be abolished
and replaced.

165
In terms of dollar impact, the private pension
system represents one of the most comprehensive
consumer frauds that many Americans will encounter in
their lifetime.
And I use the term 'fraud* advisedly.
Those . . . who sell, service, and administer
private pension plans, as well as those who negotiate
and establish plans, have seriously and deliberately
misrepresented the nature of this pension system. ^
Its E the private pension system's J. operative
premise remains the same;
some must lose so that
others may gain.
We do not yet know whether the private pension
system can be made to work in the way most people
believe it should or whether it is essentially too
flawed and too expensive to offer more than its
present limited benefits. ^
Reform Proposals
Mr. Nader has suggested in speeches and in various
publications that the present private pension system may be
replaced by a number of competitive private independent
pension funds outside the control of employers and unions.

16

Each employee would choose a fund to which tax deductible
contributions could be made on his behalf by himself and
all employers throughout his entire working career.
Individual accounts would be established by the fund
■^Ralph Nader, Remarks before the Sixth Annual
Conference on Employee Benefits, New York City, May 24,
1972, reprinted in Ralph Nader and Kate Blackwell, You and
Your Pension (New York:
Grossman Publishers, 1973)» P» 158.
^ " P r i v a t e Pension Plans." Congressional Quarterly
Report. XXXI, No. 9 (March 3, 1973). 73V.
*^Ralph Nader and Kate Blackwell, You and Your
Pension (New York:
Grossman Publishers, 1973)» P» 123.

16

For example, see Ibid., pp. 124-126.
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administrators for all participants and a passbook would
be available for each employee to maintain a record of
accrued benefits.

The plans would be structured on a

money purchase basis, with retirement benefits being
dependent on aggregate contributions plus accrued interest.
All contributions would vest immediately.
If an employee changes jobs, the succeeding employer
may begin contributions to the fund originally selected by
the employee.

Thus, portability as a fund transfer when

an employee changes jobs is not included in the Nader
proposal.

Should the employee, however, become dissatis

fied at any time with the management of his chosen fund,
his accrued pension assets may be transferred to another
fund.

In this sense, then, since complete labor mobility

without pension credit loss is accomplished and asset
transfer between qualified funds is allowed at the employee's
discretion, a type of portability is available under the
Nader system.
Also included in this proposal is the requirement
that the qualified funds be licensed and regulated by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, with directors elected
by participating members.

Officers or administrators of

the fund would be appointed by the directors and "required
to poll the membership for investment preferences."

17

The

funds could be administered by insurance companies or by
17Ibid., p. 1 2 5 .
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any other qualified group which could obtain a license.
Pension fund administrators, investment managers,
actuaries and other persons with the necessary ex
pertise who joined together to form corporations would
be eligible to apply for licenses.
It would be
possible for a bank's pension trust department, if
it were spun off and all the connections with the
commercial department severed* to qualify as an
independent retirement fund.
Since these funds would compete for fund accruals,
fund managers would have the incentive to offer the
highest possible rates of return commensurate with the
risk accepted, to keep administrative costs low and to
operate the fund in a prudent and honest m a n n e r . ^
Implementation of Mr. Nader's pension system
would cause a vast restructuring of many financial insti
tutions.

Accordingly, two transitional provisions have

been suggested.

First, only the asset values of employees

who are older than age thirty-five could be transferred
to a new fund of that employee's choice.

The asset values

accrued on behalf of younger employees may be retained in
the employer's pension fund for the duration of the transi
tion period.

Eventually, the thirty-five year age limit

would be eliminated.

Second, since many of the retired

people may have already "lost" in the "pension lottery,"
1 ft

"What Nader Really Saids
Question Posed Shifts
Argument to Fundamental Concepts," Recent Developments
in Pension Benefits. Employee Benefit Plan Review Research
Reports, August 6 , 1971, P» 1.
19

Nader and Blackwell, You and Your Pension.
pp. 1 2 5 - 1 2 6 .
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such individuals would receive a subsidy financed by a
corporate income surtax coming out of "dividend payments
on a uniform basis.

In effect, it would be a contribution

by shareholders in recognition of services rendered to all
American corporations."

20

Again, this is solely a transi

tional measure and would be eliminated when the need to
bring the retired population above the poverty level
vanishes.
Reactions to Nader's Proposals
Mr, Nader’s proposed reform of the private pension
system has prompted strong reactions from the pension
industry, employers and other pension reform advocates.
I t i s one thing to chastise the pension plans
for being too slow to recognize the changed circum
stances of modern industrial life for failing to
institute needed changes in light of these circumstances.
It is quite another to crucify these plans on the cross
of 'consumer fraud.' . . . If we were to adopt Mr.
Nader's proposal— and I doubt that anyone will want
to--we would turn upside down and emasculate the
private pension system and the-fundamental incen
tives for its further growth.
In addition to the general reaction of fear of
chaos in the financial community brought about by the
transition to Nader's competitive private funds, some
pension experts contend that the private pension system

20

Nader, Sixth Annual Conference on Employee
Benefits, May 24, 1972, pp. 165- 166 .
21

"Javits Replies to Nader," Pension and Welfare
News, VIII, No. 7 (July, 1972), 4-8, 6 l, condensation of
Sen. Jacob K. Javits rebuttal of Nader's Speech, Sixth
Annual Conference on Employee Benefits, New York, May 25,
1972.
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might be endangered further by forcing employers into
profit sharing plans.

22

Such plans could proliferate if

regulation of the private funds by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and the resulting controls over
contributions to these funds, involve more supervision
than employers are willing to accept.
Other criticisms of Mr. Nader's proposals are more
specific than the general allegation of endangering the
private pension system.

For example, Nader's program is

based on the money purchase concept, while most of the
pension plans in the U.S. are of the defined benefit
type.

23

The money purchase formula rarely is used because

it generally results in small contributions during an
employee's early working years due to the lower salaries
ordinarily earned in that period.

As indicated previously,

the money purchase concept is more appropriately used in
a stable noninflationary economy; and, even then, an
employee's current standard of living is reduced at retire
ment to reflect the lower wages in his early career for
which contributions were made.

The fixed benefit formula,

on the other hand, is designed to reflect the standard of
living just prior to retirement.

The problem of inflation

and its effects on any fixed income is especially acute
for older employees under a money purchase plan.

22

Although

Gordon, private interview, August 9» 1972.

23
•^Norman H. Tarver, "Pension Reform Legislation,"
Pension and Welfare News. VII, No. 11 (November, 1971), p. 30.
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an employer may increase past service and accrued future
service benefits under a defined benefit formula-to reflect
an increased cost of living, retroactive increases in
money purchase contributions are rare.
Another criticism of Mr. Nader's proposal is that
it would do little to extend private pension coverage to
people not currently covered.

Approximately half of the

labor force in the U.S. is not covered.
By far the major proportion of these uncovered
employees are probably employed by small employers.
It is with this type of employer that a pension plan
based on a money purchase formula is likely to be
be least suitable.
A small employer when he starts
a pension plan is likely to have on his staff older
employees who have a few years to go before retirement.
A money purchase formula will do an inadequate job
for these older employees.
Moreover, the lack of financial experience of the
employees who are currently covered may make it difficult
to choose the fund best suited to personal retirement needs.
The competitive nature of the funds probably would result
in the availability of a wide selection of risk-return
tradeoffs in the different funds.

Consequently, employers

and employees may find that investment counseling is a
necessary prerequisite for effective utilization of the
competitive funds.
Although the benefit payment function of competitive
o Ll

Charles D. Spencer, "One Answer to Naders
Employ
er's 'Promises' Looks Good Compared to Future Uncertainty,"
Recent Developments in Pension Benefits. Employee Benefit
Plan Review Research Reports, August 20, 1971.
^Tarver,

"Pension Reform Legislation," p. 30.

funds may be operated in a number of ways, a common
practice of many existing trust funds is to utilize an
unallocated advance funding technique.

That is, the fund

assets of a given employee are pooled with the assets of
other active employees prior to the time of the actual
retirement.

At retirement, a portion of the pooled assets

are withdrawn to purchase from an insurance company an
immediate annuity on behalf of the retiring worker.

While

the unallocated funding approach appears highly adaptable
to Mr. Nader's competitive fund system it also is the
most expensive of all the insured group techniques.
would be much less expensive

It

(or higher benefits could

be provided for the same amount of money), if the pension
credits were insured in the employees* preretirement years
since premium rates may be lower for deferred annuities for
younger employees than immediate annuities for retiring
employees.

That is, insurance companies may require

utilization of more conservative actuarial assumptions
for premium rates for retiring employees than for young,
active employees.
Finally, many technical problems may be encountered
in the operation of the competitive funds.

For example,

the investment funds may be difficult to manage since there
are so many voting rights that may be exercised by parti
cipants with an active interest in the fund's operation.
The transition of the pension system to these funds may
produce further repercussions in the capital markets as
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large volumes of securities are liquidated in the ownership
change.
Future of Ralph Nader's Pension Program
Although Mr. Nader's pension program has received
wide criticism, support for his plan is growing both in
the Congress and on the consumer front.

If reform

legislation is delayed indefinitely due to political and
technical pressures, additional opportunity will exist for
Mr. Nader's consumer oriented hook on pensions, You and
Your Pension, to become more widely read, thus building
further support for his approach.

Mike Gordon, Minority

Counsel to the Senate Labor Subcommittee has pointed out
that "the longer action is delayed, the more time Mr. Nader
will have to gain acceptance for his money purchase
approach with four or five alternative investment choices."

26

The Nader pension plan has received support from
a number of legislators, including Sen. George McGovern
(D— S. Dak.),2^

Although it is not clear who will be the

legislative sponsor, introduction of Mr. Nader's proposal
, 28
appears imminent.
"Subcommittee Counsel Sees 'Nader Bill'Resulting
from Failure of S. 3598," Weekly News Digest. Employee Bene
fit Plan Review Research Reports, October 20, 1972, p. 1.
^ " L egislative Forum," Pension and Welfare News,
VIII, No. 9 (September, 1972), W .
po

"Nader Proposes His Own Plan for Pension Reforms,"
The National Underwriter; Life and Health Insurance Edition,
LXXII, No. 9 (March 3, 1973)» 1? Rep. Peter A. Peyser,
Remarks before the Annual Conference of the Association of
Private Pension and Welfare Plans, Inc., May 23» 1973*
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Limited Portability Systems
Reciprocal Agreements
Portability may be implemented on a limited basis
through a reciprocal agreement.

Such arrangements may

be established on a formal multiemployer basis

29

simply an informal agreement between two plans.

or as
Under

a multiemployer plan which provides for portability, fund
assets accrued by an employee who changes jobs within the
participating employer group may be transferred to a
succeeding employer.

Depending on the contractual arrange

ment, fund transfer may be delayed or made on an installment
basis in order to minimize adverse asset liquidation
problems.
Informal reciprocal agreements between two plans
rarely occur
example,

except in special individual situations.

For

companies in need of specialized professional

employees may utilize fund transfers in order to obtain
the desired technical services of these individuals,
Generally, the professionals negotiate for the fund transfer
as a condition of employment.
The portability provided by reciprocal agreements
is limited by, and to, the participating employer group.

29

Multiemployer plans, as discussed in Chapter I,
may be of two types.
First, there is the master plan
type in which no actual portability is available; i.e.,
a group of employers are considered as one employer for
pension plan purposes.
Each participating employer con
tributes to one master plan.
The second type of multi-^
employer arrangement is discussed in this section, and is
more properly called a reciprocal agreement.
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The amount of the benefit, however, is not usually limited
in these arrangements.
Second Laver of Social Security
Another type of limited implementation of the
portability concept is related to the benefit level.

One

such mechanism has been suggested in various forms, but
generally may be called a second layer of Social Security.
Actuarial Committee Solution.— A layer of private
pensions for all employees to provide an income above
Social Security has been suggested by a committee of twelve
actuaries from leading pension consulting firms.

This

plan was outlined by George B. Swick at an actuarial
conference devoted to pensions in March 1972.-^°

Every

employer with five or more employees would be required
to establish a payroll deduction plan, so that employees
would be able to finance additional retirement income if
they so desire, but with the advantages of the group
mechanism.

Employee contributions would be tax exempt

up to 5 percent of Social Security covered earnings.

This

group plan could utilize an insurance carrier, a trust
mechanism or any other available funding medium.

The

benefits would be fully vested, funded and portable.
If the employer did not wish to set up his own group
plan for the second layer of retirement income, an "annuity
J George B. Swick, "Report of the Legislative
Panel of the Society of Actuaries," Address presented
at the Society of Actuaries Regional Meeting, New Orleans,
Louisiana, March 20, 1972. (Mimeographed)
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pool, or a series of annuity pools, would be established
on a quasi-governmental basis.

These pools would, however,

invest in the private sector of the economy."31

These

pools also could be used to implement the portability
concept; i.e., if an employee changes jobs, the assets
supporting his vested benefit credits could be transferred
to the pool.

If the employee so desires, his accrued

assets then could be transferred to the fund of a succeeding
employer.

In effect, the annuity pools would serve as

a series of clearinghouses in the private sector.
With regard to employer-supported retirement
benefits, the actuaries suggested that eligibility,
vesting, funding and portability legislation be limited
to "a layer of benefits between Social Security and 50
per cent T sic I of Social Security covered earnings."^
Employer-paid retirement benefits, however, would not be
compulsory and portability could be made available at the
employer's option through the annuity pools developed
for the employee-supported second layer of Social Security.
The concept of a limited portability system to
provide a second layer of Social Security, as suggested by
the actuarial committee, has received little support in
Congress and is not likely to be incorporated in any legis
lative proposal.

This pension reform plan, patterned after

31Ibid. , p.
32Ibid., p. 6.
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the successful British contracted-out private plans,
essentially is "too complicated and too late" for con
sideration.
Norman H. Tarver*s Special Laver II-Laver III
Concept.— Canadian pension expert Norman H. Tarver has
suggested a Layer II-Layer III portability concept (Layer
I would be Social Security) for use in the United States.
Layer II would be subject to minimum vesting, benefit and
locking-in standards and would be required before a more
generous Layer III could be established.

Layer III would

not be subject to any regulation more stringent than the
current Internal Revenue Service qualification standards.
Neither layer would be compulsory under the Tarver proposal
but, in essence, any employer with a private pension plan
would have the layer of benefits above Social Security
subjected to strict benefit and solvency regulations.
Transfer of vested benefit credits under the Tarver pro
posal would be accomplished by a direct transfer of funds
from one qualified plan to another.

Mr. Tarver also suggests

that federal tax law changes be made so that the transfer
would be a tax free negotiation.
-^See previous chapter for a description of the
British second layer plan.
'ih,
J Ronald B. Gold, Financial Economist, U.S. Treasury,

representing the Nixon Administration on Pension legislation,
private interview, Washington, D.C., August 10, 1972.
-^Tarver,

"Proposals," pp. 100-101.
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Robert Paul's Required Second Laver Plan*—

Robert

Paul of the Martin E. Segal Company has suggested that
a universal money purchase layer be required to extend
coverage to all employees . ^

Each employer would be

required to contribute approximately 1 percent of earnings
subject to Social Security taxes for all employees over
age twenty-five.

The employer may utilize (or establish)

his own private pension plan, purchase insured annuities
or use a government administered central fund to fulfill
this obligation.
vested and funded.

The required benefits would be immediately
Mr. Paul has not worked out the porta

bility portion of the required benefit plan, but, presuma
bly, the government administered central fund could serve
as a clearinghouse for pension credits being transferred.
Although Mr. Paul's plan would not help older
employees, since there is no adjustment for past service,
the proposal would be expected eventually to provide "the
average retiree with a pension equivalent to some X5%> of
his preretirement income, which would be added to the
35 % ( 50 % in the case of married couples) now provided

37
by Social Security."^
Conclusions
Any mechanism for implementing the portability
concept on a national basis must involve either a direct
-^"The Push for Pension Reform," Business Week,
March 17, 1973. pp. ^6-58.
•^Ibid. , p. 52 .

transfer implying a federal income tax change, an indirect
transfer utilizing a clearinghouse, individual insured
annuities or retirement bonds, or a series of private
funds which effectively would serve as clearinghouses.
More limited portability is available currently through
reciprocal agreements which allow fund transfers.

Such

systems may experience further expansion to meet the
needs of particularly mobile employees.

Suggestions

to implement a second layer of Social Security on a
private basis similar to the British required minimum
private pensions are not serious candidates for enactment.
To date, legislators consider the national clearinghouse
and the tax free direct transfer as the most viable
means of implementing portability.
Although the authors suggesting portability mech
anisms have discussed the dynamics of the fund transfer,
there has been little mention of the calculation of the
asset values to be transferred.

Whether a direct or

indirect fund transfer is utilized, the calculation of
transfer values is the same.

In order to explore the

mechanics and problems incurred in such a calculation,
sample transfers are presented in the next chapter.

CHAPTER

VII

THE PORTABILITY CONCEPT j

ITS COST AND THE

EFFECT ON FUNDING AND BENEFIT LEVEL
Introduction
The portability concept largely has been criti
cized for its excessive cost, complexity and corrosive
effect on benefits as well as for being unnecessary if
adequate vesting is available.

The purpose of this

chapter is to explore the veracity of these allegations.
The cost of portability is derived from adminis
trative expenses, lost income due to the necessity of keeping
highly liquid assets, and increased funding costs.

Lost

income because of liquidity needs essentially is an op
portunity cost which need not be considered in this chapter
since terminations are predictable, enabling plan adminis
trators to plan cash flows for the fund.

In addition,

since funds are constantly being paid into the fund by
the employer and in the form of payroll deductions (if the
plan is contributory),
facilitated.

cash flow forecasting is further

Portability costs attributable to increased

funding, lost turnover relief and administrative expenses
in the form of a percentage rate, however, are examined
in this chapter.
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The complexity of calculating transfer values is
exemplified by the necessity of making simplifying
assumptions in illustrating the effect of portability on
pension funds.

For example, although the present value

of a benefit easily can be calculated, and translated
into a comparable benefit in a succeeding plan, it is
necessary to assume that all transferred-in pension assets
for a new employee are refundable to him or his benefi
ciaries in the event of death or disability prior to retire
ment.

Such assets could not be treated as an actuarial

gain for the succeeding employer's fund since that employer
was not responsible for the supporting contributions.
Although such complexities do exist, they are treated only
summarily in subsequent analysis since the examples simu
lated for this chapter were designed primarily to isolate
major problems, rather than presenting a comprehensive
solution for portability implementation.
In addition, the effect of portability on the
benefit level for a mobile employee is examined and com
pared with similar benefits for long service employees.
Finally, in order to determine the effectiveness of vesting
as a substitute for portability, the same benefits are left
in "cold storage" with the original employer and compared
to ported benefits.

All of these calculations are made

on the assumption that the employee for whom the analysis
is made lives until retirement.
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The Effect of Portability on Fund Solvency
One of the major objections to portable pensions
is the possibility that a plan's fund adequacy may be
endangered when employees transfer pension fund assets to
a succeeding employer.

That is, the assets remaining

after the transfer may be inadequate to meet the liabilities
created by the benefit promise for the employees staying
with the employer until retirement.

The funding problem

is caused by the prevalent practice of underfunding past
service benefits.

As previously explained, when an employer

initiates a private pension plan that includes recognition
of an employee's service prior to the effective date of
the plan, the funding of the initial past service liability
may be deferred almost indefinitely.

To maintain a quali

fied status for favorable federal income tax treatment,
the employer need only pay the annual interest accruing
on the unfunded liability.

Thus, amortization of the

past service liability is not required, although many
employers do try to amortize such sums over a period of
twenty to forty years.
Table 8 hypothetically illustrates the effect of
portability on the solvency of the pension fund of Company
A.

Although the pension reserves for Company A are based

on various funding methods, all calculations reflect
identical age, benefit level and actuarial assumptions.
The plan and population statistics in Table 8 are given
in the next section, followed by a brief explanation of
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of the funding methods utilized in the illustration.

The

funding methods chosen for demonstration do not repre
sent all possible funding alternatives but are representative
of contrasting fund accumulation methods and amortization
schedules.

Briefly stated, the Accrued Benefit (or Unit

Credit) Cost Method, with maximum amortization of past
service liabilities, becomes fully funded after thirteen
years and, as such, is the most conservative funding form
in the sample.

The Individual Level Cost (or Entry Age

Normal) Method is the least conservative funding approach
with no amortization of past service liabilities.

Thus,

a twenty to forty year amortization schedule implies a
fund reserve position at some point between the Accrued
Benefit reserve (with amortized past service credits) and
the reserve of either of the unfunded methods.
Plan and Population Statistics for Company A
1.

Effective Date of Plant

January 1, i960

2.

Reserve Valuation D a t e i

January 1, 1970

3.

Benefit Formula:
Past Service— Flat amount of $100 annual retirement
income per year of credited past service; plus
Future Service— Flat amount of $120 annual retire
ment income per year of future service
Vesting:

1 0 0 $ after 10 years participation

5*

Portability: All accrued vested benefits fully
portable to a succeeding plan or clearinghouse at
employee's request.
Present value of benefits
transferred out calculated using actuarial
assumptions in (9) below, plus an additional k$>
loading or expense charge reduction

6.

Normal Retirement A g e :

65
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7.

Normal Retirement D a t e : First day of thatmonth
coin
cident with or next following attainment of age 65

8.

Eligibility Requirements:

None

9.

Actuarial Assumptions for Reserve Valuation Purposesi
a. Mortality:
1951 Group Annuity Table projected
eight years by Scale C and rated one year
younger for females
b. Interest!
k-%
c. Fund accumulation ratei
d. Loading!
0$
e. Salary Scale:
Not applicable since benefits
are based on a flat amount benefit formula
f. Turnover:
None assumed since cost reduction
effects of turnover offset possible cost
increases attributable to inflation and the
portability of vested benefits

10.

Employee Contributions!

None

11.

Population Statistics!
a T Sex:
100$ male
b. Average ages
40
c. Date of Employment: All covered workers assumed
employed on January 1, 1950
d. Number of covered employees:
100

Reserve Accumulation Under Different Funding Methods
Accrued Benefit (or Unit Credit) Method:

Maximum

Funding of Supplemental Liability.— An accrued benefit
cost method is one under which the actuarial costs are
based directly upon benefits accrued to the date of cost
determination.

The amount of annual cost attributable

to the current year of plan*s operation is precisely
equal to the present value of the benefits credited to
the employee participants for service during that year.
Thus, this cost method funds future service benefits
fully as they accrue.

The plan's past service liability

is funded at the maximum rate (10 percent of the initial
supplemental liability per year) allowed by the Internal
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Revenue Service for purposes of tax qualification.

Such

amortization requires a funding period of about thirteen
years since the supplemental liability figure reflects a
discount for interest.

As soon as the total benefits

accrued (e.g., past service credits plus all accrued future
service benefits) are fully funded, the aggregate reserve is
1
equal to the present value of total accrued benefits.
Table
8 illustrates the pattern of reserve accumulation for
Company A under the Accrued Benefit (or Unit Credit) Method
with maximum funding of supplemental liability.
Accrued Benefit (or Unit Credit) Method;

Unfunded

Supplemental Liability.— This method is similar to the
one described above; i.e., the actuarial costs of the plan
are based on benefits accrued to the date of valuation.

For

any given year, the employer is liable for the cost of each
unit of benefit earned in that year.

Thus, the normal cost

is the annual cost attributable to a given year of a plan's
operation.

Since the future service cost is equal to the

present value of the annually accrued benefit at that date
(e.g., the net single premium for the benefit), the reserve
for future service credits under the Accrued Benefit (Un
funded Supplemental Liability) Method is similar to the re
serve for the Accrued Benefit (Maximum Funding Supple
mental Liability) approach.
The creation of a liability for past service
■^Material for this entire section obtained from
Dan M. McGill, Fundamentals of Private Pensions (2d ed.;
Homewood, 111,*. Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1964)» PP* 156-157*

185

TABLE 8
RESERVE ACCUMULATIONS UNDER DIFFERENT FUNDING METHODS
(Closed Population— No Turnover)

Age
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
3?
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
4?
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
6o
61
62
63
64
65

Year Ending
Dec. 31
i960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

Unit Credit
Maximum
Funding

Unit Credit
Unfunded
Supplemental
Liability

Entry Age
Normal

$50,618
104,405
162,027
222,780
287,232
255,755
428,366
505,516
587,373
674,298
712,364
839,571
942,360
1 ,025,368
1,116,668
1,214,136
1,318,144
1,429,584
1,548,816
1,676,880
1 ,813,836
1,961,232
2,119,136
2,289,200
2,472,000
2,669,348
2,881,928
3,111,228
3,359,552
3,627,100
3,918,072
4,233,548
4,576,592
4,949,952
5,358,600
5,806,780

$27,108
56,424
88,092
122,304
159,120
198,864
241,500
287,424
336,744
389,760
415,986
491,826
572,676
642,768
717,840
808,336
884,544
977,184
1,076,616
1,183,680
1,298,556
1,422,432
1,555,536
1 ,699,200
1,854,000
2,021,448
2,202,228
2,397,696
2,609,652
2,838,600
3,087,972
3,358,848
3,653,892
3,975,552
4,328,100
4,715,280

$36,495
74,482
114,026
155,195
198,062
242,703
289,200
337,636
388,106
440,704
495,537
552,716
612,359
674,616
739,654
807,666
878,866
953,486
1,031,782
1,114,026
1,200,530
1,291,637
1,387,715
1,489,155
1,596,415
1,709,985
1,830,389
1,958,239
2,094,173
2,238,937
2,393,334
2,558,351
2,735,046
2,925,032
3,129,863
3,351,708

credits also is similar for the two Accrued Benefit
techniques.

The present value of credits for past ser

vice prior to the effective date of the contract is the
"basis of the plan's supplemental (or initial past ser
vice) liability.
In this second sample case illustrated in Table 8,
however, no contributions are made to reduce the supple
mentary liability.

The only payments made are the interest

charges on the unfunded past service benefits.

This

assumption is made to demonstrate the extreme situation
of minimal funding and the corresponding unfunded amount
that would exist should contract termination occur.
Individual Level Cost (or Entry Age Normal) Method t
Unfunded Supplemental Liability.— Under Entry Age Normal
funding, a level (or constant) amount is paid into the
fund each year on behalf of each employee.

It should be

noted, however, that with respect to the initial group
of employees covered under the plan, a supplemental
liability is created by the cost averaging nature of this
actuarial cost method.

The level contribution on behalf of

each employee is calculated on the assumption that payments
begin with the first year each participant could have
joined the plan had it always been in effect.

The payments

which are assumed to have been made prior to the inception
of the plan are the basis of the plan's supplemental
liability.

The annual level contribution for each employee

under this funding method equalst
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(1) The present value at entry age of total projected
benefit beginning at age 6 5 ,
(2) Divided by the present value of a temporary annuity
due for the total number of years of an employee's service.
The actuarial liability of fund accumulation at
any one year is equal to the present value of total bene
fits minus the present value of future normal costs.
reserve thus includes previous payments

(plus interest) as

well as the plan's unfunded supplemental liability.
actual reserve accumulation

This

The

however, is equal to only

what is in the fund plus payments toward liquidation of the
unfunded liability.

If no payment is made on the unfunded

liability other than the interest on the initial past
service credits, the possibility of a fund shortage is
readily apparent.

If any one employee retires before

his past service credits are fully funded or transfers
the present value of his accrued pension credits to a
succeeding fund, assets are withdrawn from the fund to
complete the financing of these credits.

The risk of insuf

ficient funding is assumed by the employer since the plan
is based on actuarial cost assumptions that presume
o
indefinite continuation.
Table 8 illustrates the reserve
accumulations for Company A using the Entry Age Normal
unallocated funding method without amortization of the
supplemental liability.
2 Ibid., pp. 228-235.
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Cost of Portability
The vested benefits available to a terminating
employee under the pension plan of Company A are presented
in Table 9.

Since there is a ten year pre-vesting parti

cipation requirement, an employee aged thirty with ten
years of past service at plan inception would not be
eligible for a vested benefit until age forty.

At that

time, the employee's total accrued benefit of $2,320 (past
service benefit IT 10 x $100 = $1,000 2 plus future service
benefit I 11 x $120 = $ 1,320 3 ) would become fully vested.
If the employee terminates at age fifty-five and
transfers his pension credits to a succeeding plan, the
value of the benefit transferred out would be $25*626,
representing an annual annuity for life of $3»955 (.96 x
$4,120).

The benefit transferred out is less than the

amount the employee would have received had he stayed
with the original employer.

The benefit reduction is

made by adding a 4 percent loading charge to the actuarial
assumptions used in calculating the present value of the
vested benefits.-^

The expense charge is made to offset

two potential fund costs.

First, investment losses may

be incurred due to the forced liquidation of securities
at an inopportune time.

Second, the employer no longer

has the advantage of possible favorable mortality gains
^Other changes in the actuarial assumptions could
accomplish the same purpose.
For example, instead of
adding a direct expense charge, less conservative mortality,
interest and age rating assumptions could be made.

TABLE 9
CALCULATION OF PRESENT VALUE OF VESTED BENEFITS IF
EMPLOYEE WERE TO TRANSFER FUNDS

Age

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
6o
6l
62
63
64
65

Accrued
Vested
Benefit*

$2 , 3 2 0
2,4 40
2 ,5 6 0
2,680
2,800
2,920
3i0 40
3,160
3,2 80
3,400
3,520
3,640
3 ,7 60
3,880
4 ,0 0 0
4,120
4 ,2 4 0
4 ,3 6 0
4,480
4,600
4 ,7 2 0
4 ,8 4 0
4 ,9 6 0
5,080
5,200
5,320

PV$1 Annuity
NRA 65,
59(—1) » W

3.3 82
3.523
3.671
3 .8 26
3.988
4 .1 5 8
4 .3 3 6
4.524
4 .7 2 2
4.932
5.153
5.388
5.636
5.900
6 . I 80
6 .4 7 9
6 .7 97
7 .136
7 .4 99
7 .8 85
8.301
8 .7 4 7
9 .2 2 7
9 .7 4 4
10 .305
10 .915

PV Factor
Less W°
Load

3.247
3.382
3.524
3 .6 7 3
3 .8 28
3 .9 9 2
4.163
4.343
4.533
4.735
4.947
5 .1 7 2
5.4 11
5.664
5 .9 3 3
6 .2 2 0
6.525
6 .8 5 1
7 .1 99
7 .5 70
7 .9 6 9
8.397
8.858
9.354
9 .8 9 3
10 .478

^Assume 10 years past service.

PV Accrued
Vested Bene
fit; (4)x(2)

$7 ,533
8,252
9,021
9 ,8 4 4
10,718
11 ,657
12,656
13 ,72 4
14,868
16 ,099
17,413
18 ,826
2 0 ,3 4 5
21,97 6
23 ,732
2 5 ,62 6
2 7 ,66 6
29 ,870
32 ,252
34,82 2
3 7 ,6 1 4
4 0 ,641
4 3 ,9 3 6
4 7 ,51 8
5 1 ,444
55,74 3

on funds that are transferred out.
In order to demonstrate the effect on a pension
fund of an employee's transfer to a succeeding plan, the
fund deficiencies created under several actuarial cost
methods are presented in Table 10.

For example, if an

employee aged fifty-one transfers his accrued benefits
in Company A to a succeeding employer, under the Accrued
Benefit Method (without supplemental funding), a $4,602 de
ficiency would be created by that one termination, leaving
the reserve .32 percent unfunded (in addition to the underfunding of the remaining employees* past service benefits).
The .32 percent reduction represents an additional cost
to the employer since the funding deficiency must be
eliminated if the pension plan is to retain its qualified
status.
Since under Company A's Accrued Benefit Method
(with supplemental funding), previous service credit
funding was assumed to be complete after thirteen years,
the fund experiences an actuarial gain (.01 x .04) from
the expense charge for termination transfer of funds.

The

gain begins in the twelfth year but levels off to .04
percent in the thirteenth year.
The cost of portability per employee steadily
decreases as age increases under the Accrued Benefit
Method (without supplemental funding).

Quite the opposite

is true, however, under the Entry Age Normal funding
method.

The cost of portability decreases during the
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TABLE 10
FUND DEFICIENCY IF ONE EMPLOYEE WERE TO TRANSFER FUNDS
(Ages 4-0-60)— Noncumulative Deficiencies

Age
4-0
4-1
4-2
4-3
44
4-5
4-6
4-7
4-8
4-9
50
51
52
53
5455
56
57
58
59
60

Unit
Credit
Maximum
Funding
$4-09
-4-03
-4-10
-44-9
-484
-525
-572
-620
-64-8
-72 5
-786
-84-6
-916
-988
-1,067
-1,153
-1,24-2
-1,34-4-1,4-4-9
-1,567

% Fund

Deficit

.06
-.02*
-.04-.04-.04
-.04
-.04
-.04
-.04
-.04-.04
-.04
-.04
-.04
-.04
-.04
-.04
-.04
-.04
-.04
-. 04-

Unit
% Fund
Credit
Unfunded Deficit
$3,373
3,334
3,294
3 »4l6
3,540
3,574
3,811
3,952
4,102
4,262
4,427
4,602
4,790
4,984
5,192
5,412
5,644
5,893
6,155
6,436
6,73^

.81
.68
.58
.53
.49
.44
•^3
.40
•38
.36
.34
.32
.31
.29
.28
.27
.26
.25
.24
.23
.22

Entry
Age
Normal
$2,578
2,725
2,897
3,098
3,321
3,580
3,867
4,189
4,550
4,959
5,408
5,910
6,468
7,084
7,768
8,526
9,362
10,288
11,280
12,433
13,681

fo Fund
Deficit

.52
.49
.47
.46
.45
.44
.44
.44
.44
.45
.45
.46
.47
.48
.49
.50
.51
.53
.54
.56
.57

*Since funding is completed after 13 years and no
turnover is assumed in the reserve calculation! actuarial
gains from turnover occur due to the 4-% expense dharge for
fund transfer.
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younger ages (age 40-46), because of the expense charge,
but increases beyond age 46.
The cost of portability is not insignificant.
Assuming only a 1 percent rate of turnover, an employer
with an unfunded qualified pension plan will incur costs
of approximately .22-.81 percent of fund assets per year.
Nevertheless, many employers are more concerned with the
cost of benefits as a percentage of payroll.

Based on

an average annual salary of $7»000 and a 1 percent rate
of turnover, the cost of portability to Company A is
approximately .36-1.95 percent of payroll.

Since most

pension plans cost 3-5 percent of payroll, with some
ranging as high as 10-15 percent,

4

the cost increase

attributable to portability clearly is significant.

The

more fully funded a plan is, however, the lower the cost
of portability.
The Effect of Portability on the Benefit Level
In order to determine how portability affects
the level of benefit available to a mobile employee,
annuity income under several different plans have been
calculated for an employee changing jobs twice.

Since

the level of vesting required influences the benefit
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Retirement Income for Employees Act, 1973.
Hearings, before a Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, Senate, on S. 4 and S. 75»
93d Cong,, 1st sess., February 15» 1973*

1 93

available for transfer, benefit calculations were made
under a

ten year, 100 percent vesting plan, the Rule

50 , and

100 percent immediate vesting.
Employee X worked for Company A for 15 years

of

(from

age twenty to age thirty-five), then went to work for
Company B.

After five years with Company B, he transferred

to Company C for a salary increase.

Each termination

involved a transfer of vested pension credits to the fund
of the succeeding employer.

This benefit simulation is

designed to illustrate several of the problems associated
with portability.

First, an employee can experience bene

fit loss (or gain) due to change in actuarial assumptions
used by different employers.

Second, benefit loss can

occur if vesting requirements are not met.

This problem,

however, would be present whether or not portability were
available.

Third, benefit loss can occur if the employer

allowing the transfer from his fund makes an administrative
expense charge to cover any fund liquidation losses in
curred on account of the transfer.

Finally, an employee

transferring funds into a succeeding employer's fund may
have a benefit under the new plan greater than he would
have been eligible for had he been employed by that succeeding
employer throughout his entire working career.

He would

then accrue a benefit under the succeeding employer's
plan larger than that of comparable employees who had
been employed continuously by that same employer.

This

situation may cause morale problems among the co-workers with

the lower benefits, in spite of the fact that the higher
benefit was accrued, under a previous employer's plan.
The following summary of the major provisions of
the pension plans for Companies A, B and C is the basis of
annuity simulations in Tables 11, 12 and 13.

Since the

benefit formula for Companies B and C are salary related,
separate annuity calculations are presented for those
Tables I k

companies in

and 15 .

Finally, an analysis is

made ofbenefits available had the employee remained
with the same employer (Table 16 ) as well as the benefits
available where 100 percent immediate vesting is provided
in lieu of portability.
Plan Provisions
Company A
1.
2.

Benefits
Past Service benefit of $100 for each
year of past service plus Future Service bene
fit of $120 for each year of future service
Actuarial Assumptions for transfer values:
a. Mortality:
1951 Group Annuity Table
projected eight years by Scale C and rated
one year younger for males and six
years younger for females
b.
Interest:
k percent
c. Loading for transfer purposes:
k percent

Company B
1.

2.
3.

Benefit: Career average benefit of li percent
of salary for each year of service (no past
service benefit except that transferred into
the plan which is nonforfeitable in the event
of death)
Salary Scale: 2 percent per year increase
Actuarial Assumptions for transfer values:
a.
Mortality:
1951 Group Annuity Table pro
jected eight years by Scale C and rated
one year younger for males and six years
younger for females

4,

b.
Interest:
4-| percent
c.
Loading for transfer purposes:
Eligibility Requirements: None

none

Company C

2.
3.

4.

Benefit: Future Service Benefit of 1 percent
of final five year average salary for each year
of credited future service (no past service
benefit except that transferred into the plan
and that amount is nonforfeitable)
Salary Scale: 1 percent per year increase
Actuarial Assumptions:
a. Mortality:
1951 Group Annuity Table
projected sixteen years by Scale C and
rated one year younger for males and six
years younger for females
b.
Interest:
2j? percent
c.
Loading for transfer purposes:
None
Eligibility Requirements: None

Annuity Simulation
Ten Year Vesting.— The annuity simulation for
Employee X under a plan of 100 percent vesting after ten
years of service is presented in Table 11.

When Employee

X transfers his benefits (100 percent vested) from Company
A, the full present value is not transferred out because
of the 4 percent expense charge made by that employer.

The

more liberal actuarial assumptions employed by Company B,
however, result in a higher benefit transferred into the
second plan than would have been available under Company
A's plan.
Since Employee X remains with Company B only five
years, he accrues no vested benefits.

The asset value

transferred out of Company B is the amount transferred
in from Company A, plus interest.

Again, a change in

the benefit level occurs when the benefit is calculated

196
TABLE 11
ANNUITY AVAILABLE FOR A MOBILE EMPLOYEE UNDER
1 0 -YR. VESTING RULE3- FOR FUTURE SERVICE BENEFITS
(All Transferred-in Benefits Automatically Vest)

Age

Company
A

$ 1,120
1,240
1,360
1,480
1,600
1,720
1,840
1,960
2,080
2,200
2,320
2,440
2,560
2,580
2,800
2,920
3,040
3,160
3,280
3,400
3,520
50
3,540
51
3,76o
52 .
3,880
53
4,000
5k
4,120
55
4,240
56
4,360
57
4,480
58
4,600
59
4,720
6o
4,840
61
4,960
62
5,060
63
6k
5,200
5,320
65
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
4o
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Asset Value
Transferred
Out— Age 35

Company
B

b
ps==1 ,981 °
$4,561°
2,082
(equivalent
2,185
2,290
to $ 1,561
annuity;
2,398
$69 annual
2,507
annuity
2,618
lost because
2,732
of expense
2,848
charge)
2,966
3,087
3,210
3,335
3,463
3,594
3,727
3,863
4,002
4,143
4,287
4,434
4,584
4,737
4,893
5,052
5,214
5,380
5,549
5,721
5.897
6,076
6,259

Asset Value
Transferred
Out--Age 40

r|

$5,683
(equivalent
to $1,874
annuity;
$650 annual
annuity lost
due to ex
pense charge
and lost
accrued
annuity)

Company
C

PS=987
1,107
1,227
1,347
1,467
1,587
1,707
1,827
1,947
2,067
2,187
2,307
2,427
2,547
2,667
2,787
2,907
3,027
3.147
3,267
3,387
3.507
3.627
3,747
3.867
3,987
4,107

a In this example, the Williams-Javits deferred
graded vesting formula (30 percent after eight years service
plus 10 percent for each year thereafter) would produce the
same results as the ten year vesting.
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TABLE 11--Continued

2.65 x $1,720 = $4,561 (Present value of $1,720
annual annuity at actuarial assumptions for Company A
with expense loading).
0 See Table 14 for annuity calculations for
Company B.
*1

Since the employee stayed with Company B only
five years, no accrued future service benefits were vested.
The only vested benefits were past service
servi<
benefits with
interest ($4,561 x (1.045)-3 = $4,561 x 1 246 « $5 »683 )
J.

V W

X

W

W

W

V -I-

^

^

W

i

e See Table 15 for annuity calculations for Company C.

on the basis of the actuarial assumptions of Company C,
which include a more conservative interest assumption
and a more conservative mortality assumption.

The use of

these different actuarial assumptions in benefit recalcu
lation result in a benefit loss for the transferring employee
The complete benefit development for Companies
B and C are presented in Tables l^ and 15*

Had the employee

remained with Company A, he would not have had the salary
increases brought about by changing jobs, but the final
retirement benefit would have been $1,213 per year higher.
Rule of 50.— The annuity available for the same
mobile employee under the Rule of 50 for vesting is calcu
lated in Table 12.

The final benefit under this vesting

provision is considerably lower than that under the ten
year vesting provision;

i.e., $1,717 annual benefit is

lost due to the two job changes.

The reasons for benefit

loss are the same under the Rule of 50 as under the ten
year vesting provision, except that only 50 percent of
Employee X's benefits are vested when he makes his first
job change.

Thus, since termination occurs before full

vesting is attained, half of the accrued benefits are
lost.

Other benefit adjustments are similar to those

made in Table 11.
Immediate Full Vesting.— As is indicated by the
benefit calculation under a 100 percent immediate vesting
provision in Table 13, a final benefit loss is experienced
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TABLE 12
ANNUITY AVAILABLE FOR A MOBILE EMPLOYEE UNDER
THE RULE OF 50 VESTING FOR FUTURE SERVICE BENEFITS
(All Transferred-in Benefits Automatically Vest)

Age

Company
A

Asset Value
Transferred
Out— Age 35

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
4l
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
6o
61
62
63
64
65

$1,120
1,240
1,360
1,480
1,600
1,720
1,840
1.9 60
2,080
2,200
2,320
2,440
2,560
2,680
2,800
2,920
3,040
3,160
3,280
3,400
3,520
3,640
3,760
3,880
4,000
4,120
4,240
4,360
4,480
4,600
4,720
4,840
4,960
5,060
5,200
5,320

PS=990
$2,280a
1,091
(equivalent
1,194
to $825
1,299
annuity;
1,407
1,516
$895 annual
annuity lost
1,627
because of
1,741
expense chargel,857
and incom
1,975
2,096
plete vest
ing; $2,280
2,219
2,344
f 2.762 =
2,472
$825)
2,603
2,736
2,872
3,011
3,152
3,296
3,443
3,593
3,746
3,902
4,061
4,223
4,389
4,558
4,730
4,906
5,085
5,268

Company
B

Asset Value
Transferred
Out— Age 40

Company
C

•U

ri

PS=493
$2,841°
603
(equivalent
723
to $937
843
annuity; $643
963
annual
1,083
annuity lost
1,203
due to ex
1,323
pense charge
1,443
and incom
1,563
plete vest
1,683
ing; $2,84l
1,803
f 2.032 =
1,923
$937)
2,043
2,163
2,283
2,403
2,523
2,643
2,763
2,883
3,003
3,123
3,243
3,363
3,483
3,603

a2.652 x $860 = $2,280 (Present value of $860
annual annuity at actuarial assumptions for Company A with
4 percent expense loading.
Since age (35) plus years of
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TABLE 12— Continued
service (15 ) total 50 » the employee is 50 percent vested
under the Rule of 50; i.e., vested benefit is 50 percent
of accrued benefit or .50 x $1,720 = $860 .)
See Table 14 for calculation of annuity for
Company B.
cSince employee transferred to Company C at
age forty with only five years of service, no future
service benefits with Company B were vested.
The only
vested benefits were past service benefits with interest
($1,280 x (1.045)-5 = $2,280 x 1.246 = $2,841).
^See Table 15 for annuity calculations for
Company C.
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TABLE 13
ANNUITY AVAILABLE FOR A MOBILE EMPLOYEE
UNDER lOOfa IMMEDIATE VESTING

Age
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
4i
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Company
A
$1,120
1,240
1,360
1,480
1,600
1,720
1,840
1,960
2,080
2,200
2,320
2,440
2,560
2,680
2,800
2,920
3,040
3,160
3,280
3,400
3,520
3,64o
3,76o
3,880
4,000
4,120
4,240
4,360
4,480
4,600
4,720
4,840
4,960
5,060
5,200
5,320

Asset Value
Transferred
Out— Age 35

Asset Value
Company Transferred
Out— Age 40
B

Company
C

■u
PS==1,981
2,082
$4,56la
(equivalent
2,185
2,290
to $1,651
2,398
annual
annuity;
2,507
2,618
$69 annual
annuity lost 2,732
2,848
due to ex
2,966
pense
charge)
3,087
3,210
3,335
3,^63
3,594
3,727
3,863
4,002
4,143
4,287
4,434
4,584
4,737
4,893
5,052
5,214
5,380
5,549
5,721
5,897
6,076
6,259

$7, 56 lc

$1,313
1,433
1,553
1,673
1,793
1,913
2,033
2,153
2,273
2,393
2,513
2,633
2,753
2,873
2,993
3,113
3,233
3,353
3,473
3,593
3,713
3,833
3,953
4,073
4,193
4,313
4,433

a2.652 x $1,720 = $4,561 (Present value of $1,720
annual annuity at actuarial assumptions for Company A
with 4 percent expense loading).

/i
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TABLE 13— Continued
*L_

See Table 1^ for annuity calculation for
Company B (Same as annuity under ten year vesting rule).
c2.888 x $2,618 (Present value of $2,618 annual
annuity at actuarial assumption for Company B).
See Table 15 for annuity calculations for
Company C.
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TABLE 14ANNUITY CALCULATION FOR COMPANY B

Age
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Annuity for
Cumulative
Cumulative
Salary =
Year
Annuity
Annuity
Salary |1.02) (.015xSalary) 10-Yr. Vesting Rule of 50
$6,730
6,865
7,000
7,190
7,285
7,430
7,580
7,730
7,885
8,040
8,205
8,365
8,535
8,705
8,880
9,055
9,240
9,420
9,610
9,805
10,000
10,200
10,405
10,610
10,825
11,040
11,260
11,485
11,715
11,940
12,190

101
103
105
108
109
111
114
116
118
121
123
125
128
131
133
136
139
141
144
147
150
153
156
159
162
166
169
172
176
179
183

PS=l,98la
2,082
2,185
2,290
2,398
2,507
2,618
2,732
2,848
2,966
3,087
3,210
3,335
3,463
3,594
3,727
3,863
4,002
4,143
4,287
4,434
4,584
4,737
4,893
5,052
5,214
5,380
5,549
5,721
5,897
6,076
6,259

PS=

990
1,091
1,194
1,299
1,407
1,516
1,627
1,741
1,857
1,975
2,096
2,219
2,344
2,472
2,603
2,736
2,872
3,011
3,152
3,296
3,443
3,593
3,746
3,902
4,o6l
4,223
4,389
4,558
4,730
4,906
5,085
5,268

aPast Service Annuity calculated from amount trans
ferred in ($4,561), using actuarial assumptions for Com
pany B ($4,561 r 2.302).

b$2,280 * 2.302 = $990.

204
TABLE 15
ANNUITY CALCULATION FOR COMPANY C
Cumulative
Annual Annuity
Salary =
Annuity 10-Yr.
Age Salaryx_ 1 (1.01) Earned Vesting
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

PS=987^
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120

$8,500
8,628
8,757
8,889
9,022
9,157
9,295
9,434
9,576
9,719
9,876
10,013
10,163
10,316
10,471
10,628
10,787
10,949
11,113
11,280
11,449
11,621
11,795
11,972
12,151
12,334

$987
1,107
1,227
1,347
1,4 67
1,587
1,707
1,827
1,947
2,067
2,187
2,307
2,427
2,547
2,667
2,787
2,907
3,027
3,147
3,267
3.387
3,507
3.627
3.747
3,867
3,987
4,107

Cumulative
Annuity
Rule of 50
Vesting
$493°
603
723
843
963
1,083
1,203
1,323
1,443
1,563
1,683
1,803
1,923
2,043
2,163
2,283
2,403
2,523
2,643
2,763
2,883
3.003
3,123
3,243
3.363
3.483
3,603

Cumulative
Annuity
Immediate
Vesting
$ 1 ,313d
1,433
1,553
1,673
1,793
1,913
2,033
2,153
2,273
2,393
2,513
2,633
2,753
2,873
2,993
3,113
3,233
3,353
3,473
3,593
3,713
3,833
3.953
4,073
4,193
4,313
4,433

aPast Service Annuity calculated from amount trans
ferred in ($5,583), using actuarial assumptions for Com
pany C. ($5,683 f 5.760)
toli percent of five year final average salary;
.015 x .2($11,621 + 11,795 + 11,972 + 12,151 + 12,334).
c$ 2 ,841

t

5.760 = $493.

d$ 7 ,651 t 5.760 = $1,313.

even when no losses are incurred due to vesting provisions.
The benefit loss, $887. is not as severe as that experienced
under either of the limited vesting provisions and is
due solely to calculation using different actuarial assump
tions and the transfer charge made by Company A.
Comparison of Retirement Benefits Available to the Mobile
Employee and the Long-Service Employee
Continuous Service.--Table 16 illustrates the
annuity available to Employee X had he been employed con
tinuously by either Company A, B, or C.

The starting

salary earned by the employee with an entry age of twenty
is assumed to be approximately $5,000 for each company.^
Although different benefit formulas are used by the companies
the ultimate benefit for employees with similar salaries
and service periods are nearly equal.

Many employers try

to follow the so-called "50 percent of final average income"
rule of thumb in establishing the broad benefit objectives
of a pension plan, especially for long-term employees.

The

final benefit available to employees under Companies B and
C comply with this criterion:

46.9 percent for Company B

and 45.1 percent for Company C.
By remaining in continuous service with one
employer, Employee X would have received considerably
higher benefits than as a mobile participant under the plan
■^Salary is irrelevant for the benefit calculation
for Company A, since the benefit formula is a flat amount
for each year of service.
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TABLE 16
ANNUITY AVAILABLE HAD EMPLOYEE REMAINED WITH
ONE COMPANY THROUGHOUT CAREER (AGE 20-65)
(Ages 30-65 Shown)
Company B
Age
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
4o
4i
42
^3
44
45
46
47
48

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Company
A
$ 1,120
1,240
1,360
1,480
1,600
1,720
1,840
1,960
2,080
2,200
2,320
2,440
2,560
2,680
2,800
2,920
3,040
3,160
3,280
3,400
3,520
3,640
3,760
3,880
4,000
4,120
4,240
4,360
4,480
4,600
4,720
4,840
4,960
5,060
5,200
5,320

Salary
Earned
$ 6,065
6,215
6,340
6,470
6,595
6,730
6,865
7,000
7,190
7,285
7,430
7,580
7,730
7,885
8 ,040
8,205
8,365
8,535
8,705
8,880
9,055
9,240
9,420
9,610
9,805
10,000
10,200
10,405
10,610
10,825
11,040
11,260
11,485
11,715
11,940
12,190

Annual
Annuity
$91
93
94
97
99
101
103
105
108
109
111
114
116
118
121
123
125
128
131
133
136
139
141
144
147
150
153
156
159
162
166
169
172
176
179
183

Accrued
Annuity
$833
926
1,020
1,117
1,216
1,317
1,420
1,525
1,633
1,742
1,853
1,967
2,083
2,201
2,322
2,445
2,570
2,698
2,829
2,962
3,098
3,237
3,378
3,522
3,669
3,819
3,972
4,128
4,28 7
4,449
4,615
4,784
4,956
5,132
5,3U
5,494

Company
C
$ 1,200
1,320
1,440
1,560
1,680
1,800
1,920
2,040
2,160
2,280
2,400
2,520
2,640
2,760
2,880
3,000
3,120
3,240
3,360
3,480
3,600
3,720
3,840
3,960
4,080
4,200
4,320
4,440
4,560
4,680
4,800
4,920
5,040
5,160
5,280
5,400
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of either Company A, B, or C.

In additiont the benefit

amount would have been similar.

Although the employee

gained a salary increase with each job change, there was
considerable erosion of pension benefits due to termination
with the portability feature.
Full Vesting without Portability.— Benefit preser
vation can be achieved with 100 percent immediate vesting
as is shown by the benefit calculation in Table 17.

If

all plan benefits were 100 percent vested and left in
"cold storage" with each previous employer, and thus not
subject to recalculation on the basis of different actuarial
assumptions and administrative charges, Employee X would
receive

(from three different sources) an aggregate annual

retirement income of $5,366.

This amount is nearly com

parable to the possible benefit available under either of
the three plans had the employee been in the service of
only one employer.
Benefit preservation similar to that indicated in
Table 17 would result from all employers using uniform
actuarial assumptions for transfer purposes, without
imposing a portability expense charge.

That is, each

terminating employee would transfer the full value of his
accrued benefits to the succeeding employer's fund.

Never

theless, slight deviations would occur if the actuarial
basis of a plan differs from the uniform assumptions.
Employers eventually may attempt to standardize all cal
culation assumptions to eliminate any confusion.

It is
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TABLE 17
ANNUITY AVAILABLE FOR A MOBILE EMPLOYEE
(No Portability)
Age

Company A

$ 1,120
30
1,240
31
1.360
32
1,480
33
1,600
34
1,720
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
6o
6l
62
63
64
65
Vesting Formula

Company B

Company C

$101
204
309
417
526
$120
240
360
480
600
720
840
960
1,080
1,200
1.320
1,440
1,560
1,680
1,800
1,920
2,040
2,160
2,280
2,400
2,520
2,640
2,760
2,880
3,000
3,120
Total Annuity Available

100 percent Immediate Vesting
Rule of 50
10-Yr. Vesting (same as WilliamsJavits Deferred Graded Vesting)

$5,366
3*980
4,840
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unlikely, however, that the expense charge for fund trans
fers will be eliminated since investment losses still
could result from forced liquidation and mortality dis
counting would no longer be possible for the terminated
employees.
Conversion Factors for Transfer Values
The effect of plan assumptions on benefits being
transferred is indicated by the following hypothetical
illustration.

Simulated conversion factors were developed

for transfers between plans that differ only in several
key assumptions.

The evaluation includes a description

of plan assumptions, an analysis of the conversion factors
and a table of present value factors for $1 of annual
annuity available under each plan.
Plan Assumptions
Plan 1
1.

2*
3*
4.

Mortality»
1951 Group Annuity Table
projected
eight years by Scale C and rated
one year
younger for males and six years younger for
females
Interest:
^ percent
Loading? ^ percent
Normal Retirement A g e ; Male 65

Plan 2
1.-3.
Same as Plan 1
4.
Normal Retirement Age t
Plan 3
1,-2.
Same as Plan 1
3. Loadings None
4. Same as Plan 1

Male 60

Plan b
1.
2.

Same as Plan 3
Interest: b jt percent
3>-~b.
Same as Plan 3

Plan 3
1.

2.
3.
b,

Mortality: 1951 Group Annuity Table projected
sixteen years by Scale C and rated one year
younger for males and six years younger for
females
Interest: 2|- percent
Loading: None
Normal Retirement A g e : Male 65

Analysis of Conversion Factors
An employee transferring from Plan 1 with a normal
retirement age of 65 to Plan 2 with a normal retirement
age of 60 would lose J b , 6 percent of his benefits as
shown in Table 18.

The right, however, to retire early

under Plan 2 in comparison to Plan 1 may compensate for
the benefit loss.
If an employee transfers pension assets from a
fund which is assumed to earn b percent to a fund assumed
to earn bj? percent, a benefit increase can be expected.

For

example, an employee aged fifty-one who transfers assets from
Plan 3 to Plan b ,
11.1 percent.

will experience a benefit increase of

The higher interest rate will benefit

younger more than older employees since the accumulation
period is longer for younger participants as compared to
that for older employees.

In a similar manner, if the

employee changes to a fund using more conservative

(lower)

interest assumptions, the benefit would be reduced.

For

example, if the same employee aged fifty-one transfers
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TABLE 18
CONVERSION FACTORS FOR TRANSFER VALUES
(Applied to Benefit Level— No Expense Charge)

Age
30
31
32
33
3^
35
36
37
38
39
40

in
42
43
44

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

From Plan 1
to Plan 2

.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
.654
•654

From Plan 3
to Plan 4
1.229
1.223
1.217
1.212
1.205
1.200
1.194
1.189
1.182
1.177
1.171
1.165
1.160
1.154
1.149
1.151
1.138
1.132
1.127
1.122
1.116
1.111
1.106
1.100
1.095
1.090
1.085
1.080
1.074
1.069
1.064
1.059
1.054
1.049
1.044
1.039

From Plan 3
to Plan 5
.507
.515
.522
.530
.538
.546
•55^
.562
.570
.579
.587
.596
.605
.614
.623
.632
.642
.651
.661
.671
.681
.691
.702
.713
.723
.735
.746
.758
.770
.781
.794
.807
.820
.833
.846
.860
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TABLE 19
PRESENT VALUE OF $1 ANNUITY BEGINNING AT NORMAL
RETIREMENT AGE
Age

Plan 1

Plan 2

Plan 3

Plan 4

Plan 5

30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
4l
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

2.353
2.449
2.549
2.654
2.763
2.877
2.995
3.119
3.248
3.383
3.523
3.670
3.824
3.985
4.154
4.331
4.517
4.713
4.919
5.137
5.368
5.612
5.871
6.146
6.438
6.749
7.080
7.433
7.811
8.214
8.647
9.111
9.611
10.154
10.734
11.370

3.599
3.746
3.900
4.o6o
4.226
4.400
4.581
4.771
4.968
5.174
5.389
5* 6l4
5.850
6.096
6.354
6.624
6.909
7.209
7.525
7.858
8.211
8.585
8.980
9.401
9.848
I O .323
10.829
11.370
11.947
12.565
13.227

2.259
2.351
2.447
2.548
2.652
2.762
2.875
2.994
3.118
3.248
3.382
3.523
3.671
3.826
3.988
4.158
4.336
4.524
4.722
4.932
5.153
5.388
5.636
5.900
6.180
6.479
6.797
7.136
7.499
7.885
8.301
8.747
9.227
9.744
10.305
10.915

1.838
1.923
2.011
2.103
2.200
2.302
2.408
2.519
2.637
2.760
2.888
3.023
3.164
3-314
3.470
3.613
3.810
3.995
4.190
4.397
4.6l6
4.850
5.098
5.362
5.643
5.944
6.266
6.610
6.980
7.376
7.801
8.259
8,754
9.290
9.872
10.507

4.453
4.568
4 .685
4.807
4.931
5.060
5.192
5-328
5.467
5.412
5.760
5.913
6.071
6.233
6.402
6.577
6.75 8
6.948
7.145
7.352
7.568
7.79 4
8.031
8.280
8.543
8.820
9.111
9.419
9.745
10.090
10.457
10.845
11.259
11.702
12.178
12.690
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funds from Plan ^ to Plan 3* a benefit reduction of 10.0
percent would be experienced.
An employee changing jobs which involves two
pension plans based on widely different interest and
mortality assumptions may also experience a benefit change.
The mortality and interest assumptions for Plan 5 are more
conservative than those used in Plan 3*

The conservative

actuarial assumptions employed in Plan 5 result in large
benefit losses for younger employees; i.e., almost 50
percent of accrued benefits are lost.

The benefit loss

for older employees is not as great (only an approximate
20 percent benefit loss) because the interest accumulation
period is not as long for younger employees.

It is clear,

therefore, that changes in actuarial assumptions,

especially

interest earned by the pension fund, can have a significant
effect on pension preservation.
Conclusions
The very simple examples presented in this chapter
illustrate a few of the problems related to the determination
of transfer values for pension credits.

For example,

incomplete funding could endanger the adequacy of the
pension fund if many terminations are experienced.

In

addition, benefit fluctuations may result from an employee's
changing jobs several times if transfer expense charges
are made by an employer and/or the actuarial assumptions
used by different employers are not uniform.

Since an employer must forego mortality cost
reductions for benefits transferred out of the fund, some
charge must be made so that the remaining employees are
not treated inequitably.

The pension credits ported to

a succeeding fund on behalf of the terminating employee
must become nonforfeitable; i.e., a death benefit equal
in value to the transferred pension credit must be payable
to the beneficiaries of an employee who dies prior to
normal retirement by the succeeding employer.

On the

other hand, employees who remained with one employer may
have pension benefits which are forfeitable upon death
in the preretirement period.

Unless an offsetting charge

is made, a mobile employee would have more secure benefits
than the long-service employee since ported credits are
fully funded and nonforfeitable.

The determination of

such an expense charge would be difficult.

The flat

percentage reduction of pension assets transferred out
as suggested in this chapter may not be suitable in every
situation.

Another possible solution would be a fee based

on the terminating employee's prorated portion of the un
funded supplemental liability.
The administrative problems created for the suc
ceeding employer by this nonforfeitable benefit would be
numerous.

Each employee's nonforfeitable assets would

have to be accounted for separately; each employee would
have a death benefit of a different amount.
The problem of the creation of nonforfeitable
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benefits is easily circumvented, and benefit preservation
fully maintained, by providing vesting.

The employee

would receive the same (or larger) benefits if vesting
without portability were implemented, thus giving credence
to the supposition that portability is not necessary.
Although portability might be feasible if uniform
transfer values were legislated and the nonforfeitability
of transferred pension credits were ignored, the desirability
of such actions is questionable.

Private pension plans

as a whole would be subject to a loss of flexibility
because of the increased funding necessary to maintain
a plan's qualified status in the event of adverse termina
tion experience.

In addition, the uniformity of actuarial

assumptions for transfer purposes may lead to a further
standardization of all actuarial assumptions, thus removing
a stimulative competitive factor in the pension industry.
The many problems related to portability imple
mentation have caused legislators to avoid considering
passage of any legislation mandating portability.

The

strongest legislative proposals before the 93d Congress,
however, do involve more limited forms of portability and
are analyzed in the next chapter for the purpose of
determining the future of full portability.

CHAPTER VIII
THE PORTABILITY FEATURES OF MAJOR PENSION
LEGISLATION BEFORE THE 93d CONGRESS
Introduction
There are three major pension reform bills before
1
the 93d Congress as well as many additional minor bills.
Major legislation has been introduced by (1) Senators
Harrison A. Williams (D— N.J.) and Jacob K, Javits

(R— N.Y.)

of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
(2) the Nixon Administration (sponsors:

Rep. Wilbur D.

Mills (D— Ark.); Rep.John N. Erlenborn (R— 111.); Rep.
John Dent (D— Pa.) and Rep. Albert H. Quie (R— Minn.)) and
(3) Rep. John Dent, Chairman of the House General
Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education
/

and Labor.

Each of these bills includes a portability

feature, representing opposing and contrasting positions
on the degree, as well as on the means of implementation,
of portability.

The jointly sponsored Williams-Javits

bill provides for a voluntary clearinghouse administered
■'"See Appendix E for a summary of the minor bills
before the 93d Congress.
These bills are deemed to be
minor because they are either narrow in scope, or less
strongly sponsored than the major legislation discussed
in this chapter.
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within the Department of Labor.

The Dent bill, on the

other hand, contains a provision for a clearinghouse
supervised within the Department of Labor, but partici
pation by employers is mandatory.
In direct contrast to the clearinghouse concept
espoused by the Senate and House Labor Committee bills,
the proposal by the Nixon Administration includes as a
tax free transaction any lump-sum distribution of assets
from either a qualified individual or employer-sponsored
private pension plan to a succeeding qualified individual
or employer-sponsored private pension plan.

Reinvestment

must occur within a specified period of time and all
involved parties must consent to the transfer.

The porta

bility feature of the Nixon Administration bill, therefore,
is voluntary and fund transfer is direct.
The portability features of three major bills
indicated above are discussed in detail in this chapter.
In addition, provisions of these bills which are related
only indirectly to portability are briefly outlined.

A

complete statement of the major bill provisions is presented
in Appendix D.
Williams-Javits Joint Senate Bill
Background of the Bill
The "Retirement Income Security for Employees
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Act of 1973" (S. 4-),^ also referred to as "RISE," was
introduced in the 93d Congress on January 4, 1973 ^
Currently,

S. ^ has fifty-three sponsors, which is a

majority of the Senate.^” It thus is expected that this
bill will be passed as soon as it is brought to the Senate
floor.
The 1973 Williams-Javits bill is nearly identical
to S. 3598, a 1972 bill introduced and sponsored by the
same Senators in the 92d Congress which was not passed.
Although primarily developed by the Subcommittee on Labor
of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, S. 3598
was based on an earlier bill introduced by Sen. Javits
alone.^

The latter was developed by Sen. Javits because

of his own personal interest in and study of pension
reform and was patterned after the Ontario Act.
As a result of the increased interest in pension
reform evidenced during the 91st Congress, the Subcommittee
p

U.S., Congress, Senate, Retirement Income Security
for Employees Act of 1973. 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973» S. k ,
-^The House counterpart of S. 4 has been intro
duced by Rep. Henry P. Smith (R— N.Y.) as H,R. 2^32.
^Wall Street Journal, March 26, 1973* P» 26.
^S. 2, introduced in the 92d Cong., 1st sess., also
had been introduced by Sen. Javits in several earlier
sessions of Congress,
A complete discussion of the provisions of the
Ontario Act and similar Canadian legislation is included
in the analysis of portability prototypes in Chapter 5*
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on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare was authorized to conduct a study of private
n

welfare and pension plans . (

Continuation of this study

has proceeded through the 92d and 93d Congress.

The

scope of the three year Senate-sponsored study has inO
eluded hearings on various aspects of pension reform,
studies conducted in cooperation with the private pension
g
industry,
and a statistical cross-section survey of 1,493
private pension plans.10
The Senate survey of private pension plans has
been widely criticized for several reasons.

First,

only

plans which had been in existence since 1950 and were
still active in 1970 were reviewed and plan experience,
in some cases, was averaged over that twenty year interval.
Plans with that longevity obviously have provided
an unusually long time in which individuals could

7

U.S., Congress, Senate, Authorization of the
Senate Subcommittee on Labor to Conduct a Study of Pension
and Welfare Plans, S. Res. 3^0, 91st Cong., 2d sess.,
March 12, 1970.
O
For example, in addition to hearings on general
pension reform, hearings on terminations alone have been
reported in: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, Private Welfare Pension Plan S tudy,
1972— Report of Hearings on Pension Plan Terminations,
92d C o n g , t 2d sess., September, 1972.
q

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Study of the Cost of Mandatory Vesting
Provisions for Private Pension Plans, by Donald S. Grubbs,
Jr., Committee Print (Washington, D . C . : Government
Printing Office, February, 1973)*
10U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Statistical Analysis of Ma.ior Character
istics of Private Pension Plans, 92d Cong., 2d sess.,
September, 1972.
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meet service and, indeed, age requirements.
Shorterlived plans do not provide equal opportunities.
Similarly, such averaging may not represent a current or
realistic ahalysis of the future.
A second area of criticism of the study involves
the questionnaire used to complete the survey.

The

questionnaire was lengthy (over thirty pages) and contained
questions deemed "ambiguous," "out-of-context," conducive
to misinterpretation, and "irrelevant."

12

Many of these

questions would impose a heavy reporting burden on partici
pants,

Moreover, since some of the answers required

were averages, any recent improvements in the plan might
be distorted.

In addition,

"although the staff intends

to work objectively, there is danger of influence by
partisan politics unless outside objective expertise is
called upon."1-^

Although outside advice initially was

rejected by the Senate Labor Subcommittee staff, later
studies were conducted with the cooperation and assistance
of the private pension industry.
A final source of criticism of the Senate survey
11

Merton C. Bernstein, "The Pension Industry and
Effective Reform," Pension and Welfare N e w s . VII, No. 9
(September, 1971)» 15.
12

Frank L. Griffin, "President of Conference
of Actuaries in Public Practice Comments on Pension
Questionnaire and Offers to Interpret Results,"
Employee
Benefit Plan Review; Research Reports, October, 1970, p. 2.
13
^"Leary Reviews Washington Scene at Merdinger
Seminar,"
Weekly Mews Digest, Employee Benefit Plan
Review Research Reports. October 2, 1970, p. 1.
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is related to the statistical analysis of the survey
results.

For example, the "one-in-nine" rule established

by the Senate Subcommitte survey has been widely disputed
because of the implication that only 11 percent of those
covered under private pension plans ever receive benefits
from those plans.
The logical error of such statements is that
they fail to recognize that an employee who leaves
one employer without any vested rights does not drop
out of the labor force.
He goes to another employer
and typically, in time, will settle down and work
long enough to establish his entitlement to vested
benefits.
Despite the barrage of criticisms surrounding the
early activity of the Senate Labor Subcommittee, legislation
has been reported out of the whole Committee in both the
92d and 93d Congress primarily on the basis of the recom
mendations of the study.

S. h, the current bill from the

Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, provides
deferred graded vesting, minimum funding standards,
termination insurance for all unfunded vested liabilities,
increased disclosure and fiduciary responsibility standards,
overfunding procedures,

termination priorities and volun

tary portability for all plans with twenty-five or more
employees.

The provisions would be administered by the

Department of Labor, which would be empowered to petition
•t

h

William A. Dreher, "Deadline for Private Pensions,"
Pension and Welfare N e w s . VII, No. 9 (September, 1971)t 16.
13
^See Appendix D for a complete description of the
provisions of S. k .
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the courts to compel compliance.
The Voluntary Portability Provision
Title III of the Retirement Income Security for
Employees Act of 1973 provides for a Voluntary Portability
Program Fund to be established and administered by the
Secretary of Labor.

16

This voluntary portability program

is designed to facilitate transfer of vested credits between
qualified pension and profit-sharing retirement plans.

It

is voluntary on the part of both the employee and the
employer;

i.e., either party may require that vested

pension credits ramain in the employer's fund.

In addition,

the Secretary of Labor is ". . . empowered to protect
the employee's vested interest from his initial plan by
assuring that the credits purchased from the new plan
have equivalent actuarial value."

17

All funds deposited in the portability fund are
to be invested in interest-bearing accounts of commercial
banlts and savings and loan associations.

The amount deposited

in each of these financial institutions cannot exceed the
deposit insurance maximum specified by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation and the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation.

16

U.S., Congress, Senate, Retirement Income Security
for Employees Act of 1973, S. 4 , ppT l 4 o - l 4 l .

17

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Report to Accompany S. 4, Retirement In
come Security for Employees Act of 1973, Rept. No.
93-127* 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973. S. 4, p. 24.
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An additional provision of Title III of S. 4
authorizes the Secretary of Labor to provide any technical
v

assistance requested by plan administrators for the
purpose of entering into a reciprocal arrangement.

Such

an arrangement would allow free transfer of pension
credits within the participating employer group.

The

Secretary is not required to establish reciprocal arrangements, but merely to provide technical advice.
The clearinghouse concept has been utilized by
the Senate Labor Subcommittee as a means of facilitating
pension fund transfers because that Committee is not
authorized to initiate tax code revisions.

If a central

clearinghouse were not used, the terminating employee
would get "constructive receipt" of the pension funds
which would be taxed as ordinary income to the employee.
Obviously, if present tax laws could be modified
to permit the tax-free transfer of vested credits
by employees from job to job, then the 'clearinghouse'
system established by this Title might not be indis
pensable.
However, in the absence of such far-reaching
t a x charges, the voluntary program established herein
Can provegto be of inestimable value to many parti
cipants.
The employers most likely to join the voluntary
portability program would be those in industries which
compete for skilled labor; e.g., technicians and professional
people.

The portability feature would be an attractive

fringe benefit for mobile employees.

19

l8Ibid.
■^Mike Gordon, Minority Counsel to the Senate Sub
committee on Labor and Aid to Senator Jacob K. Javits,
private interview, Washington, D.C., August 9» 1972.
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Criticisms of a Voluntary Portability Clearing
house .— In addition to the general criticisms of the
concept of portability, further criticism has been directed
toward the idea of a voluntary portability system.

For

example, some experts contend that a voluntary system
will not be supported.

Former Secretary of Labor, James

D. Hodgson has stated:
I think it flies in the face of natural moti
vation of employers to expect them to develop an
interest in providing portability that is an invi
tation for a worker to leave their employ.
It is
highly dubious that much will result frompthis
kind of situation, maybe a few odd cases.
It also is argued that the voluntary portability fund
is unlikely to be supported because of the cost of parti
cipation in the fund.

Merton C. Bernstein has pointed

out that when funds are transferred out of the pension
fund, the employer no longer has the advantage of interest
and mortality discounting as a means of reducing pension
costs.

If the employer is forced to base the fund transfer

on conservative reserve actuarial assumptions, his loss
is magnified;

i.e., the more conservative the actuarial

assumptions used for the transfer value calculation, the
higher the cost to the employer.

21

PO

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, Retirement Income Security for Employees
Act, 1972. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor of the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Senate, on S. 3598,
S. 302^, S. 3012 and Other Bills, 92d Cong., 2d sess.,
1972, p. 107.
?1

"Legislative Forum," Pension and Welfare News,
VIII, No. 9 (September, 1972), V T ,
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Other criticisms of the voluntary portability
program are more obvious than the premise of lack of
participation.

First, the voluntary system may provide

nothing more than preservation of vested benefits.

Second,

since portability may be difficult to apply to unallocated
funds, false hopes might be raised for employees.

Finally,

"in order to take advantage of the F.D.I.C. insurance,
the clearing house would have to open thousands of accounts.
It would fast run out of banks.'

22

Future of Voluntary Portability.— In commenting
on the voluntary portability feature of the Williams-Javits
bill, Mike Gordon, minority counsel to the Senate Labor
Subcommittee, has said that portability is not the strongest
part of the bill since Labor and Management both testified
23
against it and no one really supported it. J The volun
tary portability feature probably will be dropped if the
tax free transfer provisions of the Nixon Administration
proposal are adopted.
The Nixon Administration Proposal
Background of the Bill
The "Retirement Benefits Tax Act"

(H.R. 7157) was

introduced into the House of Representatives on April
18, 1973 on behalf of the Nixon Administration by Rep.

22

Ibid.

^ U . S . , Congress, House, Retirement Benefits Tax
A c t , 93d Cong,, 1st sess., H.R. 7157.
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Wilbur D. Mills for himself and others.2^

The bill has

been referred to the Committee on Ways and Means since
it is a federal income tax related bill.2 -’ Although the
Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means was the primary
sponsor of the tax reform bill, Rep. Mills has not openly
supported this legislation this year.

26

The Nixon Administration proposal was developed
by the White House Pension Task Force and supported by
studies made by the Departments of Labor and the Treasury
and an A.S. Hansen, Inc. study ( a private pension con
sulting firm) of its clients.2"'7

Tax reform legislation

that pertains to private pensions was proposed by the
Nixon Administration in the 92d Congress (as H.R. 12272),
but the bill was never reported out of the Committee on
Ways and Means.

The version introduced in the 93d Congress

has been expanded and liberalized considerably.
2Ll

U.S., Congress, House, Retirement Benefits Tax
Act, 93d Cong., 1st sess., H.R. 7157*
2^The Senate counterpart of this bill, S. 1631 , was
introduced by Sen. Carl Curtis (R— Neb.) for himself and
others, and referred to the Senate Committee on Finance.
The Administration proposals for Fiduciary Responsibility
and Disclosure, to be administered by the Secretary of
Labor, introduced as S. 1557 in the Senate and H.R. 6900
in the House, have been referred to the concerned Labor
Committees of each respective house.
26

Committee prints pertaining to the Administration
pension reform bill clearly state that such information
does not represent the position of the Committee on
Ways and Means.

27

Ronald B. Gold, Financial Economist, U.S.
Treasury, representing the Nixon Administration position
on Pension Legislation, private interview, Washington,
D. C . , August 10, 1972.
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The Administration reform bill has been centered
around the obtainment of several goals.

For example,

concern has been expressed that the private pension
system be encouraged rather than inhibited through
penalty legislation.

As stated by former Secretary of

Labor James D. Hodgson in a speech before the National
Foundation of Health, Welfare and Pension Plans;
We have also been very much concerned with the
maintenance of continued health, flexibility, and
vigor of our private pension system and assuring an
interest by the employer in maintaining and expanding
it.
We regard this system as one of the triumphs of
our form of enterprise.
So we are very anxious
not to impair its growth or damage its flexibility
to meet needs in widely different circumstances.
The desire to meet this goal was made manifest in the
bill provisions which would add minimum vesting and
funding standards to the requirements for qualification
for favorable tax treatment of pension fund contributions
in the Internal Revenue Code of 195^*

Enforcement of

these standards would be effected by the Secretary of
the Treasury by denial of plan qualification in the
event of noncompliance; the incentive to comply is evident.
Another goal of the Nixon Administration pension
tax reform is the encouragement of individual self-reliance
and personal savings.

Toward this end, three specific

"Secy. Hodgson Promotes Pension Reform as Saving
Private Pension System," Recent Developments in Pension
Benefits. Employee Benefit Plan Review Research Reports,
December 31» 1971» P« !•
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tax related provisions have been included in H.R. 7157•

29

First, an employee would be allowed to deduct from his
gross income for federal income tax purposes any contri
butions to a qualified individual retirement account
(QIRA) or a qualified employer-sponsored private pension
plan.

Second, self-employed persons who contribute to

some type of qualified pension plan for themselves and
their employees

(called Keogh or H.R. 10 plans) would be

allowed a more generous deduction than that now permitted.
Third, a tax free transfer could be made from one qualified individual or group plan to another qualified plan.-'
A final general goal of the Nixon Administration
regarding private pension plans is related to the groups
of employees who will receive the greatest benefit and
protection.

For example, the Rule of 50 for vesting and,

to a lesser extent, the funding provision (twenty year
amortization of the unfunded vested liabilities) favor
the older employee.

Ronald B. Gold, a U.S. Treasury

financial economist who was active in the development of
the Nixon Administration proposal, pointed out that the
Rule of 50 does discriminate against the younger worker,
but that many of the young are not covered anyway,
protection of their interests would be mythical.

so
Thus,

^ S e e Appendix D for a complete description of the
provisions of H.R. 7157*
-^CThis provision, is discussed in greater -detail
in the next section since it is the basis of the voluntary
portability system.
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the Rule of 50 was a "chosen trade-off," with more pro
tection to the older worker planned.3'
1'
A second group which will benefit substantially
from the Nixon Administration tax proposals are middleincome employees who wish to save for their own retirement.
For example, under the President's proposal, tax savings
as a percentage of income are at a maximum for persons
earning $ 7,500 per year whether or not they are covered
under an existing plan.32

Although a desirable goal may

be to help the low-income employee,

such aid simply may

not be possible through private pension reform.
The proposal by its nature will not benefit
low-income employees. But their most pressing need
is not greater retirement income but greater current
income.
Such persons require direct assistance both
during their working career and at retirement through
improved social security and public assistance
programs. ^
Portability Through the Tax Free Direct Transfer Provision
Section 5 of the Retirement Benefits Tax Act,
introduced as H.R. 7157» provides that an employee will
not incur an income tax liability upon the receipt of a
lump-sum distribution from a qualified retirement plan
if the employee "reinvests the funds in a qualified indi
vidual retirement account or a qualified employee-sponsored
33-Gold, private interview, August 10, 1972.
32Ronald B. Gold, "Tax Deductions for Individual
Retirement Savings," National Tax Journal, XXV, No. k
(December, 1972), 587.
33Ibid., p. 593.
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retirement plan within 60 days after the close of the
employee's taxable year."3^

In addition, any interest

accrued on contributions made by an individual to a
qualified retirement savings program would be nontaxable
until benefits are received as retirement income.
Individual retirement savings programs include
investment in "stocks, bonds, mutual fund shares, annuity
and other life insurance contracts, face amount certifi
cates and savings accounts with financial institutions."33
Benefits from such a plan, to qualify for tax relief as
a retirement program, cannot be paid until age 592 except
in the case of death or disability.

Penalty for noncom

pliance with this rule is an exise tax of 30 percent
of the amount withdrawn.

In addition, withdrawals must

begin by the time the taxpayer reaches age 70f- and must be
large enough so that " . . .

the entire accumulation will

be distributed over his life expectancy or the combined
life expectancy of the taxpayer and his spouse."-^

The

penalty for noncompliance by a taxpayer aged 7Oi or older
is an annual exise tax of a specified amount.
The effect of the tax proposals are far reaching.
-^U.S,, Congress, House, Committee on Ways and
Means, Study Material Relating to Administration Proposal
Entitled the "Retirement Benefits Tax A c t ," Committee
Print (Washington, D.C.s
Government Printing Office,
April 18, 1973). P* 44.
3 3Ibid., p. 42.
3 6 Ibid., p. 43.
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Any employee receiving a lump-sum distribution of retire
ment benefits upon termination would be allowed to reinvest
those assets tax free in his own individual retirement
savings program or a succeeding employer's qualified
private pension plan.

The lump-sum distribution is made

by the employer on a voluntary basis; i.e., the employer
would have the option of retaining the pension fund assets
supporting any vested liability and dispensing vested
benefits from his own fund when the terminated employee
retires.

Provision is made, however, for both individuals

and labor unions to negotiate for lump-sum distributions
of retirement benefits.

Since individuals and bargaining

parties are left to develop their own portability programs,
President Nixon's goal of individual self-reliance has
been furthered.
Although the Nixon bill's provision for lump-sum
distributions recontributed to qualified retirement plans
was introduced only recently (April 18, 1973)
to the idea seems to be generally favorable.

reaction
The major

hindrance to successful passage of the entire Administration
proposal is cost.

The portability feature, latent in

the lump-sum distribution provision, will not be costly
since few such distributions currently are made.

On the

other hand, the revenue loss from deductions for individual
voluntary retirement savings is expected to be $300 million
J This provision was not part of the Administration
proposal before the 92d Congress (H.R. 12272) and is only
one of the additions for the 93d Congress version.
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the first year after passage and $480 million hy the
nQ
fourth year.
Similarly, the revenue loss resulting
from increased contribution ceilings for self-employed
retirement plans is expected to be $55 million in'the
first year after enactment and rise to $110 million in
subsequent years,39

These figures are based on the

President's earlier pension reform proposal (H.R. 12272) and
may understate the revenue loss since the current reform
proposal is slightly more liberal with respect to accep
table qualified retirement plans.

The revenue loss from

these tax reform proposals, therefore, may prevent passage
of the entire package, including the provision for favorable
tax treatment of lump-sum distrubutions reinvested in
qualified retirement plans.
The Dent Bill
Background of the Bill
The "Employee Retirement Benefit Security Act"
(H.R. 462) was introduced in the House by Rep. John Dent
on January 3i 1 9 7 3 This bill establishes a mandatory
portability program and reinsurance of all unfunded vested
3®U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and
Means, Tax Proposals Affecting Private Pension Plans.
Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House of
Representatives, on H.R. 12272, 92d Cong., 2d sess,
1972, p. 72.
39Ibid., p. 75-

40

U.S., Congress, House, Employee Retirement BeneSecurity A c t , 93d Cong., 1st sess. , H.R.462.
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liabilities acquired after bill enactment.

An additional

bill, H.R. 2, which was introduced simultaneously by Rep.
i), i

Dent,

provides for full vesting after ten years with

transition provisions, minimum funding, eligibility,
j[i 2

disclosure and fiduciary standards.

Together, these

two bills comprise the pension reform proposals of Rep. Dent.
Although Rep. Dent has been interested in pension
reform legislation for a number of years and has intro
duced such legislation in prior Congressional s e s s i o n s , ^
much of the study and research supporting the current
Dent proposal was conducted by the Pension Study Task
Force of the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House
Committee on Education and Labor.

This committee

was formed by the House of Representatives on September
29, 1971 to conduct a study of vesting, funding, porta
bility, benefit insurance, disclosure, and fiduciary
resp o n s i b i l i t y . ^

The Task Force study of pension reform

issues will continue through the 93d Congress.
U.S., Congress, House, Employee Benefit Security
A c t , 93d Cong., 1st sess., H.R. 2,
[l O

See Appendix D for a complete description of
the Dent proposal.
^ F o r example, Rep. Dent sponsored H.R. 1269 in
the 92d Congress.
H.R. 1269 was similar to the combined
H.R. 2 and H.R. 462 except for the omission of a portabi
lity feature in the earlier bill.
^ U . S . , Congress, House, Committee on Education
and Labor, Interim Staff Report of Activities of the
Pension Study Task Force of the General Subcommittee on
Labor, Committee Print, 76-420 (Washington, D . C . : Govern
ment Printing Office, 1972), p. 1.

The Mandatory Portability Provision
Title I of H.R. 462 authorizes the Secretary of
Labor to establish and administer a Portability Program
Fund.^

Since participation in the portability program is

mandatory for all employers, every employee may benefit
from the program.

The employer must apply for membership

in the program; membership is indicated by a certificate
from the Labor Department.

When an employee partici

pating in a "member plan" terminates, he may request that
"a sum of money equal to the current discounted value of
. . . vested rights under the plan" be transferred to
the portability fund administered by the Secretary of
Labor.^
The employee may leave on deposit with this federal
clearinghouse such accrued pension assets, or he may
request that these funds be transferred to a succeeding
employer's qualified plan.

If the accrued pension assets

are not transferred out of the federal portability fund,
an immediate life annuity (or other similar insured
retirement benefit) will be purchased on the employee's
behalf when he retires.
The Secretary of Labor would be required to main
tain individual accounts for all assets deposited in
the fund.

The assets of the portability fund could be

l± £

-^U.S., Congress, House, Employee Retirement Bene
fit Security A c t , H.R. 462, pp. 12-15.
46

Ibid. , p. 12.
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invested in interest bearing accounts of commercial banks
and savings and loan associations.

The amount deposited

in any one financial institution, however,

could not

exceed 10 percent of the amount in excess of that required
to meet current and anticipated withdrawals.
As indicated in House hearings in the 93d Congress,
the mandatory portability feature of the Dent proposal
for pension reform has not been well received by either
labor or management.

It is quite likely,

therefore, that

portability will be dropped from H.R. 462 in markup sessions
by the House Committee on Education and Labor before the
bill goes before the House.

4*7
'

Since that Committee was

to hold pension reform hearings in eight different cities
through May 1973» no markup sessions are anticipated
before summer.
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Conclusions
The pension reform legislation before the 93d Con
gress represents two contrasting means of implementing
portability.

The Nixon Administration tax proposal calls

for the direct transfer of funds from one qualified retire
ment plan to another.

The terminating employee who

47

Joseph P. Leary, Executive Director of The
Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans, Inc.,
telephone interview, Washington, D.C., May 16, 1973*
I* Q

"Pension Hearings to Tour 8 Cities; Report
Released," The National Underwriter; Life and Health
Edition, LXXVII, no. 12 (March 24, 1973). 1.

requests the transfer would not incur a tax liability for
the lump-sum distribution of retirement benefits; i.e.,
the problem of constructive receipt would be nonexistent.
Conversely, the Williams-Javits and Dent proposals utilize
a central clearinghouse for implementation of portability.
Since both of these bills are from Labor Committees which
cannot originate tax provisions, the clearinghouse con
cept is necessary to facilitate tax free fund transfers.
That is, the clearinghouse solution to the problem of
constructive receipt of transferred funds is mandatory
since tax law modifications cannot be incorporated in
a Labor Committee bill.
If the Nixon Administration pension tax reform
proposals are passed, the clearinghouse mechanism will
be dropped from the House and Senate Labor Committee
bills.

The clearinghouse would no longer be necessary

since voluntary portability would be available through
the tax free direct transfer provision.

PART III
FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE
PORTABILITY CONCEPT

CHAPTER IX
EXPECTATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF THE
PORTABILITY CONCEPT
Introduction
The portability concept, involving the right of a
terminating employee to transfer the assets supporting
his pension credits to a succeeding pension plan, has been
proposed as a solution to the problem of providing an
adequate, secure retirement income to a mobile labor force
in the United States.

Labor mobility is highly desirable

as a supplement to general economic efficiency; i.e.,
allocation of economic resources is facilitated by the
existence of an adaptable labor force able to relocate in
adjustment to changing demand.

Since private pension fund

contributions by employers primarily are considered a
form of deferred wages, the preservation of pension rights
upon employee termination is a natural consequence of both
the deferred wage theory and the desirability of labor
mobility.
Without some means of private pension preservation,
many employees will be unable to participate in a healthy
American economy during their retirement years.

Pension

preservation may be achieved either by vesting alone or
238
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by a combination of vesting and portability.

Proponents of

vesting as a prerequisite to a fund transfer contend that
vesting alone is not an adequate means of implementing
a pension preservation system which permits labor mobility
without loss of retirement credits.
For example, even if an employee remains with one
employer long enough to accrue vested pension credits,
a number of problems could be encountered which may endanger
ultimate fulfillment of the promised benefit.

First,

the employer could suffer financial reverses sufficiently
severe to force cancellation of the pension plan due
to business necessity.

If the terminated pension plan is

even partially unfunded, there will not be sufficient
assets to provide the accrued benefits of all pension
promises.

Second, although fraudulent practices involving

pension funds may be rare, such abuses can occur and en
danger pension fund adequacy.

The safety of vested

benefit rights thus can be questioned with validity;

an

employee terminating with vested pension rights may be
well advised to have his credits transferred to a succeeding
plan,

Finally, whether the succeeding plan is another

qualified employer-sponsored plan or some kind of indi
vidual qualified savings program, the employee will have
greater access to financial reports on the subsequent
f u n d #s performance and adequacy than he would as a ter
minating employee with vested credits under the original
plan.

Moreover, -an employee is more likely to be aware

240
of financial problems and pension fund adequacy relating
to his current employer than he would a former employer.
In direct contrast to the employee who is actively
concerned about the adequacy and preservation of his
retirement income, many employees are unaware of their
accrued pension rights and may not become concerned about
retirement until late in their working careers.

This

lack of interest is the natural result of a general tendency
to concentrate on more currently pressing problems such as
career development, family, financial and social pressures
and children's education.

In attempting to resolve such

problems, the issue of retirement is easily forgotten.
Employees who change jobs may fail to maintain a record
of vested credits so that it becomes difficult when they
retire to file for these retirement rights.

Portability

has been suggested as a means of eliminating the problem of
inaccurate or nonexistent records of vested benefits:
had retirement credits followed the employee throughout
his career, accrued benefits would be combined for dis
bursement from the pension fund of the final employer.
The Problem of Converting an Appealing
Idea into a Workable System
Although the portability concept has broad appeal
for mobile employees in need of a pension preservation
mechanism which transcends that offered by vesting, a
number of problems and misconceptions have been encountered
in developing a workable portable pension system.

For

example, many concerned pension reform advocates have
been unsure of the costs entailed in a portability system.
Since some kind of funding and vesting programs must
accompany a portability system to ensure that a pension
right supported by adequate assets is available to port, some
cost estimates of portability have included the cost of
funding and vesting.

The actual cost of portability, however

should include only those costs related to the change
in actuarial assumptions necessitated by a termination
because of elimination of a turnover or withdrawal assumption
additional administrative expenses and increased fund
liquidity requirements because of the withdrawals.

Never

theless, isolation of the types of costs associated with
portability have not provided a meaningful method of esti
mating the level of costs.
Another problem related to the implementation of
the portability concept is the resulting complexity of
such a system.

Opponents of the concept point out that

even if actuarially feasible, fund transfers may not be
equitable.

An employee may prefer the benefits available

under one plan (e.g., early retirement) and thus be
reluctant to forfeit those benefits by a fund transfer.
Moreover, the actuarial assumptions employed as well as
benefit and wage patterns vary from plan to plan.
Any analysis of portability immediately leads
to the question of whether or not portable pensions are
really necessary.

Reform advocates, legislators and labor

leaders concede that portability does not provide most
employees with much more than that available through a
sound minimum vesting program.

Although portability may

help the highly mobile employee, many employees accrue
vested benefits from only two or three employers.

Filing

for and receiving retirement benefits from two or three
employers is not an excessive burden on the retiring
employee.
Federal legislative interest in the development of
the portability concept has been stimulated by the desire
of Congress to protect the pension rights of individuals
and prevent pension fund abuses.

The contributions made

by an employer to a qualified private pension plan are a
deductible expense for federal income tax purposes and,
as such, are a type of public subsidy of the private
pension system.

Federal lawmakers thus have an incentive

to see that individual and public interests are protected.
Since portability has been proposed as one means of pre
serving pension rights,

Congressional interest in the

concept is well founded.

Consequently, many of the develop

ments regarding portability have been initiated and de
bated in Congressional hearings with legislative proposals
often representing opposing positions on the means of
implementing portability.
Conclusions of Analysis of the
Portability Concept
In an effort to examine in depth in this study
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the general allegations against and arguments presented
for the portability concept made in business and finance
journals as well as in Congressional hearings, analysis
was made of existing systems, suggestions for implementing
a national system and specific legislative proposals
for portability.

In addition, the mechanics of a transfer

system were explored since it has been the focus of such
wide concern.
Applications for the United States of Portability Prototypes
Although the European and Canadian portability
systems do not offer a very useful prototype for direct
use in the United States, there are a number of general
principles associated with those programs which should
be heeded by U.S. legislators and pension reform advocates.
First, the European private pension systems are highly
regulated to enforce minimum levels of benefits, vesting,
funding,

investment, actuarial assumptions, disclosure

and fiduciary responsibility.

It may not be possible to

implement a mandatory portability system in the United
States and still retain the flexibility and competitive
market structure that characterizes the U.S. private
pension system.

Second, since many of the European

private pensions are insured (administered by an insurance
company) through individual policies, the portability
option available to European employees may be more easily
implemented than in the United States.

That is, the

portability option may not be appropriate in the United

States since the pension industry is dominated by indi
vidual trusts which utilize the group pension plan form,
often with an unallocated funding approach.

The adminis

trators of U.S. insured private pension plans may be
better prepared to allow fund transfers, since their
records of asset accumulations may be on an individual
basis.

Contributions to an insurer administered pooled

account, however, often are not made on behalf of any
one employee; rather, a lump-sum payment is made on the
basis of some criterion such as a percentage of gross
payroll.
A third area of application of the portability
experience of European private pension systems is derived
from Great Britain.

The British require that a minimum

layer of wage-related benefits above the social security
program be vested, funded and portable.

Employers may

provide this second layer of benefits by contributing
to a government-run national program or by contracting
out the administration of the benefits to private pension
institutions.

Portability thus is required of closely

regulated minimum benefits, which can be administered by
the private pension system.

Parliament, however, is

considering expanding the portability requirement to all
private pensions.

If this regulation is passed, observati

of the British pension system will become even more rele
vant in the future.

Portability of minimum benefits in

the past has been successful and if extension of the

portability feature to all private pensions in Great
Britain is equally successful, the lesson of implemen
tation of portability in stages is evident.

By initially

requiring portability of only minimum benefits, the U.S.
pension industry would have the chance to develop workable
transfer procedures.
Canadian pension regulation, particularly the
Ontario Act, has served as the pattern for several reform
bills that have been introduced in the U.S. Congress.
Observation of the experience in Canada, however, indicates
that a voluntary federal clearinghouse is unnecessary
under certain conditions.

For example, if vesting is

required after only, say, ten years of service and
attainment of age forty-five, most employees probably will
accrue vested benefits from only two or three employers.
There is little advantage, therefore, in pension credit
transfers to effect consolidation of benefits for dis
bursement from one fund.

In addition, Canadian federal

income tax regulations permit tax free transfers of the
actuarial value of pension credits between qualified
pension plans.

If a similar system of minimum vesting

and tax free direct transfers are developed in the United
States, a clearinghouse to implement portability would
not be necessary.
iviechanisms for Implementation of the Portability Concept
There are two basic approaches to implementing
the portability concept, each with varying mechanical
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details.

The first approach utilizes a central clearinghouse

as a depository for financial assets supporting the pension
credits of terminated employees.

The clearinghouse

would effect the transfer of funds accrued by a terminating
employee to the clearinghouse and, if appropriate and re
quested by the employee, from the clearinghouse to a suc
ceeding employer's fund.

Since the funds are transferred

by and through the clearinghouse, the employee would not
incur a tax liability because he does not receive construc
tive use of the pension fund assets.
Because it eliminates the problem of modifying
federal income tax law, the clearinghouse concept has been
put into the form of legislative pension reform proposals
by both House and Senate Labor Committees.

The Senate

Labor Subcommittee proposal (S. 4), principally sponsored
by Senators Jacob K. Javits (R— N.Y.) and Harrison A.
Williams (D— N.J.) and cosponsored by fifty-one other
Senators, establishes a voluntary portability clearinghouse
within the Labor Department.

Because of this strong

support, voluntary portability is likely to pass in the
Senate.

Members of the House, on the other hand, have not

been receptive to portability even on a voluntary basis.
Under the leadership of Rep. Wilbur D. Mills (D— Ark.),
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, the House
may adopt a tax incentive approach to pension reform,
an alternative that would eliminate reliance on a Labor

24?
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Labor Department clearinghouse.

An additional obstacle

to the clearinghouse concept is the fact that the Nixon
"Administration is dead set against the idea, and reformers
are not pushing it very hard."

2

The second basic approach to implementing the
portability concept is the tax free direct transfer of
pension fund assets from one qualified pension fund or
retirement savings plan to a subsequent arrangement.

This

approach would necessitate a change in the Internal
Revenue Code to allow the reallocation to be made without
the employee incurring an income tax liability based on the
amount of the funds involved in the transfer.

The Nixon

Administration proposal, principally sponsored in the 93d
Congress by Rep. Wilbur D. Mills in the House and Sen.
Carl Curtis (R— Neb.) in the Senate, would permit a tax
free lump-sum distribution of pension fund assets from an
employer-sponsored plan if the funds are reinvested in a
qualified individual or employer-sponsored retirement
plan within sixty days of the distribution.

Since this

proposal is based on a lump-sum distribution which in
herently is voluntary on the part of the employer, the
entire portability mechanism implicitly is voluntary.
The current Nixon Administration proposal originally was
1
"Pension Reform Getting Attention Early in Con
gress," The National Underwriter; Life and Health Insurance
Edition, LXXVIII, No. b (January 27, 1973), 1.
2
"The Push for Pension Reform," Business Week
March 17, 1973, p. 50.
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introduced in modified form in the 92d Congress as a
limited system of tax free transfers restricted to
qualified individual retirement savings plans.

As indicated

by their favorable testimony in House hearings,^ this
proposal was so well received by employers, labor leaders
and the pension industry that the tax free direct transfer
concept was expanded to its present status in

the legis

lative proposal for the 93d Congress,
Passage of the Nixon Administration tax reforms
is quite likely unless they are impeded by procedural
problems or are felt to be too costly in terms of lost
tax revenue.

Government policy makers must make a diffi

cult choice between passing pension reform legislation
which would result in lost tax revenue and maintaining
that revenue source for the federal budget.

In addition

to reducing lost tax revenue from incentive pension reform
legislation can be inflationary for two reasons.
lost revenue remains in the

First, the

public sector and can be used

for private investment, an incidence which has an
cally accelerated stimulative effect.

economi

Second, the lost

revenue can be spent (or deferred for later consumption),
thus creating an immediate inflationary impact through
increased demand.
In summary, then, a voluntary portability system
-^U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Ways and
Means, Tax Proposals Affecting Private Pension Plans,
Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, House
of Representatives on H.R. 12272, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972.
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in the nature of a clearinghouse or a tax free direct
transfer is the most likely form to be implemented by
Congress,

The tax free transfer probably is the more

popular of the two techniques but its adoption may be
prohibited by such economic pressures as inflation and
revenue requirements.

If the revenue reform approach is

blocked, pension reform advocates may press harder for
acceptance of the Labor Department clearinghouse concept.
In either instance, however, mandatory portability is
considered to be outside the responsibility of Congress
and therefore will not be a part of any pension reform
program.

As stated by Sen. Jacob K. Javitss

Portability is more of a question mark because
it is not indispensable to achieving adequate pro
tection against undue private pension losses but
rather is a means of j, improving the workers' ultimate
retirement benefits.
The Mechanics of the Pension Fund Transfer
Whether the clearinghouse or the tax free direct
transfer is utilized, several functional problems may
be encountered, as was illustrated in Chapter VII by
the analysis of the mechanics of the pension fund transfer.
First, if an employer's pension plan is underfunded, a trans
fer of the assets supporting the vested pension credits of
a terminating employee may endanger the fund's adequacy
to meet future liabilities created by pension promises to
4

Sen. Jacob K. Javits, Rep. John H. Dent, Joseph
P. Leary, Norman H. Tarver, "Legislative Forecast, '73»"
Pension and Welfare N e w s , IX, No. 2 (February, 1973)t 44.

remaining employees.

The employer may be forced to contri

bute additional amounts to the pension fund in order to
maintain its qualified status for federal income tax
purposes.

The additional contributions, therefore, may

represent a cost of portability to the employer.

This

cost either may be fully absorbed by the employer or
paid by both the employer and the employee.

The latter

payment would be effected by charging a fee for fund trans
fers against the pension assets to be ported.

This fee

could be based on a flat percentage of pension fund
assets or a prorated portion of the total unfunded lia
bility of the fund,
A second problem related to pension fund transfers
is the possible benefit fluctuation resulting from
transfers between funds which utilize significantly dif
ferent actuarial assumptions.

For a given level of con

tribution, an employer whose plan is based on conservative
actuarial assumptions would provide a correspondingly
lower pension benefit than an employer whose plan is
formulated on less conservative actuarial assumptions.
The third problem related to pension fund trans
fers may be the most subtle and complicated of all the
difficulties connected with the portability concept.

When

pension funds are transferred to a succeeding pension
fund, the vested benefits which those assets support
must be nonforfeitable;

i.e., in the event of a participant*

death or permanent disability, the benefits must be paid
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to the employee or his beneficiaries.

Transferred pension

credits thus are extremely secure; not only are the bene
fits vested and funded, but, in addition, are nonfor
feitable.

The employer from whose fund the assets are

transferred must either absorb the funding cost and the
nonforfeitability cost (attributable to the reduction
in discounted contributions in anticipation of mortality
experience) or make a charge against withdrawn funds.

If

the latter alternative is used, the charge can be deter
mined on the basis of the life expectancy of the employee
at his attained age; however, the fee may be more easily
administered by charging a flat percentage of transferred
funds.

If the employer wishes to offer portability as a

fringe benefit, all or part of the flat rate would be
paid by the company.
Nonforfeitability of transferred pension credits
also creates a problem for the succeeding employer into
whose fund the ported assets are reinvested.

Since the

benefits are completely nonforfeitable, they cannot be
integrated wholly into the succeeding plan.

The funds,

of course, can be pooled with other pension funds but
separate records must be maintained for each employee's
nonforfeitable pension benefit in a manner similar to
the separate records maintained for employee contribu
tions, which also are nonforfeitable.
The Future of the Portability Concept
The immediate outlook for the portability concept

is its probable enactment as a voluntary system based on
either the central clearinghouse approach or the tax free
direct transfer proposal.

The numerous problems of im

plementing the portable pension system will be left
to individuals, employers and unions to resolve in private
negotiations and at the bargaining table.

That is, the

mechanism will be made available by enabling legislation
but it will be the responsibility of the concerned parties
to take advantage of the portability option.
arrangement has several advantages.

This type

First, individual

and unique problems associated with specific pension
funds and funding forms can be resolved on an individual
basis.

In such cases, mandated transfer procedures may be

difficult to apply.

Second, the competitive flexibility

of the private pension industry as well as the bargaining
flexibility desired by union officials can be maintained.
Third, the portability feature may be sought primarily by
only a relatively few highly mobile employees, many of
whom are skilled technicians in a position to demand a
portable pension.

The voluntary feature thus ensures

that the entire labor force will not suffer the reduction
in benefits required to pay for the adoption of the
portability option by a small group of participants.
Finally, voluntary portability will give the pension
industry as well as the nation's employers as opportunity
to adjust, develop and experiment with appropriate transfer
techniques.
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After a period of adjusting to voluntary porta
bility during which transfer procedures can be perfected
and solidified,

it then may be possible to extend the

transfer concept in individual cases and through reci
procal agreements covering large groups of employees.

In

addition, pension reform advocates probably will be in a
better position to press for this extension.

Senator

Jacob K, Javits, known for his support of pension reform,
has expressed continued belief in the portability concept:
"Ultimately, the individual is entitled to greater
portability and to have his pension benefits get the
benefit of better management in a pooled reserve.

But we

think that is an evolutionary proposition.
As more and more people are covered by private
pensions and the private pension industry is subject to
increasingly strict vesting, funding, fiduciary responsi
bility and disclosure standards, portability will be
sought as an attractive means of strengthening and securing
pension programs.

That is to say, portability as a

pension reform issue is a theme which will be heard for
years to come.
concept,

Although portable pensions are an appealing

the intricate technical and mechanical problems

cannot be solved instantaneously.

Rather, the portability

concept must be developed slowly with a long period of
^U.S,, Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means,
Hearings on H.R. 12272, p, 210.

maturation in order to achieve portability's full potential
as a valuable management tool for the provision of a
secure, adequate retirement income for the United States
labor force.
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APPENDIX A
MAJOR BILLS— 92d CONGRESS

Bills
S. 2, "Pension and Employee Benefit Act"
Sponsors
Sen. Jacob K. Javits
Date Introduceds
January 25» 1971
House Versions
H.R. 3823 (Rep. Helstoski)
Committee References
Labor and Public Welfare
Ma jor Provi s i ons s
1.
Central Pension Commission— independent authority
2.
Prospective deferred graded vesting ( 10% after 6
years service; full vesting after 15 years of
service)
3.
30 year amortization of unfunded liabilities
b.
Insurance of unfunded liabilities
5.
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act amended
increasing fiduciary responsibility and disclosure
requirements
6.
Voluntary portability through a central commission
7.
Powers of Secretary of Labor increased for pro
vision of technical assistance in reciprocity
arrangements
8.
Eligibility requirements less than 6 months;
continuous service defined
Bills
H.R. 1269. "Employee Benefit Security Act"
Sponsors
Rep. John Dent
Date Introduceds
January 22, 1971
Senate Versions
S. 4-326 (Sen. Harrison A. Williams)
Committee References
Education and Labor
Major Provisionss
1.
Administered by the Department of Labor
2.
Prospective 10 year full vesting; with alternate
phase in options for plans in existence and plans
established after enactment
3.
Eligibilitys
later of 3 years of service and age
2 5 ; continuous service defined
4-. 25 year amortization of unfunded liabilities
5.
Insurance of unfunded liabilities
6.
Increased disclosure and fiduciary standards
7.
Secretary of Labor to study portability

APPENDIX A— Continued
Bills
S. 1993* "Federal Reinsurance of Private Pension
Plans Act"
Sponsors
Sen. Vance Hartke
Date Introduced:
January 22, 1971
Committee Reference:
Finance
Major Provision:
Insurance of unfunded liabilities?
administered by the Department of Labor
Bill:
H.R. 686, Amendment of the Internal Revenue Code
of 195^- and the Social Security Act
Sponsor:
Rep. Dingell
Date Introduced:
January 22, 1971
Committee Reference:
Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1. Prospective 10 year full vesting as a requirement
of qualification
2.
Voluntary portability through a central clearing-'
house administered by the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare in conjunction with Social
Security
3.
Powers of the Secretary of Labor increased for
provision of technical assistance in developing
reciprocal and other portability arrangements
Bill:
H.R. 2150, "Pension Benefit Security Act"
Sponsor:
Rep. Collier
Date Introduced:
January 25* 1971
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provisions:
1. Administered by the Department of Labor
2. Prospective 10 year full vesting; with alternate
phase-in options for plans in existence and
plans established after enactment
3. Eligibility:
later of 3 years of service and age
25 ? continuous service defined
25 year amortization of unfunded liabilities
5.
Insurance of unfunded liabilities
6.
Secretary of Labor to study portability
Bill:
H.R. 3272, "Employee Benefits Protection Act"
Sponsor:
Rep. Derwinski (On behalf of President Nixon)
Date Introduced:
February 2, 1971
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provision:
Amends the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act to increase disclosure and fiduciary
standards

APPENDIX A— Continued
Bill:
H.R. 3296, "Federal Pension Insurance Program"
Sponsor:
Rep. McFall
Date Introduced:
February 2, 1971
Committee Reference:
Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1. Administered by the Board of Directors of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
2. Minimum funding standards set by the Board
3. Insurance of unfunded liabilities
4. Increased disclosure and fiduciary standards
5.
Voluntary portability through a central clearing
house within the F.D.I.C.
Bill:
H.R. 6530. "Pension and Employee Benefit Act"
Sponsor:
Rep. Halpern
Date Introduced:
March 23» 1971
Committee Reference:
Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1. Independent pension commission created
2. Prospective alternative deferred full vesting
formulas with age and service requirements
3. 30 year amortization of unfunded liabilities
4. Insurance of unfunded liabilities
5.
Minimum fiduciary standards; annual independent
audit
6.
Voluntary portability through a central pension
commission
Bill:
S. 2485» "Pension Protection Act"
Sponsor:
Sen. Griffin
Date Introduced:
September 8, 1971
Committee Reference: Finance
Major Provisions:
1.
Government Corporation within the Department of
Treasury created
2.
10 year vesting with phase in provisions (past
and future service)
3 . Eligibility:
later of age 25 and 1 year of
service; continuous service defined
4.
Insurance of unfunded liabilities
5.
Secretary of Treasury to study portability
Bill:
S, 2486, "Employee Benefits Protection Act"
Sponsor:
Sen. Griffin
Date Introduced:
September 8, 1971
Committee Reference:
Labor and Public Welfare
Major Provision:
Amends the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act to increase disclosure and fiduciary
responsibility standards
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APPENDIX A— Continued
Bill:
H.R. 12272, "Individual Retirement Benefits
Act of 1971"
Sponsors:
Representatives Mills, Byrnes, Ford, Betts
and Edwards (On behalf of President Nixon)
Date Introduced:
December 14, 1971
Senate Version:
S. 3012 (Senators Curtis, Bennett,
Dominick, Fannin, Hansen, Jordan, Scott, Thurmond)
Committee Reference:
Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1.
Tax deductions (with specific limitations) allowed
for contributions by individuals to qualified
individual retirement accounts
2.
Deduction limits for self-employed persons raised
from $ 2,500 to the lesser of $ 7,500 or 15$
income (Keogh or H.R. 10 Plans)
3. Minimum prospective vesting standard:
Rule of 50
Bill:
H.R. 12337* "Employee Benefits Protection Act"
Sponsors:
Rep. Erlenborn and Others (on behalf of Pres. Nixon)
Date Introduced:
December 14, 1971
Senate Version:
S. 3024 (Sen. Jacob K. Javits and Others)
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provisions:
Amends the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act to provide increased disclosure and
fiduciary standards
Bill:
29CFR 460; Amendment to Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act (Form D-l)
Sponsor:
W.J. Usery, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Labor
Date Introduced:
January 31, 1972
Reference: Department of Labor
Major Provision:
Increased disclosure requirements
Bill:
H.R. 14470, "Private Pension Transfer Act"
Sponsors:
Rep. Anderson and 39 other cosponsors
Committee Reference:
Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1. Amendment of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
to allow an individual tax free transfer of funds
2.
Transfer of credits may be partial, but any funds
not transferred to be taxed as ordinary income and
capital gains (if applicable)
3.
Reinvestment required within 1 year (H.R. 14133*
an earlier bill required that reinvestment be
within 60 days)
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Bill:
S. 3598, "Retirement Income Security for Employees
Act of 1972"
Sponsors:
Senators Williams and Javits and 51 other Senators
Date Introduced:
May 11, 1972
Committee Activity:
Reported out of Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare; Reported out of Senate Finance
Committee with essentially all but 6 below eliminated;
never brought to Senate floor
Major Provisions:
1. Minimum deferred graded vesting standard (past
service for persons over ^5 and future service):
30$ vested after 8 years of service plus 10$
for each year of service thereafter; 100$ vesting
after 15 years of service
2. 30 year amortization of unfunded liabilities
3. Plan discontinuance priorities defined
k.
Eligibility requirements of less of 1 year of
service and age 25
5. Voluntary portability through a central clearing
house administered by the Secretary of Labor
6. Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act amended
to increase disclosure and fiduciary responsibility
standards
7. Insurance of unfunded liabilities; fund to be
within the Treasury department
8. General administration within the Department
of Labor; Secretary empowered to compel compliance
through federal courts
9. Powers of Secretary of Labor increased to provide
technical assistance in developing reciprocal
and portability arrangements
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EXISTING REGULATION OF PRIVATE PENSIONS

Act:

National Labor Relation Act (Wagner Act) of 1935s
4-9 Stat. 449* 29 U.S.C. 151s Inland Steel Ruling
Year of Enactment:
194-7
Regulating Body:
National Labor Relations Board
Major Provision:
Pensions designated as remuneration for
labor and subject to the same rights and privileges as
wages in the collective bargaining process
Act:

Labor Management Relations Act (Taft Hartley Act);
6l Stat. 136, 157 (194-7), U.S.C., sec. 186 (1964-);
Sec. 302 pertinent to pensions
Year of Enactment:
194-7
Regulating Body: Federal Judicial System; U.S. Justice Dept.
Major Provisions:
1,
Prohibits transfer of funds from employer to
employees or their representatives (purpose:
to
protect employees from any outside influence over
participatipation by labor leaders or factions)
2.
Prohibits contributions by the employer to a
pension fund solely administered by a union or
its representatives; a lawfully established
pension fund must be administered by labor and
management
Act:

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LandrumGriffin Act); 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. 4-01 (1964-)
Year of Enactment:
1959
Regulating Body:
Federal Judicial System; U.S. Justice
Department
Major Provision:
Required bonding of administrators
and officers of union pension funds
Act:

Fair Labor Standards Act (1938), 52 Stat. 1060:
29
U.S.C., sec. 209; Equal Pay Act (1963), 77 Stat. 56 :
29 U.S.C., sec. 206; Civil Rights Act (1964-), 78 Stat.
24-1: 26 U.S.C., 14-4-7 (a) (4-) 5 4-2 U.S.C. 1971, 1975 (a);
Age Discrimination and Employment Act (1967), 81 Stat.
602:
29 U.S.C., 621
Regulating Body:
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
and Federal Judicial System
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Major Provisions:
1.
Requires
with all
2.
Prohibits
basis of

pension benefits to be treated equally
other aspects of employment compensation
unequal treatment of employees on the
sex, age, or race

Act:
Securities and Exchange Act of 193^* Sec. 10
Year of Enactment:
1934
Regulating Body:
Securities and Exchange Commission
Major Provision:
Separate accounts subject to the
anti-fraud provisions of the Act, but not registration,
regarding the purchase and sale of securities
Act:

Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Secs. 401(a) to (f)—
4o4, 501 (a)
Year of Enactment:
1954
Regulating Body:
U.S. Treasury Department; Internal
Revenue Service
Major Provisions:
Requirements for qualification (con
tributions to the pension fund allowable as deductible
business expenses):
1.
There must exist a written trust, contract or
legally binding arrangement.
2.
The program must be permanent, continuing and
communicated to the employees.
It must be for
the exclusive benefit of the employees and their
beneficiaries.
3.
The funds cannot be diverted.
The plan must not
discriminate in favor of stockholders, supervisors,
officers or highly compensated employees.
4.
Benefits must be definitely determinable.
5.
The plan must be in existence the year in which
the tax deduction is made.
Act:
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Sec. 401(a) amended
Year of Amendment:
19&2
Regulating Body:
U.S. Treasury Department; Internal
Revenue Service
Amendment:
When a plan terminates, or the employer dis
continues contributions, benefits accrued to date are
vested to the extent of the fund
Act:

Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act; 29 U.S.C.
Secs. 301 et, seq.
Year of Enactment:
1958
Regulating Body:
U.S. Department of Labor
Major Provisions:
Requires the administrators of pension
plans to disclose to the Labor Department annual fi
nancial reports on the structure, assets and liabilities
of pension plans, fees paid to officers and trustees
(Limited penalties for false reporting)
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Act:

Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act amended;
29 U.S.C., Secs. 302, et seq. (Supp. IV, 1963 )
Year of Amendment:
1962
Regulating Body:
U.S. Department of Labor
Major Provisions:
Increased power given to the Secretary
of Labor to:
1.
Compel disclosure
2.
Investigate suspected abuses
3.
Seek criminal penalties for embezzlement, kick
backs, bribery, false statements and conflicts
of interest
Require bonding of plan administrators
Act:
Treasury Regulations; Secs. l.^Ol-Mc)
Year of Enactment:
1963
Regulating Body:
U.S. Treasury Department; Internal
Revenue Service
Major Provisions:
1.
Set minimum funding requirements as a further
condition for qualification; i.e., contributions
must at least cover normal cost plus interest on
any unfunded accrued liability
2. Fund contributions in excess of the following
sum are not deductible:
a.
Normal cost plus
b.
10?S of any unfunded accrued liability
3.
If the plan terminates within a few years after
the plan's inception and it is found not to be
a bona-fide plan, all prior tax deductions may be
disallowed.
*4-. Any actuarial gains must be used to offset future
normal costs.
Revenue Ruling:
72-5, I.R.B. 1972-2, 16 , which amplifies
Revenue Ruling 69-139b (C.B. 1962-2, 123)
Year of Ruling:
1972
Regulating Body:
U.S. Treasury Department, Internal
Revenue Service
Major Provisions:
If no discrimination is involved,
transferrability of prior service credits to a suc
ceeding employer is allowed.
This ruling is applied
to corporations which (1) frequently acquire other
corporations or (2) frequently merge or reorganize.
Frequent plan amendments may thus be eliminated.
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Opinions
"Accounting for the Cost of Pension Plans,"
Opinion No. 8, pars. 16 , 17, 18, 2 k
Year Rendered:
1966
Rendering Body:
American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Accounting Principles Board (only
authority is denial of accounting certification)
Major Provisions:
1. Annual pension cost should not be less than the
sum of:
a.
Normal cost
b.
Payment sufficient to ensure 20 year amorti
zation of unfunded vested benefits
2. Annual pension payments should not exceed the
sum o f :
a.
Normal cost
b.
10°?o of the initial unfunded past service cost
(until fully amortized)
c.
10% of any unfunded past service liability
arising out of a plan amendment
d.
Interest payments on the difference between
total pension liabilities and amounts funded.

265

APPENDIX C
THE EFFECT OF PRIVATE PENSION PLANS
ON LABOR MOBILITY
Prior to the 196o's, there were no comprehensive
studies conducted to determine the effect of private pen
sion plans on labor mobility.

The lack of interest in

determining whether or not private pension plans are a
deterrent to labor mobility perhaps is due to (1) the
difficulty of obtaining meaningful data on termination
motivation and (2) the traditional, universal agreement
that private pensions do restrict worker mobility.

Early

treatments of the relationship between labor mobility
and private pensions were based on the "common sense"
conclusion that pensions were a hindrance to labor
mobility.^
Summary results of the major studies which speci
fically dealt with the effect of private pensions are
presented in Table 20.

The early studies by Michael

Purchek, Herbert S. Parnes and Robert Tilov.e, which were
rather narrow in scope, produced results in direct
1

For example, see:
Gordon F. Bloom and Hebert R.
Northrup, Economics of Labor Relations (Homewood, 111.:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1958), p. 5 9 7 •
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TABLE 20

STUDIES OF EFFECT OF PRIVATE PENSIONS
ON LABOR MOBILITY

Study, Date
Michael Purchek;
Cornell Uni
versity; 1952
(sample of 11
plans)

Major Conclusions

1.

2.

3.

Coverage and withdrawal experience
of plans studied does not support
the contention that pension plans
restrict labor mobility.
Pension coverage was so narrow that
retirement accruals not a factor;
those most likely to terminate were
not covered.
Turnover not changed by introduction
of pension plan

Herbert S. Parnes 1.
1958;
(2 companies
employing man
ual workers ex2.
amined to deter
mine effect of
pensions on
labor mobility)

Private pension plans make little
little difference in the degree to
which manual workers are tied to
their employers.
Job attachment or retention most
attributed to seniority and fear
of unknown

Robert Tilove;
1959

Turnover rates the highest from ages
20-^0, when retirement not a major
influence on job consideration, al
though the chance of forfeiture
is the greatest
Pensions may be a restraining factor
for older employees, although older
employees may have more vested credits
and be more influenced by family,
social, community ties as well as
job seniority.

1.

2.

U.S. Department
1.
of Labor; Bureau
of Labor Statistics
BLS No. 1359?
1963
2.

Impossible to isolate pensions as a
major impediment to labor mobility;
other influencing factors:
seniority,
age, composition of the workforce,
size of the firm, wages and industry
Trends which have mitigated the effect
of pensions in reducing mobility—
increased vesting, early retirement,
and multiemployer plans.
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TABLE 20--•Continued

Study, Date

Major Provisions

U.S. Department
of Labor; Bureau
of Labor
Statistics;
BLS No. 1407;
1964

1.

Joint Economic
Committee; Slapp
Report on
Pensions; 1966

1.

Possible that pensions have no sigr
nificant effect on turnover as indi
cated by the following
a. Employees induced to stay on the
job until credits vest
b. Employees seem unconcerned about
retirement as evidenced by the
wide practice of cash withdrawals
upon termination

Lowell C, Smith:
Unpublished PhD.
dissertation on
proposed pension
legislation;
1970

1.

Pensions do restrict mobility but
not uniformly throughout all ages and
industries; restriction greatest
among older workers with unvested
pension rights, but then workers
also have other reasons for not
terminating such as seniority,
tenure, security, and community and
social ties.

Jozetta H. Srb;
Corness Uni
versity;
1969

1.

Overall economic condition of country
major determinant of labor mobility
Other influences on labor mobility:
growth and development of unions,
large corporations, seniority, age,
fringe benefits, level of employment.

Source:

2.

2.

Seniority may,be a more significant
deterrent to worker mobility than
private pensions.
Difficult to isolate effect of pensions
on labor mobility since pension
accruals largely related to seniority,
age, etc.

The complete title of each study is cited in
the bibliography, by author.
Summary results
have been quoted directly— no adjustments
have been made to the authors' conclusions.

opposition to the widely-held contention that private
pension plans were a deterrent to labor mobility.

The

results of these early studies were supported by later
major studies by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the
U.S. Department of Labor as well as summary surveys by
Lowell C. Smith and Jozetta H. Srb.
In general, it may be concluded that private
pension plans cannot be isolated as a major determinant
of labor immobility.

Other factors often cited as major

influences on employee termination include seniority,
age

(older workers are less likely than younger workers to

terminate), community position, availability of alter
native job offers and general resistance to change.

Pri

vate pension plan coverage often is related to seniority
and age and thus cannot be segregated as a source of
restriction on the nation's labor mobility.

In addition,

recent trends of increased vesting and early retirement
in private pension plans as well as the spread in the
multiemployer plan concept actually may stimulate labor
mobility rather than serve as a hindrance.
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ADDENDIX D
MAJOR BILLS— 93d CONGRESS

Williams-Javits Joint Senate Bill
Title:
Retirement Income Security for Employees A c t , 1973
Bill Number!
s7“ 5
Sponsors:
Sen. Harrison A. Williams and Sen. Jacob K.
Javits for themselves and 51 other Senators
Bill Origination:
Senate Labor Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
Bill Status:
Reported out of the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare
House Counterpart:
H.R. 2^32 (Referred to the Committee
on Education and Labor)
Major Provisions:
1.
Administered by the Department of Labor
2.
All private plans with more than 25 employees
to be covered (Major exceptions:
labor union
plans financed solely by members' dues and
public plans)
3.
Registration within 6 months of effective date
4.
Vesting (effective 3 years after bill enactment
a.
30$ after 8 years service plus 10$ each
year thereafter
b.
All service to be included (past and future
service)
c.
Eligibility:
later of age 25 and 1 year
service
d.
Only 3 of the 8 years need be continuous
e.
If the existing plan's vesting provisions
are more favorable that that described above,
the employer may have two plans; one for
new employees with above requirements and
the original plan for old employees.
f.
Other phase-in options for vesting available
5. Funding— 30 year amortization of all unfunded
liabilities; if initial costs of meeting
funding schedule are excessive, cost may be
spread over 5 years.
6.
Priority list for the distribution of funds of
terminated plans established
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7.
8.
9.

10.

Employer responsibility established for funding
schedule payments due to date
Variances for funding and vesting requirements
allowed by the Secretary of Labor in cases of
extreme hardship
Portability
a. Voluntary fund established by the Secretary
of Labor
b.
Individual emplovee records kept
c. Technical assistance provided to help es
tablish private portability and reciprocity
arrangements by the Secretary of Labor
Termination insurance required for all unfunded
vested liabilities
a.
Limited in amount to lesser of 50$ of the
highest 5 year average monthly wage of
participants and $500
b.
Will not cover vested benefits effective
within last 3 years nor benefits :of plans
which terminated within 3 years of effective
date
c. Will not cover employees who own more than
10$ of the company's (employer's) stock
d.
Premiums based on funding status and amount
of unfunded liability (recommended range:

.2$— M )

e.

11.
12.
13.
1^.
15.
16.

Solvent employers liable for all insurance
benefits up to 50$ of net worth
f.
Administered by Department of Labor with
fund in the Treasury
Waiting periods for provisions to take effect
a.
Insurance and portability— 1 year
b.
Vesting and funding--3 years
Increased Disclosure and Fiduciary Responsi
bility standards— penalties applied if employees
are harassed when requesting plan information
Enforced by the Secretary of Labor, who
is
empowered to petition the courts to compel com
pliance
Overfunding-required equitable distribution
of plan assets in the event of termination
of contributory plans
Supersedes state laws
Additional study regarding
a.
Extension of provisions to plans of state
and local governments
b.
Special vesting provisions for high mobility
workers
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Dent Bills
Titles
Employee Benefit Security Act
Bill Numbers
H.R. 2
Sponsorss^ Rep, John Dent and Carl Perkins
Bill Originations
Pension Task Force of the Committee
on Education and Labor
Bill Statuss
Referred to the Committee on Education and
Labor
Major Provisions:
1. Administered by the Department of Labor through
a revision of the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act
2.
Increased Disclosure and Fiduciary Responsibility
standards
3.
Vesting— 10 year full vesting of all accrued
benefits with alternative phase-in options for
existing plans:
a.
50$ vesting after 10 years plus 10$ for
each year thereafter
b.
100$ after 20 years, with service reduced
to 10 years after no longer than 9 years
(effective after 2 years)
Eligibility--later of 2 years service and age
30 ; continuous service defined as all service
with that employer except services
a. Before age 25
b.
When employee refused to contribute
c. Under periods of suspension
5. Funding— 25 year amortization of all vested
unfunded liabilities plus normal costs and
interest on other unfunded liability
Titles
Employee Retirement Benefit Security Act
Bill N u m b e r s H . R . k 6 2
Sponsors:
Rep. John Dent and Rep. Carl Perkins
Bill Originations
Pension Task Force of the Committee on
Education and Labor
Bill Status:
Referred to the Committee on Education and
Labor
Major Provisions:
1. Administered by the Department of Labor through
a revision of the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act
2. Mandatory Portability Program Fund
a. All employers must register with the
Secretary of Labor
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b.

3.

Upon the request of a terminating employee,
employer must transfer to the fund the
present value of vested benefits
c.
Separate employee accounts to be Kept
for each employee
d. Secretary of Labor to provide technical
assistance for the development of reci
procal arrangements
Plan termination insurance required for all
unfunded vested liabilities acquired after
enactment
a.
Premium to be determined by the Secretary
of Labor (not more than .2%>)
b.
Insurance pool fund to be created within
the Treasury department, but administered
by the Secretary of Labor
c. Limitations on amount of individual
benefit*
less of 50 %> of highest 5 year
average monthly wage or $500
d.
Will not cover vested benefits arising in
first 3 years of plan.
e. Solvent employers liable for benefits
paid out by insurance fund
Nixon Administration Proposal

Title*
Retirement Benefits Tax Act
Bill Numbert
H.R. 7157
Sponsors!
Rep. Wilbur Mills for himself and Others
Bill Origination!
White House Pension Task Force,
Department of Labor and the Department of the
Treasury
Bill Statusi
Referred to the House Committee on Ways
and Means
Senate Counterpart!
S. 1631 (Referred to the Senate
Committee on Finance)
Major Provisions!
1.
Vesting— prospective benefits
a.
Employer plans-Rule of 50 (50% vesting
when age plus years of participation in the
plan total 50 , plus 10% vesting for
each year participation thereafter)
b.
3 year waiting period
c.
Eligibility— 30 years of age
d.
Can exclude employees within 5 years
of re
tirement for initial vesting eligibility
determination
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e.

Rule of 35 for persons who own more
than 50 % of a company ( 50 % vested when
age plus service total 35 plus 10%> vesting
for each year of service thereafter)
f. Prospective benefits only for vested benefit
calculation;for plans in effect upon
enactment, only benefits accrued after
January 1, 1973 used in calculation.
Past
service prior to enactment, however,
used to determine whether qualified for
vesting.
Tax deductions
a. Lesser of 20% income or $1,500 for indivi
duals' contributions to a qualified indi
vidual retirement account (QIRA) or private
qualified retirement plan sponsored by
the employer, to be reduced by employer
contributions
b.
Raising of ceiling for tax deductions of
contributions of a self-employed person to
his Keogh (H.R. 10) plan to lesser of
$7500 or 15% of income
Funding— 5%> per year of unfunded vested
liabilities
Eligibility for plan participation— 3 years
service and attainment of age 3 0 , unless within
5 years of retirement (slight deviation for
owner employees)
Lump-sum distribution from a qualified retire
ment plan not taxable to employee if reinvested
in either a qualified employer plan or a
qualified individual retirement account
within 60 days after the close of the employee's
taxable year
An exise tax of 5% (200$ after 90 days) levied
on the amount involved in a prohibited trans
action (e.g., illegal or less-than-arms-length
transaction), payable by persons involved in
that transaction
To be enforced by amending the Internal Revenue
Code to require the above for qualification for
favorable tax treatment

APPENDIX D--Continued
Title:
Employee Benefit Protection Act
Bill Number:
H.R. 6900
Sponsors:
Rep. Erlenborn, Dent, Quie and Others
Bill Origination:
White House Pension Task Force and the
Departments of Labor and the Treasury
Bill Status:
Referred to the Committee on Education and
Labor
Senate Counterpart:
S. 1557 (Referred to the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare)
Major Provisions:
1.
Amendment of the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act to provide increased disclosure
and fiduciary responsibility standards
2.
To be administered by the Secretary of Labor
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APPENDIX E
BILLS BEFORE THE 93d CONGRESS, 1st SESSION

House of Representatives
Bills
H.R. 3^
Sponsor:
Rep. Dingell
Committee Reference!
House Committee on Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of
195^ and the Social Security Act to assist in providing
means for portability of credits under certain private
pension plans, and for other purposes.
Bill!
H.R. 186
Sponsor:
Rep. Edwards
Committee Reference:
Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1.
Minimum eligibility requirements
2.
Vesting— Rule of 50
3.
Allowing deductions for individuals for personal
savings for retirement
4.
Increasing Keogh ceiling
Bill:
H.R. 27^
Sponsor:
Rep. Annunzio
Committee Reference:
Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of
195^ to permit an exemption, in an amount not exceeding
the maximum social security benefit payable in the
taxable year involved, for retirement income received
by a taxpayer under a public retirement system or
under any other system if the taxpayer is at least
65 years of age.
Bill:
H.R. 29^
Sponsor:
Rep. Bennett
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provisions:
1.
Vesting
2. Funding
3.
Insurance of unfunded vested liabilities
4.
Administered by the Department of the Treasury
5 . Fines and criminal prison sentences for violations

2 76

APPENDIX E— Continued
Bills
H.R. 364
Sponsor:
Rep. Carney
Committee Reference s Ways and Means
Major Provisions
To amend the Internal Revenue Code to
allow exemption from income tax the first $5»000 of
pension income.
Bills
H.R. 266
Sponsors
Rep. Carney
Committee References
Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1.
Vesting-10^ after 5 years service plus 10% each
year thereafter
2. 40 year amortization of all unfunded liabilities;
30 year amortization of liabilities created after
enactment
3.
Insurance of the unfunded
4. Voluntary portability of vested rights between; plans
Bills
H.R. 402
Sponsors
Rep. Collier
Committee References
Ways and Means
Major Provisions
To amend the Internal Revenue Code
to allow exemption from income tax the first $3»000
of pension income from any federal retirement plan
Bills
H.R. 404
Sponsor:
Rep. Collier
Committee References
Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
Similar to S. 374
Bills
H.R. 406
Sponsors
Rep. Conte
Committee References
Education and Labor
Major Provisions:
Similar to S. 4
Bills
H.R. 419
Sponsors
Rep. Conte
Committee References
Ways and Means
Major Provisions
To repeal the provisions of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 which limits the capital gains
treatment of pension fund distributions
Bills
H.R. 452
Sponsors
Rep. Delany
Committee References
Ways and Means
Major Provisions
To amend the Internal Revenue Code to
allow exemption from income tax the first $5»000 of
pension income.
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Bills
H.R. 723
Sponsors
Rep. Long (Md.)
Committee References
Education and Labor
Major Provisionss
1. Fiduciary responsibility and disclosure standards
2. Vesting— deferred graded full vesting— 1% after
6 months service plus Vfo each year thereafter, but
100^ vesting must occur after 20 years service
3. Funding— 30 year amortization of unfunded liabilities
4. Insurance of unfunded liabilities
5» Portability— mandatory
6. Central pension agency established
Bills
H.R. 932
Sponsors
Rep. Railsback
Committee References
Ways and Means
Major Provisions
To
amend the Welfare andPension Plans
Disclosure Act
Bills
H.R. 934
Sponsors
Rep. Railsback
Committee References
Ways and Means
Major Provisions
To
amend the Internal Revenue Code to
allow individuals to establish their own pension plans
with tax deductions for contributions
Bills
H.R. 935
Sponsors
Rep. Railsback
Committee References
Ways and Means
Major Provisionss
1. Fiduciary responsibility and disclosure
2. Vesting--10$ per year starting with 6th year
service
3. Funding— 40 year amortization of unfunded liabilities
for plans in existence; 30 years for all pro
spective unfunded liabilities
4. Reinsurance
5. Portability study to be undertaken
6. Central pension agency established
Bills
H.R. 976
Sponsors
Rep. Rondino
Committee References
Education and Labor
Major Provisionss
Similar to S. 4
Bills
H.R. 996
Sponsors
Rep. Roe
Committee References
Education and Labor
Major Provisions
To improve education by increasing the
freedom of the Nation's teachers to change employment
across state lines without substantial loss of retirement
benefits through establishment of a Federal-State program
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Bills
H.R. 1001
Sponsors
Rep. Roe
Committee References
Education and Labor
Major Provisionss
Similar to S. ^
Bills
H.R. 1273
Sponsors
Rep. Whitehurst
Committee References
Ways and Means
Major Provisions
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of
195^ to allow deductions for personal savings for
retirement
Bills
H.R. 1^-3^
Sponsors
Rep. Talcott
Committee References
Ways and Means
Major Provisionss
1.
Minimum eligibility requirements
2. Vesting
3. Allowing deductions for individuals for personal
savings for retirement
Increasing Keogh ceiling
Bills
H.R. 1552
Sponsors
Rep. Helstoski
Committee References
Ways and Means
Major Provisionss
1.
Vesting
2.
Funding
3.
Reinsurance
k.
Portability
5. Establishment of a central pension agency
6,
Increased fiduciary responsibility and disclosure
Bills
H.R. 1682
Sponsors
Rep. Ruppe
Committee References
Ways and Means
Major Provisionss
1.
Disclosure and Fiduciary Responsibility
2. Vesting
3. Funding
4.
Insurance of unfunded liabilities
5.
Portability
6.
Central pension agency established
Bills
H.R. 1826
Sponsors
Rep. Peyser
Committee References
Education and Labor
Major Provisions
To require pension plans to provide op
tional annuities for surviving spouses and certain
vesting rights to employees whose employment is in
voluntarily terminated without cause
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Bill:
H.R. 1988
Sponsor:
Rep. Boland
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provisions:
Similar to S. *1Bill:
H.R. 2079
Sponsor:
Rep. Matsunaga
Committee Reference:
Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
Similar to H.R. 419
Bill:
H.R. 2091
Sponsor:
Rep. Minish
Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provisions:
Similar to S. 4
Bill:
H.R. 2*1-32
Sponsor:
Rep, Smith (R— N.Y.)
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provisions:
House version of S. 4
Bill:
H.R. 2780
Sponsor:
Rep. Biaggi
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provisions:
Same as H.R. 2
Bill:
H.R. 28*1-5
Sponsor:
Rep. Harvey
Committee Reference:
Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1. Vesting
2.
Insurance Corporation established within the
Department of the Treasury
3. Enforced by denial of qualification for favorable
tax treatment
Bill:
H.R. 2836
Sponsor:
Rep. Gaydos
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provisions:
Same as H.R. 2
Bill:
H.R. 2858
Sponsors:
Reps. Perkins, Dent, Annunzio, Ashley, Badillo,
Bingham, Blatnik, Brademas, Brown, Burke, Burton,
Chisholm, Clark, Clay, Dominick, Daniels, Danielson,
Dulski, Hays, Hawkins, Holifield, Kyros, Leggett,
Lehman, McCormack.
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provision:
Revision of the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act; Similar to H.R. 2.
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Bill:
H.R. 2919
Sponsors:
Reps. Thompson, Dent, Mayne, Meeds, Milford*
Mollohan, Moorhead (penn.), Morgan, Moss, Murphy,
Nix, Pepper, Pike, Preyer, Price (111.), Randall,
Rosenthal, Roybal, Sarbanes, Seiberling, Stokes,
Tiernan, WonPat, Yatron
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provisions:
Revision of the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act; Similar to H.R. 2
Bill:
H.R. 2935 and H.R. 2936
Sponsor:
Rep. Wylie
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provision:
Revision of the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act: Similar to H.R. 2
Bill:
H.R. 2973
Sponsors:
Dent, Annunzio, Ashley, Badillo, Bingham,
Brademas, Burton, Clay, Daniels, Danielson, Kyros,
McCormack, Moorhead (Penn.), Moss, Murphey (N.Y.), Pike,
Preyer, Randall, Rosenthal, Stokes, Tiernan, Yatron
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provisions:
Revision of the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act; Similar to H.R. 462
Bill:
H.R. 2996
Sponsor:
Rep. King
Committee Reference:
Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 to increase the maximum dollar limitation on the
amount deductible for pensions for the self-employed
from $ 2,500 a year to $ 7*500 a year
Bill:
H.R. 3112
Sponsor:
Rep. Dellums
Committee Reference:
Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1.
Required employee pension and profit sharing plans
2. Fiduciary responsibility and disclosure
3.
Vesting
4.
Funding
5.
Insurance of unfunded liabilities
6.
Portability
7.
Establishment of a central agency for pension
administration
Bill:
H.R. 3127
Sponsor:
Rep. Gaydos
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provisions:
Revision of the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act; similar to H.R 2
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Bills
H.R. 3306
Sponsors
Rep.
Vander Jagt
Committee References
Education and Labor
Major Provisionss
Revision of the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act
Bills
H.R. 3315
Sponsors
Rep. Vander Jagt
Committee References
Ways and Means
Ma jor Provi s i ons s
1. Fiduciary responsibility and disclosure standards
2. Vesting
3.
Insurance corporation established within the
Department of the Treasury to insure unfunded
liabilities
4-. Enforced by adding above provisions to rules to
requirements for qualification in the Internal
Revenue Code
Bills
H.R. 34-50
Sponsors
Rep. Lent
Committee References
Education and Labor
Major Provisionss
Increased fiduciary responsibility and
disclosure; similar to S. 4Bills
H.R. 3784Sponsors
Rep. Brown (Ohio)
Committee References
Education and Labor
Major Provisionss
Revision of the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act; similar to H.R. 2
Bills
H.R. 3883 and H.R. 3884Sponsors
Rep, Charles H. Wilson (Calif.)
Committee References
Education and Labor
Major Provisionss
Revision of the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act; Similar to H.R. 2
Bills
H.R. ^351
Sponsors
Rep. Broyhill
Committee References
Ways
and Means
Major Provisions
To amend
the Internal Revenue Code
liberalize the retirement income credit

to

Bills
H.R. 4-357
Sponsors
Rep. Byron
Committee References
Ways
and Means
Major Provisions
To amend
the Internal Revenue Code to
provide a $5,000 exemption from income tax of pension
benefits
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Bill:
H.R. 4-604Sponsor:
Rep. Blatnik
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provisions':
1. Vesting— graduated schedule with 100$ after 10
years service, to be distributed no later than
age 65
2. Funding
3. Fiduciary responsibility and disclosure
Bill:
H.R. 4-902
Sponsor:
Rep, Bingham
Committee Reference:
Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
To amend the Internal Revenue Code to
provide a $5»000 exemption from income tax of pension
benefits
Bill:
H.R. 4-924Sponsors: Reps. Dent and Perkins
Committee Reference: Education and Labor
Major Provision:
To improve education by increasing the
freedom of the Nation's teachers to change employment
across State lines without substantial loss of retire
ment benefits through establishment of a Federal-State
program
Bill:
H.R. 5117
Sponsor:
Rep. Burke (Mass.)
Committee Reference:
Ways and Means
Major Provision:
To amend the Internal Revenud Code to
provide a $5*000 exemption from income tax of pension
benefits if the taxpayer is 65 or older.
Bill:
H.R. 513^
Sponsor:
Rep. Hanrahan
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provision:
Increased fiduciary responsibility and
disclosure; similar to S. 4Bill:
H.R. 5260
Sponsor:
Rep. Waggonner
Committee Reference:
Committee on Education and Labor
Major Provision:
To provide that the terms of pension
plans which call for different retirement ages for
men and women shall be unlawful
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Bill:
H.R. 5318
Sponsor:
Rep. Broomfield
Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1. Fiduciary Responsibility and Disclosure
2.
Vesting
3. Funding
k.
Reinsurance
5.
Portability
6.
Establish a central pension agency
Bill:
H.R. 5386
Sponsor:
Rep. Annunzio
Committee Reference:
Banking and Currency
Major Provisions:
To amend Title III of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act to disallow the garnishment of
pension or retirement funds
Bill:
H.R. 5^37 and H.R. 5^38
Sponsor:
Rep. St. Germain
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provisions:
Revision of the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Acts; similar to H.R. 2
Bill:
H.R. 5502
Sponsor:
Rep. Forsythe
Committee Reference:
Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
To amend the Internal Revenue Code to
provide a $5»000 exemption from income tax of pension
benefits if the taxpayer is 65 or older
Bill:
H.R. 6613
Sponsor:
Rep. Rooney
Committee Reference: Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
1.
Minimum standards for eligibility
2.
Vesting
3 . Deductions for personal savings
4.
Raising Keogh ceilings
Bill:
H.R. 67^2
Sponsor:
Rep, Roe
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provisions:
To strengthen and improve the protections
and interests of participants and beneficiaries of
employee pension and welfare benefit plans
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Bills
H.R. 7325
Sponsor:
Rep. Reid
Committee Reference:
Ways and Means
Major Reference:
A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 to permit an exemption of the first $5*000
of retirement income received by a taxpayer under a
public retirement system or any other system if the
taxpayer is at least 65 years of age.
Bill:
H.R. 7346
Sponsor:
Rep. Rinaldo
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provisions:
A bill to improve education by increasing
the freedom of the Nation's teachers to change em
ployment across state lines without substantial
loss of retirement benefits through establishment of
a Federal-State program
Bill:
H.R. 7359
Sponsor:
Rep. Tiernan
Committee Reference:
Ways and Means
Major Provisions:
Same as H.R. 7325
Bill:
H.R. 7672
Sponsor:
Talcott
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provisions:
1. Minimum standards for participation
2.
Vesting
3.
Deductions to individuals for personal savings for
retirement plans
4.
Increased contribution limitations for self-employed
individuals and shareholder-employees of electing
small business corporations.
Bill:
H.R. 7746
Sponsor:
Rep. Conyers
Committee Reference:
Education and Labor
Major Provisions:
A bill to strengthen and improve the
protections and interests of participants and bene
ficiaries of employee pension and welfare benefit plans.
Senate
Bill:
S. 75
Sponsor:
Sen. Griffin
Committee Reference:
Labor and Public Welfare and Finance
Major Provisions:
1.
10 year vesting; retrospective
2.
Insurance of all unfunded liabilities (employer
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responsibility established if termination voluntary)
Covers all plans with 15 or more participants
b,
Amendment of bankruptcy laws to give pensions same
priority status as wages
5. Disclosure and fiduciary responsibility
6. Funding
7.
Enforcement by employees bringing suit in federal
courts
8. Administered by Secretary of the Treasury
3.

Bill:
S. 213
Sponsor:
Sen. Stevens
Committee Reference:
Finance
Major Provision:
Extension of Keogh plan tax benefits to
any individual (except self-employed persons or members
of an employer plan)
Bill:
S. 3 7 b
Sponsors:
Curtis, Fannin, hansen, Bennett, Dominick
Committee Reference:
Finance
Major Provisions:
(Same as S. 3012 and H.R. 12272 in
92d Congress)
1.
Rule of 50 vesting
2.
Individuals allowed to deduct contributions to
their own qualified individual retirement accounts
3.
Self-employed deduction ceiling to be raised
Bill:
S. 1129
Sponsor:
Sen. Ribicoff
Committee Reference:
Finance
Major Provisions:
To amend the Internal Revenue Code to
increase the credit against tax for retirement income
Bill:
S. 1179
Sponsor:
Sen. Bentson
Committee Reference:
Finance
Major Provisions:’
1. Vesting— 25% after 5 years plus 5% per year
thereafter (100^ after 20 years)
2. Funding— amortization of unfunded over 30 years
3.
Insurance of unfunded liabilities by a non
profit chartered corporation
Eligibility— later of age 30 or 1 year service
5. Voluntary portability
6.
Individuals to receive a tax credit for their
contributions to own or employer plan (lesser of
$375 or 25 % of contributions reduced by employer
contributions)
7.
Enforced by adding above requirements to Internal
Revenue Code for favorable tax treatment
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Bill:
S. 1423
Sponsors:
Sens. Williams and Javits
Committee Reference:
Labor and Public Welfare
Major Provision:
To amend the Labor Management Relations
Act, 1947» to permit employer contributions to jointly
administered trust funds established by labor organi
zations to defray costs of legal services.
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Accrued Benefit Cost Method (Also called Unit Credit)--An
actuarial cost method under which the pension costs
are based directly upon benefits accrued to the date
of cost determination.
This cost method is charac
terized by increasing annual costs due to the employee's
advancing age.
Accrued Future Service— Service from the later of the
effective date and the employee's date of entry to
the present.
Accrued Liability— Actuarial accumulation of a plan's past
normal cost under a given actuarial cost method.
Actuarial Accumulation— As distinguished from a simple
accumulation of past normal cost and interest earnings,
for it includes other positive as well as negative
yearly adjustments, the values of which depend on
the particular cost method being used and mortality,
turnover and salary experience.
Actuarially Sound— >A pension program in which future as
well as current costs are recognized and where pro
vision has been made to meet these costs over a
reasonable period of time, as determined in the
actuarial valuation.
Actuarial Assumptions— Mortality, interest, retirement
rate, disability rate, withdrawal rate, new entrant
rate, salary scales, marital status, expense loading.
Actuarial Cost Method— A particular technique for estab
lishing the amount and incidence of the cost of pension
plan benefits and the related accrued liability.
Actuarial Equivalent— An alternate benefit in which what is
gained is equal to what is given up.
Actuarial Gain (Loss)— Where the actual experience under
the plan is more (less) favorable than the actuary's
estimate.
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Actuarial Present Value (Present Value)— Current worth
of payments payable or receivable in the future; where
each such amount is discounted at an assumed rate of
interest and adjusted for the probability of its
payment or receipt.
Advance Funding— Any arrangement under which sums intended
for the payment of retirement benefits are set aside
under proper legal safeguards prior to the date of
the actual retirement.
Aggregate Level Cost Method— See projected Benefit Cost
Methods.
Allocated Funding Instrument-1 Contributions are allocated
to provide the benefits of specific employees.
Benefit Security Ratio (BSR)— Assets divided by cost of
accrued benefits.
Career Average Plan— Benefit designated as a certain
percentage of annual salary: for each year of service;
e.g., 2% of annual salary for each year of service.
The actual level of salary earned is thus reflected
in the retirement benefit.
Clearinghouse— A federal, private, or quasi-private
agency which would act as a depository for the assets
supporting the pension credits of a terminating employee
The assets may be transferred to a succeeding employer
or remain on deposit at the clearinghouse until the
employee's retirement.
In the latter case, the
clearinghouse could serve as a private pension plan
by administering retirement benefits of employees
whose assets were never transferred out.
Conditional Vesting— Vested rights allowed to be exercised
only under certain circumstances; e.g., withdrawal.
Consideration— Payment made into the unallocated fund.
Constructive Receipt— When pension funds are transferred
from one fund to another, the funds may pass through
the hands of the employee (e.g., if there is a delay in
transfer while the terminated employee seeks succeeding
employment).
Since the funds are said to be con
structively received, the funds are taxed as income.
Contributorv-"Premium paid or consideration made by both
employee and employer.
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Conventional Plan— A plan which provides benefits that
vary both with years of service and with rates of
compensation and which is not one of the pattern
type.
Practically all of the plans adopted prior
to 1950 were of the conventional type.
Deferred Annuity— An annuity which becomes payable at a
specified age; usually the normal retirement age.
Deferred Full Vesting— Rights to pension credits deferred
until all requirements are met (e.g., 10 years service).
Deferred Graded Vesting— A given percentage of the accrued
benefit to be vested after a required period of
service, that percentage to be increased for each
additional year of service.
The usual goal is full
vesting after a period of service, but interim service
assures only partial or graded vesting.
Deferred Wage Theory— Pension contributions viewed as a
form of wages earned by the employee.
Benefit
from this form of compensation is deferred until the
employee retires.
Defined Benefit Formula— Annuity determined by formula with
benefit cost variable.
Defined Contribution Formula— See Money Purchase.
Disclosure (As a Pension Reform Issue)— Adequately in
forming employees about pension benefits as well as
the circumstances under which employees would be dis
qualified for coverage; may also refer to increased
reporting to the Labor Department or the Treasury
Department of fund assets, investment, funding
schedules, etc.
Economic Growth, Participation in (Referring to pension
P lans)— Pension assets credited with more than .just
the minimal interest guaranteed in the actuarial
assumptions used to calculate the transfer values.
Effective Date— Date on which a pension plan takes effect;
i.e., plan begins.
Eligibility— Provision which determines the earliest
entry date of an employee in a plan.
Several
conventional and most pattern plans cover an employee
automatically from his employment date, and such
plans are said to have no eligibility requirements.
In plans that have eligibility requirements the date
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is important since it usually marks the time from
which an employee (a) starts accruing benefits, (b)
starts accumulating credited service to be applied
for vesting, early retirement and other provisions,
and (c) commencss contributions, if the plan is
contributory.
Entry Age Normal Funding Method— See Projected Benefit
Cost Method.
Fiduciary Responsibility— Setting of standards for persons
having control over the disposition of pension funds
including investment practices, rules of conduct,
degree of personal liability and regularity of
outside audits.
Final Agerage Salary Plan— Benefit designated as a certain
percentage of final average salary, which is the average
of salary earned the last few years of service;e .g . ,
50rfo of the average of the last five year*s salary
earned.
Flat Benefit Formula— Benefit designated as a fixed amount
per month or year beginning at normal retirement age.
Flat Unit Benefit Formula— Benefit formula which adds
a flat unit of pension benefit for each year of
credited service.
Full funding— If plan is terminated, all benefits for
credited service (including past service) to date of
termination could be provided; i.e., accrued liabilities
could be liquidated in full without further contributions.
Funded Ratio— Assets divided by supplemental cost.
Funding— Completed when the value of the assets is equal
to the amount of the liabilities.
Funding Forgiveness— Occurs in nonvested plans when turn
over is anticipated actuarially to reduce costs in
the fundipg of benefits.
Future Service— Service subsequent to the inception of
the pension plan.
Grandfather Rights— Any plan which is in existence when
the bill is enacted may retain any eligibility require
ments for vesting which it may already have.
Liberal
ization of the plan to meet specifications may be re
quired as late as e.g., 10 years from bill inception.
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Guaranty Fund— Some type of cooperative arrangement that
would assure the fulfillment of legitimate benefit
expectations under private pension plans irrespective
of the financial status of the plans or their
sponsors.
H.R. 10 Plans— See Keogh Plans.
Immediate Full Vesting— 100% vesting of benefits as they
are accrued by the plan participant.
Incentive Legislation— Regulation of pension reform by
adding additional standards to the requirements for
qualification for favorable tax treatment.
Individual Level Cost Method— See Projected Benefit Cost
Method.
Initial Past Service Liability— (Also Called the Supplemental Liability)— Amount which would be required
to pay for all past service credits at the inception
of the plan.
Insured Deferred Annuity— Current purchase from an insur
ance company of guaranteed periodic, usually monthly,
income payments beginning at retirement, continuing
until annuitant's death.
Insured Plans— Annual premiums are paid to an insurance
company under an agreement, policy or contract which
prescribes the rights under the plan, especially eligi
bility for benefits, benefit amounts, plan termination
and premiums and other charges.
In the event of
termination, the employer has no obligation to the
insurer to make additional payments.
Annuities are
purchased on behalf of concerned eligible participants
The insurer, then, has the legal obligation to pay
specified benefits as they fall due.
Integration— A plan is said to integrate, by the Treasury
Department's standards, if the combined benefits under
Social Security and the private plan for higher com
pensated employees do not constitute a higher percen
tage of compensation than for those bf the lower
compensated employees.
Keogh Plans (or H.R. 10 Plans)— Pension plans established
by self-employed persons for themselves and employees
(who have been employed at least three years).
Con
tributions for self-employed person's benefit are
deductible for federal income tax purposes up to
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less of 10^ of earned income or $2,500
Liability— Benefit obligation determined under the benefit
formula applicable based usually on the amount of
service rendered by participants up to the date of
valuation of the assets.
Locking-in— Requirement that vested benefits be barred
from being cashed in by a withdrawing employee.
The
benefit would be obtainable only in the form of a
retirement pension except in the case of death or
permanent disability.
Modified Cash Refund Annuity Benefit— Life annuity with
a preretirement death benefit of employee contribu
tions with interest and a post retirement death
benefit of employee contributions less any annuity
payments.
Money Purchase— Amount of annuity is calculated, given
a certain amount of premium; defined contribution
plan.
In such a plan, the fixed commitment is usually
expressed as a specified percentage of the compen
sation of covered employees.
Multiemployer Plan— Two or more employers (often financially
unrelated) act as one employer for pension plan
purposes; i.e., one master pension plan serves several
employers.
Noncontributorv— Premium paid or consideration made by
employer only.
Noninsured Plans— Trusteed plans dedicated to providing
employee retirement benefits.
Typically, banks serve
as the trust agent, but other outside trustees may
administer the plan.
Normal Costs— Annual premium or consideration; yearly cost
assigned to a pension plan.
Normal Retirement Age (NRA)— Contractual age on the date
the employee is expected to retire from active service
and receive a full accrued pension.
One-in-Nine-Theory— Under this theory, only one employee
m nine who comes under pension plan will ever have a
benefit.
Statements to a similar effect were recently
made by Senators Williams and Javits in connection
with the preliminary survey results released by
their Committee.
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Past Service— Credited service prior to effective date
of plan; i.e., the inception of the plan.
Pattern Plan— Developed as a result of the establishment
of the principle in 19^9 that pensions are subject to
bargaining.
The pattern plan refers to a form of
plan which has been adopted by certain of the inter
national unions and which has been negotiated with
minor variations, with individual companies or
groups of companies.
Pay-as-You-Go Funding— Retirement benefits are treated
as payroll costs and are paid directly to retirees
by employer as the benefits fall due.
Penalty Legislation— Regulation by the Labor Department
(or any agency other than the Department of the
Treasury) which is enforced through the federal
judicial system.
Pension Preservation— Maintenance of vested pension
benefits or as the prevention of loss of accrued
benefits? may or may not involve a fund transfer
upon employee termination.
Where the benefits are
preserved is considered to be irrelevant by proponents
of this concept.
Portability— The right of a terminating employee to trans
fer the assets supporting his pension credits to a
succeeding pension plan.
Postretirement Death Benefit— Payments to a beneficiary
upon the death of a pensioner, at least amounting
to the excess of the decedent’s contributions with
interest over the aggregate pension payments he
had received.
Preretirement Death Benefit— Death benefit payable to
beneficiary if employee dies in the preretirement
period, at least amounting to employee contributions
with interest.
Projected Benefit Cost Method— An actuarial cost method
under which the pension costs are based upon total
prospective benefits at the employee's entry age into
the plan.
Costs are usually spread evenly over the
working career of the employee, so that annual costs
are level, unless the benefit formula changes.
If
the cost is calculated for each individual employee
(or similarly estimated by some group method) and the
normal cost is the sum of the individual costs, then
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the projected benefit method is said to be an indivi
dual level cost (or entry age normal) method.
If,
however, there is no individual calculation, but
rather normal cost accruals are calculated for the
plan as a whole, then the projected cost method is
said to be an aggregate level cost method.
Promissory Estoppel, Theory of (As related to Private
Pensions)— The concept that justifiable expectations
cannot be denied if the employee under question acted
upon those expectations.
Prudent Man Rule— Trustee or any person involved with the
investment of pension funds, investing with such care
and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would in
dealing with his own property.
Qualified Pension Plan— A pension plan is accorded a
"qualified" status when certain standards of contract
formality, permanence, nondiscrimination and benefit
determination are met.
The purpose of "qualification"
is to allow an employer to deduct pension contributions
within specified limits as ordinary business expenses
for federal income tax purposes.
Qualified Individual Retirement Account (QIRA)— The
accounts designated:'m the Nixon Administration bill,
to which individual or employer contributions are
deductible.
Reciprocal Agreement (Reciprocity)— An arrangement between
nonuhiform plans by which employees are allowed to
move from one plan to another without losing pension
credits.
The contractual arrangement determines
whether or not funds actually are transferred.
Alter
natively, the transfer may be delayed.
The benefit
formula for the pension credit transfer is also
subject to the terms of the reciprocal agreement.
Self-Administered Plan— Pension plan funded and administered
by the employer; these plans are generally of the trust
form, often using employed or consulting actuaries to
ensure financial soundness.
Split-Funding— At the time of employee retirement,
purchase an insured annuity for the employee.

trustees

Supplemental Cost— See Initial Past Service Liability.
Tapered Benefit Formula— Reduced benefits allowed for
earlier retirement; the earlier the retirement, the
lower the benefit level.
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Terminal Funding— Benefits payable to retired employees are
funded in full, while no provision is made for benefits
standing to the credit of the active employees.
Such
funding can be accomplished through the purchase of an
immediate annuity in the appropriate amount for each
employee as he reaches retirement or by the transfer to
a trust company of a principal sum actuarially esti
mated to be sufficient to provide the promised bene
fits.
Under this procedure, the past service liability
is never liquidated and active employees are completely
dependent on the willingness and financial ability of
the employer to provide the benefits credited under
the plan.
Trust— Contributions are normally turned over to a trust
company which invests the funds and pays benefits in
accordance with the pension plan which is made a part
of the trust indenture.
The trust company assumes
no obligation under the plan other than that of investing
the funds in a reasonable and prudent manner.
It
provides no guarantees with respect to preservation
of principal or rate of investment earnings.
If the
sums in the trust fund should prove inadequate to meet
the commitments under the plan, the deficiency would
have to be made up by the employer, if at all.
Actuarial
services are normally provided by an independent
actuary.
Unallocated Funding Instrument— Contributions made to a
pooled fund with no funds earmarked for any parti
cular employees.
Unfunded— No assets exist to support the liabilities
created by the benefit promise.
An unfunded liability
usually is created when a plan is initiated or when
the existing plan is expanded to allow for past
service benefits or improvement in those benefits.
To
maintain a qualified status for federal income tax
purposes, the interest on the unfunded must be paid
annually.
Vested Benefit Security Ratio
cost of vested benefits.

(VBSR)— Assets divided by

Vesting— The right of an employee to the pension benefit
attributable to his employer's contributions under a
pension plan in the event of his termination of
employment prior to retirement.
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